


Religions
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in Today's
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中國宗教評論



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Editorial to the first issue

With this first issue of *Religions & Christianity in Today's China* (中國宗教評論) the China-Zentrum presents a new e-journal. Like the German language journal of the China-Zentrum, *China heute. Informationen über Religion und Christentum im chinesischen Raum*, now in its 30th year, it will be published four times a year. The new English language publication has been initiated within the context of a further “internationalization” of the China-Zentrum (China Center), located in Sankt Augustin, Germany, with Catholic member organizations in several European countries.

Already for a number of years we have been requested from many sides to provide parts of *China heute* with its analyses also in English. *Religions & Christianity in Today's China* will thus contain English translations of main articles published in *China heute* as well as original contributions on relevant topics. The new journal furthermore functions as a kind of continuation of *European Ecumenical China Communication* which has been published in the China-Zentrum since 1992, comprising documentation of various European Ecumenical and Catholic China meetings and conferences.

The first issue of *Religions & Christianity in Today's China* has its focus on the 8th European Catholic China Colloquium which was held in Freising in September 2010, on the topic “Chinese in Europe – Trends and Catholic Perspectives.” More keynote lectures of this Colloquium will be published in the next issues. In addition, this issue includes News Updates and Statistics which give an insight into recent events and general trends with regard to religions and especially Christianity in today's China.

Religions & Christianity in Today's China is freely available on the website of the China-Zentrum, www.china-zentrum.de. Additionally, readers who subscribe to *Religions & Christianity in Today's China* will regularly receive e-mail updates providing web links to the contents of each newly published issue.

We hope that the journal catches your attention and that you will participate with us in this new endeavor. The China-Zentrum is a non-profit organization. For the publication of *Religions & Christianity in Today's China* we are dependent on the generosity of our friends and readers. In order to help us cover inevitable costs, we would be very grateful if you could consider sending in a voluntary contribution.

Sankt Augustin, July 2011

The Editors

News Update on Religion and Church in China January 1 – June 8, 2011

Compiled by Katharina Wenzel-Teuber

Translated by David Streit

January 1, 2011:

Taiwan: temple and church bells mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the State

At precisely 10.00 a.m. on New Year's Day, 1,752 Buddhist temples and more than a hundred Catholic churches throughout Taiwan sounded their temple bells and drums and their church bells in honor of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. For those churches that didn't have their own bell, the Catholic Bishops' Conference provided recordings of ringing church bells. On the Protestant side, a number of congregations invited others to common worship services to mark the occasion. The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior had called upon all religions to offer public prayers of blessing for Taiwan.

An uprising in Wuchang on October 10, 1911 unleashed the Xinhai Revolution, which toppled the Emperor's rule and led to the founding of the Republic of China on December 1, 1912. The People's Republic of China is also celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution as well as the 90th anniversary of the founding of China's Communist Party (*UCAN* Dec. 31, 2010; see also entry of May 30, 2011).

January 8–15, 2011:

Official religious delegation from mainland China visits Taiwan

The ten religious representatives belonged to the China Committee on Religion and Peace which is under the Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and is affiliated with the World Conference "Religions for Peace." Dao Shuren, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Daoist Association, led the delegation, in which Liu Yuanlong, Secretary General of the Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic Church, also took part. The group had meetings with, among others, Archbishop Hong Shanchuan SVD of Taipei and Cardinal Shan Guoxi SJ, Bishop Emeritus of Gaoxiong. Liu invited the 89 year old Cardinal to take part in a visit to mainland China scheduled for June of 2011. Back in September of 2010, one mainland religious delegation had already visited Taiwan under the leadership of Wang Zuo'an, Director of the State Administration [Bureau] for Religious Affairs (*UCAN* Jan. 12 and 14; March 16, 2011; see also entry of beginning of June, 2011).

January 10, 2011:

The Pope addresses the diplomatic corps on freedom of religion and China

On the occasion of the New Year reception of members of the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, in his address on religious freedom around the world, Pope Benedict XVI spoke, among other things, about countries with a “legal or social order [that] is inspired by philosophical and political systems which call for strict control ... of the state over society.” Subsequently, he alluded to Catholics in mainland China who are “experiencing a time of difficulty and trial” (www.vatican.va).

January 11, 2011:

A 7.9 meter high statue of Confucius has been unveiled in Tian'anmen Square in Beijing

The statue, created by artist Wu Weishan, was erected on a 1.6 meter high marble pedestal in front of the North entrance of the newly renovated National Museum on the East side of the square. From this vantage point, Confucius gazes on the slightly smaller (6 x 4.6 meter) portrait of Mao over the Gate of Heavenly Peace. The erection of this Confucius statue in this central square of the capital which is so rich in history, is seen by commentators as part of the contribution of the official re-evaluation and revival of Confucius and his teaching to the strengthening of China's “soft power.” Over the last five years alone, on the initiative of the Chinese government, 322 Confucius Institutes have been set up in 96 countries. These institutes are part of efforts to spread Chinese language and culture and are intended to help form a positive image of China abroad. The goal is to establish 1,000 Confucius Institutes worldwide by the year 2020.

It was with the student protests in Tian'anmen Square in 1919 that the “May Fourth Movement” began, which among other things called for the tearing down of the “Confucius shop.” Confucius and his teaching were also attacked in the first years of the People's Republic and particularly violently during the years of the “Cultural Revolution” (*SCMP* Jan. 12; *Die Welt* Jan. 13; see also entry of April 22, 2011).

January 13, 2011:

Regional Major Seminary of Hebei announces new leadership

The new rector is Bishop Feng Xinmao of Hengshui (Jingxian, Hebei). He will be replacing Bishop Ma Yinglin (not recognized by Rome). Bishop Fang Jianping of Tangshan and the priest Sun Jigen of the Diocese of Handan have been named chairman and secretary respectively of the seminary's executive board. *Asianews* reports that the seminarians have welcomed the appointment of Bishop Feng as rector. In November/December of 2010 they had gone on strike because the Hebei provincial government Bureau for Ethnic and Religious Affairs had named one of its own department heads as vice-rector. On December 4, 2010, the provincial government rescinded this appointment. The Hebei Regional Major Seminary currently has 116 students (*Asianews* Jan. 15; *Xinde* Feb. 1).

January 13, 2011:

Underground priest in Hebei taken away by security officials

According to local sources of *UCAN* ten men forcibly removed 40 year old Peter Zhang Guangjun (Diocese of Xuanhua, Hebei Province) who was dragged away from the home of a Catholic family – without even shoes or a coat. Days later he was still unaccounted for. Church sources surmise that this action on the part of the security forces is intended to “convince” him to support the official Church and the government (*UCAN* Jan. 19; see also entries of April 8 and April 13, 2011).

January 24, 2011:

State Administration for Religions Affairs presents the main focus of its working plan for 2011

For Buddhism and Daoism, the plan gives instructions for dialogue and exchange about content and orientation under the covering theme of “tranquility, harmony.” For the Catholic Church, the plan is for “education in the principles of independence and autonomy” and “guidance to furthering self-selection and self-consecration of bishops.” For the Protestants, the plan proposes promoting the normal order of activities. The faithful are to be instructed to change over from private worship meetings to registered churches and meeting points. As for Muslims, the plan proposes strengthened support for the Hajj work of the Islamic Association. Individual pilgrimages to Mecca are to be completely eliminated. Further elements of the plan are intensification of religious exchanges with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, a tightening of controls (*guanli*) of the collective religious activities of foreigners in China, and lastly defense against infiltration by foreign powers. The State Administration for Religious Affairs published its working plan on its website (www.sara.gov.cn; vgl. *Xinhua* Jan. 24).

January 26, 2011:

Communist Party Chief Zhang Qingli: Tibet is more complicated than Xinjiang

Of all the provinces and regions of China, the Autonomous Region of Tibet has not only the harshest natural conditions but also the most complex societal conditions, said Zhang Qingli in an interview with *China Daily*. He continued that there are parallels to the Autonomous Uigur Region of Xinjiang, but there are also differences. Ethnically, Tibet is more uniform. According to Zhang, there are more than 20,000 mosques in Xinjiang, but only 8,000 Imams; Tibet, on the other hand, has less than 1,800 monasteries but there are 46,000 monks. The largest separatist force in Xinjiang, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, has been categorized by the UN as terrorist, and as such, the authorities are free to combat it, whereas a Tibetan separatist movement such as the Tibetan Youth Congress is not yet been labeled terrorist, Zhang argued. – Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Autonomous Region of Tibet since 2006, previously held official positions in Xinjiang (*China Daily* Jan. 26; *TibetInfoNet News Digest* Jan. 15–28).

January 27, 2011:

Mainland Chinese philanthropist launches charitable tour in Taiwan

Well known for his publicity-packed charitable operations, mainland billionaire Chen Guangbiao announced that he would give away approximately 500 million NT\$ (12,000,000 Euro) during the course of his fifth charitable tour of Taiwan. In Hsinchu alone, in the auditorium of the local government building, accompanied by a flock of business people and journalists, Chen gave away 6.7 million NT\$ (c. 160,000 Euro) to the local Women's Association, to social service organizations and to 315 needy families. Each of the "red envelopes" contained 10,000 NT\$ (240 Euro) in cash. Chen set aside a further 65,000 Euro to finance school meals for poor school children. His tour of Taiwan has been accompanied by criticism. A representative of the Council for Mainland Affairs explained that the Taiwanese government is unable to interfere since Chen is not breaking any laws. The underprivileged are the ones who will have to decide whether or not taking Chen's money offends their dignity, he said (*Central News Agency website* Jan. 27).

January 28, 2011:

"Joint Declaration on Fostering Harmony among Religions"

Published as an action of the official press organs of Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism, the declaration is intended to be a joint contribution to the "Interfaith Harmony Week" which – following upon a 2010 resolution of the UN General Assembly – is to take place annually in the first week of February. In five points, the declaration calls for love of country and of religion; adherence to the leadership of the Party; efforts toward equal opportunities, tolerance, and greater exchange among religions; combating misuse of religion, as well as struggle against terrorism, separatism, extremism and inhuman cults; adherence to the principles of independence. It also calls for positive contributions of the religions to social welfare, to economy, and to the protection of nature.

In a circular letter, the leadership boards of the official Catholic Church have called on dioceses to take part in this "Harmony Week." Bishop Li Shan opened the week in Beijing on February 27 with a Mass. However, many other dioceses have been hesitant in their response to the initiative. According to one Catholic source, they consider this event "arranged by the government" as simply "too political" (*People's Daily Online* Jan. 28; *Renmin ribao* according to *fjnet.com* Jan. 29; *UCAN* March 11).

January 30, 2011:

United Front representative denies that the Karmapa Lama is a Chinese spy

According to reports, cash in various currencies (including Chinese RMB) amounting to more than US\$ 1,000,000 has been discovered in the Gyuto Monastery in Dharamshala, residence in exile of the 17th Karmapa Lama, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, who fled from China to India in 1999. The suspicion began to be bandied about in the Indian media that the Karmapa Lama was a Chinese spy. In repeated press releases on its website, the public relations office of the Karmapa Lama vigorously denied any contact with the Chinese authorities. The money found came from freewill contributions by supporters from various countries, the office said. The Tibetan government-in-exile expressed its solidarity. Xu Zhitao, representative of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, also denied that

the Chinese government was attempting to use the 17th Karmapa Lama to control the monasteries along the Chinese-Indian border. Such accusations are simply a sign of Indian mistrust of China, he said. Even as allegations of connections to China were being rebutted, Indian authorities were apparently conducting further investigations into alleged irregularities involving foreign exchange regulations (*Global Times* [online] Jan. 31; *India Today* [online] Jan. 28; *Taz* [online] March 11; www.guardian.co.uk Jan. 31; Feb. 10; www.sify.com Feb. 24; www.voanews.com Jan. 31; Statements of the Office of the 17th Karmapa Lama can be found at www.kagyuoffice.org/OfficialStatements.php).

February 2011:

Rising inflation is having an impact on the Church's budget

The official news agency *Xinhua* spoke of concerns with regard to China's persistent inflation. In February, the Consumer Price Index rose by 4.9%, while the Manufacturers' Price Index went up by 7.9%. Further increases were expected in March. According to *UCAN*, this difficult situation also has an impact on the finances of parishes as well as on church sponsored charitable activities. Wang Ting of the Catholic Social Services Center of the Diocese of Xi'an said that the situation is causing problems in project work since the budget drawn up last year is no longer sufficient due to the rising costs (*UCAN* Jan. 26; *Xinhua* March 27).

February 3, 2011:

Chinese New Year

In China the "Year of the Rabbit" kicks off with the traditional Spring Festival.

February 6, 2011:

Newspaper report: 2010 saw far more divorces than weddings in China

The Chinese newspaper *Fazhi wanbao*, referring to statistics of the Ministry for Civil Affairs, announced that in all of China during the year 2010 there were 1,960,000 divorces registered as opposed to only 1,200,000 weddings. Reasons given to explain this dramatic rise in separations were the 2003 simplification of the divorce laws, the separation of families due to job related internal migration, and greater financial independence for both men and women.

February 7, 2011:

Fire damages thousand year old Fahai Temple in Fuzhou

The conflagration destroyed the main hall of the temple in Fuzhou (Fujian Province). Many Buddha statues were damaged. The temple, founded in the year 945, is also the headquarters of the Buddhist Association of Fujian Province and houses a large number of ancient and very valuable Buddhist scriptures which a report says seem to have survived the blaze. Following the fire, the State Administration for Religious Affairs sent out to all of its branch offices a call for renewed fire protection (*UCAN* Feb. 17; *Xinhua* Feb. 7; english.cntv.cn Feb. 9).

February 7, 2011:

Diocese of Handan: Special Masses offered for departing migrant workers

In the parish of Quzhou in the Diocese of Handan (Hebei Province) a special Mass was celebrated for those members of the parish who were about to set out for other parts of the country in search of work. As the pastor, Fr. Xu Shuwen, reported, departing parishioners were urged to come to the parish to ask for letters of recommendation and were advised to go immediately to the nearest Catholic church upon reaching their destination. They were encouraged to remember to celebrate the four greatest holy days of the year by attending Mass, and to ask for a dispensation from the local pastor if they were not able to be present at Mass on Sunday due to the demands of their jobs. According to Fr. Xu, in many parishes of the target locations to which the migrants are heading outreach to Catholic migrant workers is dear to the hearts of pastors, but, unfortunately, not all pastors have the same zeal. Since 2008 Fr. Xu's parish has been running special programs for its migrating parishioners who make up about 10% of the parish's 10,000 members, with that percentage increasing each year. Job centered migration from the countryside to the cities is an immense challenge to the Catholic Church in China since migrating Catholics frequently lose their contact with the Church in the process (*Xinde* March 10).

February 10, 2011:

Former leader of the Seventh Day Adventists in China dies at 93

Pastor David Lin died in Loma Linda, California, at the age of 93. Until 1950 he served in Shanghai as the Secretary (Director) of the Seventh Day Adventists in China. In 1958 he was placed under house arrest due to "counterrevolutionary activities," and in 1960 he was sentenced to 17 years in prison. In 1983 he once again took up his duties as pastor in Shanghai. After 1991 he and his wife moved to California. In 1949 there were 21,168 baptized adult Adventists in China. Today their number has reached almost 400,000 faithful, according to a report released by the *Adventistischer Pressedienst* (March 11).

February 14, 2011:

Xinhua: New directives for building up spiritual civilization in the countryside

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council have issued a document titled: "Opinions on the further strengthening and development of the spiritual civilization in the countryside in the new situation." In addition to strengthening the core social values, numerous other questions are addressed such as the building up of infrastructure, health care, protection of the environment, ethical behavior, etc. The document also challenges people to struggle against "feudal superstition, pornography, gambling, drugs, and illegal religious activities" according to the law. Wedding and funeral practices should be carefully guided and in the process scientific and modern forms should be encouraged. On the other hand, the document calls for sticking to the traditional holidays and festivals which are sanctioned by folk tradition. Doing so will help to build up the outstanding cultural heritage of the Chinese nation, the document says (*Xinhua* Feb. 14).

February 17, 2011:

Bishop Augustinus Hu Daguo of Shiqian dies

Recognized only as a priest by the government, the underground Bishop Hu Daguo had lived for years at the official Cathedral of Guiyang, to which his movements were restricted. Bishop Hu was born in 1922 and was ordained a priest in 1951. In 1955 he was arrested and remained in a labor camp until 1979. In 1987 he was consecrated a bishop together with Bishop Fan Xueyuan of Baoding and was subsequently recognized by the Holy See. – In 1999 the official Church combined the three dioceses of Guiyang, Anlong, and Shiqian to create the Diocese of Guizhou, corresponding to the territory of Guizhou Province. 93 year old Bishop Wang Chongyi and 44 year old Coadjutor Bishop Xiao Zejiang lead the church, assisted by 19 priests and 44 religious sisters. The two bishops are recognized by both the government and by the Pope. Approximately 100,000 Catholics live in Guizhou Province (*UCAN* Feb. 17).

February 20, 2011:

Geng Hui, Catholic composer of Church music, dies

Born in 1941 in Taiyuan (Shanxi Province), Geng studied at the conservatory in Shenyang and for many years was active as a professor of music in teacher training. Since 1985 Geng also taught music in the Major Seminary of Taiyuan and began to compose Chinese-language Masses. His best known composition in the Chinese Church is his 1995 “Chinese Unity Mass” (*Zhonghua heyi missa*), in which he endeavored to combine Chinese and Christian musical themes (see article on the website of the Diocese of Taiyuan www.tycatholic.cn).

March 2, 2011:

Bishop Lucas Li: St. Joseph as patron and model for migrant workers

In a Mass to celebrate the opening of the Month of St. Joseph, the Bishop of the Diocese of Fengxiang (Shaanxi Province) explained that St. Joseph is not only the Patron of the Universal Church but also of Chinese workers. All of the faithful should follow his example and take up their responsibilities in their families, in their Church, and in society at large. In particular, Catholics who migrate to look for jobs in other places should learn from his example (*Xinde* [online] March 3; *Zenit* March 18). – St. Joseph (Feast Day March 19) is especially revered by Chinese Catholics and is the most frequently chosen baptismal patron for men.

March 4, 2011:

Taiwan: Five condemned prisoners are put to death

The executions took place despite appeals from national and international organizations and from the Catholic Church in Taiwan. The most recent executions had been in April 2010 when four prisoners were executed following an unofficial five-year moratorium. At that time the Minister of Justice had resigned amid the controversy over the death penalty. The Presbyterian Church of Taiwan and the Catholic Bishops' Conference had joined the fray with statements on the abolition of the death penalty

(see *China heute* 2010, No. 2, pp. 85f. [in German]). Salil Shetty, Secretary General of Amnesty International, spoke of this development as a step backwards for the country which had once been considered one of the leaders in the movement for the abolition of the death penalty in Asia (*Asianews* March 7 and 29; *Central News Agency website* March 28; *UCAN* March 3).

March 9, 2011:

Bishop Andreas Hao Jinli of Xiwanzi dies

Underground Bishop Hao (not recognized by the government) was born in 1916 and was ordained priest in 1943. Between 1958 and 1981 he first spent ten years in prison, then was transferred to a labor camp. In 1984 he was secretly consecrated a bishop. In 1988 he became Ordinary of the Diocese of Xiwanzi (Chongli) in Northern Hebei Province. Constrained for years to a wheelchair, he lived in the village of Gonghui under strict government surveillance. After his death the police closed off the streets leading to the village but that did not prevent many of the faithful from managing to make their way to his funeral on March 17. Since the death of Auxiliary Bishop Leo Yao Liang on December 30, 2009, the diocese which counts more than 35,000 Catholics has no longer had an active bishop. The official Church combined the dioceses of Xiwanzi and Xuanhua in 1980 to create the Diocese of Zhangjiakou. Despite difficulties the two underground dioceses continue to exist (*Asianews* March 14; *Fides* March 21; *UCAN* March 10; see also entry of April 13, 2011).

March 11, 2011:

Severe earthquake in Japan – prayers and donations in China

Already on March 11, the day of the earthquake, Bishop Li Liangui, Director of the Catholic charitable organization Jinde Charities in Shijiazhuang, and the Chinese Buddhist Association sent messages of solidarity to Caritas Japan and to Buddhist organizations in Japan. A message of the official Chinese Bishops' Conference to the Japanese Bishops' Conference followed on March 15. The website of the official Protestant bodies also called on March 15 for prayers for Japan.

Chinese Catholics in many local communities prayed for the victims of the earthquake in Japan. According to *Xinde*, the occasion provided an opportunity for Chinese clergy and laity to overcome the remnants of resentments against Japan that have lingered on since World War II. During the Masses, prayers were also offered for the victims of the March 10 earthquake in Yingjiang (Yunnan Province) in which 25 people were killed.

The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong held a week of prayer for Japan. In Taiwan the victims were remembered in many Buddhist temples (such as Foguangshan and Fagushan). The Catholic Bishops' Conference of Taiwan called communities and Catholic universities to pray and encouraged all Christians active in the medical field to volunteer and join rescue teams. In the "paper dome" in Puli (Nantou District) Taiwanese Catholics and Protestants joined together in their prayers for Japan. The paper edifice was designed and built by the Japanese architect Shigeru Ban following the 1995 earthquake of Kobe when it served as a provisional church. Afterwards, it was moved to Nantou, the epicenter of the 1999 earthquake in Taiwan, where it now serves as a dialogue center. – The count of the dead and missing from the earthquake and tsunami wave in Northern Japan has been estimated at 30,000 (as of the end of March). There has been severe damage to the atomic power plant at Fukushima (*Asianews* March 23; *Fides* March 14; *UCAN* March 22; *Xinde* [online] March 24; www.ccctspm.org March 15; www.fjnet.com; www.jinde.org March 14; www.sara.gov.cn March 14 and 22).

March 16, 2011:

Tibetan monk sets fire to himself in protest

According to reports from the International Campaign for Tibet, 21 year old Phuntsog, a monk of the Kirti Monastery in the Ngaba/Aba District (Sichuan), set fire to himself in the city of Ngaba. Police who extinguished the flames reportedly beat the monk. He died the following day. The monk set himself on fire to commemorate Tibetans “killed in the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown in the region ... in 2008,” the Tibetan government-in-exile said. Immediately following the incident hundreds of monks and lay people took to the streets in protest. According to a March 30 report from the Tibetan government-in-exile, the authorities were now carrying out a patriotic education campaign in the monastery and the monks were forbidden from pursuing their religious studies.

According to *Xinhua*, the person who set fire on himself was another monk who had long suffered from epilepsy. The other monks had forcibly removed the badly burned monk from the hospital, *Xinhua* said. – The *Voice of Tibet* reported on November 19 that already on November 15 of last year, the monk Lobsang Palden had hanged himself in a monastery in the Sog/Suo District of Nagchu/Naqu (Tibetan Autonomous Region) after government officials of the local Religious Affairs Bureau had persistently harassed him about his contacts with the Dalai Lama (*Radio Free Asia* March 17, 18, and 22; *South China Morning Post* March 18; *TibetInfoNet News Digest* Jan. 15–28; March 12–25; *Xinhua* March 17 and 18; www.tibet.net March 17 and 30; see also entry of April 21–22, 2011).

March 19, 2011:

Bishop of Urumqi calls on families to erect house altars

All families in Xinjiang composed of two or more faithful should recite together at least one decade of the Rosary each day, wrote 79 year old bishop Xie Tingzhe in his Lenten Pastoral Letter. In this way each and every family becomes a church. The Bishop (not recognized by the government) published his pastoral letter on his blog. – A family altar is a necessity, the Bishop explained to *UCAN*, since there are only 18 churches in all of Xinjiang and the government does not allow Catholics from several families to get together for private prayer. The Diocese of Urumqi has 10,000 Catholics and covers an area of 1,600,000 km², equal to that of the Autonomous Uigur Region of Xinjiang (*UCAN* March 21).

March 20, 2011:

Catholic newspaper reports on Buddhist-Catholic help for homeless seniors

A 72 year old single, homeless man who lived by rummaging through garbage for usable items had already received help several times from the Buddhist Changming Foundation. The foundation eventually found a home for him at the beginning of 2011 in the Catholic Jinde Home for the Elderly in Shijiazhuang. Since the home is already bearing the expenses of more than ten elderly individuals who have no income and no relatives, the Buddhist foundation has announced its intention to pay the old man’s maintenance costs and expressed its satisfaction that he was being lodged in a home for the elderly that is a “believing” home, *Xinde* reported on March 20. – In mainland China, apart from government arranged political meetings, there is scarcely any contact or cooperation between different religions and denominations.

March 25, 2011:

Tibetan parliament-in-exile takes note of Dalai Lama's retirement from political office

After initial refusal, the Tibetan parliament-in-exile in Dharamsala has finally agreed to the withdrawal of the 76 year old Dalai Lama from his last remaining executive role in the Central Tibetan Administration in exile. According to Article 19 of the Tibetan Charter (Constitution), he exercises the highest executive authority which includes the approval of laws, the naming of ministers, convening and dissolving of the parliament, etc. The amendment of the Charter, made necessary by the Dalai Lama's retirement, is now underway. The Dalai Lama officially announced his (often spoken of) retirement from political life to the Tibetan parliament-in-exile on March 14, 2011. He will, however, continue to be the spiritual figurehead of all Tibetans in exile, he said.

On March 20, 2011, elections (prepared far in advance) began for the new Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Approximately 85,000 exiled Tibetans around the world have voting rights in the election. All three of the candidates are laymen, while the previous holder of the office, Samdhong Rinpoche, is a Lama (*AP* March 20; *BBC News* March 15; *IANS* March 29; *TibetInfoNet News Digest* March 12–25).

March 30, 2011:

First consecration of a bishop for 2011 – with approval of both government and Pope

Born in 1964, Paul Liang Jiansen has been consecrated Bishop of Jiangmen (Guangdong Province). The three co-consecrating bishops (Gan Junqiu of Guangzhou, Liao Hongqing of Meixian, and Su Yongda of Zhanjiang) are all likewise recognized by the Pope. Priests and faithful from both Hong Kong and Macau also took part in the celebration. Bishop Liang entered the major seminary shortly after his baptism in 1985. He was ordained a priest in 1991. In 2004, his now deceased predecessor Bishop Li Panshi named him Vicar General. The Diocese of Jiangmen has 7 priests, 26 religious sisters, and almost 20,000 faithful. The diocese includes the island of Shangchuan, where St. Francis Xavier died in 1552 before he was able to set foot on mainland China (*Asianews* March 30; *UCAN* March 30).

March 30, 2011:

Taiwan diocese announces activities for centennial of Republic of China

The Diocese of Gaoxiong in Southern Taiwan has composed a special “Prayer for the Nation” and has called upon all Catholics to pray it daily. In a press conference the diocese announced a program that is to include concerts and folk performances from the indigenous peoples in July and also a big prayer meeting to be held in December. Archbishop Liu Cheng-chung declared that all should make every effort to preserve and to promote the natural beauty, the people, the democratic values and the traditional cultures of Taiwan. The Church, too, wants to expand its services to the people of Taiwan, he said.

The Council for Cultural Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has called for groups involved in the areas of traditional customs, religion and art to develop programs for the centennial year based on the motto “The entire people asks blessings for 100 years of peace and well being.” Various organiza-

tions from different religions have already announced initiatives. Last Pentecost Monday, as part of the national celebration (but also to mark the 50 years of its own Golden Jubilee), the Diocese of Gaoxiong organized a concert of seven Catholic choirs (*UCAN* March 31; June 15; www.cca.gov.tw; see entry of January 1, 2011).

April 1, 2011:

First interview with Vatican's "new China strategist"

In his first interview since his appointment as Secretary for the Pontifical Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, which is also responsible for the Church in China, Archbishop Savio Hon Tai-fai said that not all of the 45 bishops who had taken part in the 8th National Assembly of Chinese Catholic Representatives (despite Rome's instructions not to attend) had been coerced into doing so. The number of opportunists among the Chinese bishops has increased, he said. According to Hon this has been the result of inadequate formation of the clergy and of compromises in the appointment of bishops, something about which both the priests and the faithful in China have been complaining in recent times. It has been clear to the Chinese government for a few years now that illegitimate bishops will never be really accepted by the faithful, and China has therefore been working hard to see to it that priests who are obedient to their (the government's) rules can obtain the permission from Rome to be ordained bishops, Hon explained. If a candidate is denied approval by the Holy See, Beijing threatens to go ahead with the ordination anyway. With the carrying out in Chengde of a consecration not approved by Rome the government wants to make it very clear just who is the boss in this house, Archbishop Hon said. Like Cardinal Zen he believes that there continue to be good reasons for the existence of an underground Church. He is convinced that, since China has well prepared and capable negotiators available for this area, the Vatican also needs to have the same kind of negotiators for its dialogue with China (*Avvenire* April 1, as found at <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1347369?eng=y>).

April 5, 2011:

***Qingming*: Millions of Chinese honor the dead on "tomb sweeping day"**

The official news agency *Xinhua* reported that from April 3–5, approximately 460,000,000 Chinese visited cemeteries and memorial sites in order to pay homage to their deceased relatives. Authorities had strengthened security measures in order to avoid fires or panic stampedes, the report said. Since 2008 three traditional feast days, among which is *qingming* or "tomb sweeping day", are once again recognized as official, national holidays (*Xinhua* April 5).

April 8, 2011:

Priest Joseph Chen Hailong (Diocese of Xuanhua) arrested

UCAN has reported that the 29 year old priest, Joseph Chen Hailong, who cares for Beijing's underground Catholics in the outlying neighborhoods of Yanqing and Yongning was arrested, along with two companions, by dozens of plainclothes policemen from Xuanhua who had apparently lain in wait for him for weeks. The following day they handed him over to officials of the Bureau for Religious Affairs. According to the news agency, he is at least the third underground priest to have been arrested in Hebei Province since the beginning of the year. The priest Zhang Guangjun, also from the Diocese of

Xuanhua, was arrested on January 13, 2011. It is reported that during his imprisonment they deprived him of sleep for at least five nights in a row and that they tortured him in other ways, both physically and verbally. After a temporary release on bail, he was once again arrested on March 8, 2011 and presumably beaten again. Another underground priest from Hebei Province, Wang Lifang from the Diocese of Zhengding, disappeared in the middle of March after he had been lured out by a false request for the administration of the sacrament of the sick (*UCAN* April 13).

April 9, 2011:

Beijing Diocese opens “Year of Evangelization by the Laity”

During the opening Mass in the Cathedral, 50 catechists from various parishes who had previously taken part in a several month long formation program were formally commissioned to go out as evangelizers. The diocese called upon Catholics to each pay the cost for at least one Bible which will be given to catechumens or course participants. – On May 8, 90 interested participants signed up for the 35th course for catechumens at the “North Church” in Beijing (*UCAN* April 14; www.catholic-bj.org April 9 and 10; May 9).



Bishop Li Shan and the priests of the diocese sign a transparency about evangelization. Photo: *UCAN*.

April 10, 2011:

More than 160 members of Beijing Protestant Shouwang Church arrested

They were temporarily arrested as they attempted to make their way to an open-air worship service. On following weekends other members of the Shouwang Church were arrested as they tried to gather in public places. The church is Beijing’s most well known house church. On May 11, a group of house church leaders addressed an appeal to the National People’s Congress (*South China Morning Post* April 11 and 18; May 13 and 23; for more, see *China heute* 2011, No. 2, p. 72 and an appeal by He Guanghu on pp. 85-86 [in German]).

April 11, 2011:

Chinese Islamic Association launches competition for a new logo

The logo is intended to increase the influence of the association in society and to eventually be used both nationally and internationally on documents and in publications. The winning design will receive

a prize of 5,000 Yuan. The brochure describing the competition says: “The Chinese Islamic Association is a social organization loving the country and the religion. It is registered with the civil authorities and under the direction (*zhuguan* 主管) of the State Administration for Religious Affairs. It represents more than 23,000,000 believing Muslims throughout the whole country” (as found at www.sara.gov.cn).

April 11, 2011:

Bishop Fang Xingyao: 11 candidates for office of bishop await appointment by Chinese Bishops’ Conference

Bishop Fang, Chairman of the Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic Church, made this statement in an article appearing in the official newspaper *China Daily*. According to Fang, vacant sees in 44 of 97 dioceses are a serious obstacle to further evangelization in China. Liu Bainian, Honorary Chairman of the Patriotic Association and of the official Bishops’ Conference, stated on May 13 in the Beijing-friendly Hong Kong newspaper *Wen Wei Po* that 10 candidates have already been reviewed by the Chinese Bishops’ Conference (which is not approved by Rome). According to Liu, the 11th is Bishop Liang Jiansen, who was already consecrated on March 30, 2011 (see entry of March 30). He did not name any other names. Liu called on the Vatican not to interfere in “China’s work of self-selection and self-consecration of bishops.” He also called on the Vatican to recognize and support those bishops who had already been consecrated. Self-selection and self-consecration of bishops is necessary for successful evangelization, it belongs to the normal field of responsibility of the local Church and, as such, needs no Papal approval, he said (*China Daily* April 11 as found at *UCAN* April 11; bj.wenweipo.com May 13).

April 13, 2011:

Diocese of Hong Kong’s Justice & Peace Commission calls upon Hebei Province government to end persecution of underground Church in Zhangjiakou

For years the province government in Zhangjiakou (Northern Hebei Province) has exerted pressure on priests to force them to accept the so-called “priest’s identity card,” to join the Patriotic Association, and to accept the official principles of “independent self-rule of the Church,” the document states. Since 2006 almost 20 priests of the Zhangjiakou region have suffered illegal arrest, physical as well as psychological abuse and forced education sessions, the commission says. It also points to cases of torture and gives names: There is the case of priest Zhang Guangjun (see entry of April 8). The priest Yu Zhongxun, arrested in September 2007, was hung all night long from a basketball backboard; tied for 10 days to a stool; burned with cigarettes; and even had chili-water forcibly poured into him. The priest Liu Zhongjun was arrested June 8, 2009. For the last six days of his six-month imprisonment he was subject to total sleep deprivation and forced to maintain the same position for hours on end.

The commission calls for the immediate release of the detained Hebei priests and gives the following names: Fr. Li Huisheng and Fr. Ren He (both from the Diocese of Xiwanzi), Fr. Chen Hailong (Diocese of Xuanhua), Fr. Wang Lifang (Diocese of Zhengding), Bishop Su Zhimin and the priests Lu Genjun, Ma Wuyong, Liu Honggeng (all four from the Diocese of Baoding) as well as Bishop Shi Enxiang (Diocese of Yixian) (text of the appeal can be found at <http://www.hkjp.org/statement.php?id=109>).

April 13, 2011:

Vatican China Commission publishes message to Chinese Catholics

From April 11–13, 2011, in the course of its IV Plenary Meeting, the China Commission instituted by Pope Benedict XVI directed its attention to the situation of the Church in China. During the course of their discussions, commission members noted that there seems to be a “general climate of disorientation and anxiety about the future,” further aggravated by the many vacant diocesan administrations, internal divisions, and by urbanization and the depopulation of rural areas. At the same time, there are signs of a living faith and of great commitment, the commission states.

The message takes a very detailed stance on the November 20, 2010 episcopal consecration carried out in Chengde without Papal mandate, and on the 8th National Assembly of Catholic Representatives of the Church in China from December 7–9, 2010. “As far as the sad episode of the episcopal ordination in Chengde is concerned, the Holy See, on the basis of the information and testimonies it has so far received, while having no reason to consider it invalid, does regard it as gravely illegitimate, [...] and this also renders illegitimate the exercise of the ministry.” Pressure placed on the participating bishops and external coercion could however mean that the canonical penalty of excommunication (foreseen by Canon Law for participation in illicit episcopal consecrations) might not have been incurred automatically, the document says. “Every bishop involved is therefore obliged to refer to the Holy See and find the means of explaining his position to the priests and faithful [...]” Priests and faithful, in turn, should have some understanding for the situation of their bishops. With regard to the urgent need to fill the many vacant sees, the commission hopes “that there will not be new wounds to ecclesial communion, and asks the Lord for strength and courage for all of the persons involved” (*Vatican Information Service* April 14).

April 13-15, 2011:

Vatican confirms beatification process of Ming Dynasty Chinese convert

In its message of April 13 (see preceding item) the China Commission stated: “We have learnt with joy the news that the diocese of Shanghai can start the beatification cause of Paul Xu Guangqi [1562–1633], which will be added to that of Fr. Matteo Ricci, S.J.” Vatican spokesman Fr. Federico Lombardi described the news to journalists during an April 15 press conference as a wonderful ray of hope for China today and in the future. The layman Paul Xu Guangqi was a highly educated, high-ranking imperial official, a great and faithful servant of both his country and of his people; he demonstrates clearly that there is absolutely “no contradiction or risk in being both Chinese and Catholic,” Lombardi said.

It was Shanghai Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian who initiated the beatification process for Xu, a native of Shanghai. According to *Asianews*, Shanghai’s underground Catholics share in the joy at the opening of the beatification process but they were also eagerly awaiting the beatification of Shanghai Cardinal Gong Pinmei (1901–2000) who spent 33 years in prison because of his faith and his fidelity to the Pope (*Asianews* April 22; *AFP* April 15).

April 14, 2011:

***Xinhua* report: Chongqing secondary school forced to drop optional Bible course**

According to the report of the state news agency, a course on religious literature that had been introduced as part of the diversification of the lesson plan, proved to be so popular that there were more students interested than there were places available. “Netizens” criticized the course as inappropriate. Vice Rector Deng Xiaopeng is quoted as having said that the secondary school, which is affiliated with the Southwest China Normal University, was ordered to drop the course so as to avoid unsolicited religious influence on the students. The *Xinhua* report also cites Zhang Xinying, a former vice director of the Institute for World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang explained that students can deal with the Bible in class as a purely literary work if it can be guaranteed that the teacher will not be proselytizing. But there are many examples of cases where foreign language and literature teachers are using their classes to spread a religious faith, Zhang said. According to the report, Ye Xiaowen, former director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, told *China Daily* that the beginning of 2012 will see the publication of a religion textbook designed for college students.

April 21-22, 2011:

300 Tibetan monks taken away from the Kirti Monastery

Following the March 16 incident in which a young Tibetan monk of the Kirti Monastery (Ngaba / Aba District, Sichuan) burned himself to death in protest, there were a series of demonstrations in the region and measures taken by the authorities against the monastery (see entry of March 16, 2011). On April 15, the Dalai Lama stated in an appeal that the monastery, home to about 2,500 monks, was completely surrounded by armed forces, who have also been sporadically interrupting the supply of food and other necessities to the monastery. During the night of April 21–22, reports indicate that 300 monks were forcibly loaded into army trucks and taken to an undisclosed place. Protesting monks and village residents found themselves up against armed security forces equipped with armored vehicles and police dogs, two civilians were reportedly killed. The 11th Kirti Rimpoche, living in exile in India, provided that information to journalists on April 29.

The state news agency *Xinhua*, on the other hand, reported several times in April that life in the monastery was being carried on in a normal fashion. On April 27, *Xinhua* reported that the government was conducting “legal training” in the monastery since some of the monks had been involved since 2008 in upsetting the civil order by their involvement in disturbances, prostitution rings and gambling, while others had become alcoholics – all things in contradiction to the teachings of the Buddha. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances called on the Chinese authorities on June 8 to report on the fate of those monks who had been taken away from their monastery in trucks. On June 9, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by confirming that the government was conducting “legal education” in the monastery “in order to maintain religious order there;” there had been “no such thing as enforced disappearance” (*The Boston Globe* / AP June 10; *Kyodo* April 29; *Xinhua* April 16, 26 and 27; www.dalailama.com April 15).

April 22, 2011:

New Confucius statue removed from Tian'anmen Square

The statue of Confucius by artist Wu Weishan, standing 9.5 meters high (including the base), had only been installed a few months ago, on January 11 of this year. In a surprise move, it was taken down again during the night and moved to the inner courtyard of the National Museum before which it had been erected. Public reaction to the statue on Chinese internet had been hotly debated. “The action concerns the symbolic allocation of the central place of the People’s Republic of China and can therefore be read as a further sign on the highest level of struggles for power and of cultural struggles” commented Mark Siemons in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (April 26; *Die Welt* April 23; www.peopleforum.cn April 22; see entry of Jan. 11, 2011).

April 23, 2011:

About 50,000 attend annual memorial sacrifice at “Genghis Khan Mausoleum”

Xinhua reported that this was the 784th anniversary of the sacrificial rite at the memorial, which lies in the Ordos Highlands in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia (Genghis Khan’s actual burial site is unknown). Participants included Mongol groups from the region and visitors from neighboring Mongolia. The article laments that the centuries-long tradition is being threatened since younger Mongols are losing their interest in sacrificial culture (*Xinhua* April 23). The present mausoleum building was built in 1954.

April 23, 2011:

“Underground” Bishop Li Hongye of Luoyang (Henan) dies at 91



Bishop Peter Li Hongye suffered a heart attack as he was celebrating the Easter Vigil and died the same night. He was born in 1920, was ordained priest in 1944 and in 1955 was arrested because of his faith. After his release in 1985, he went back to his diocese and was clandestinely consecrated Bishop of Luoyang in 1987, although he was never recognized as bishop by the authorities. In 2001 he was placed under house arrest in Luoyang. Suffering from heart problems, in 2004 he returned to his hometown of Gongxian (about 50 kms east of Luoyang), and it was there that he died. Just ten days after he was buried, authorities partly demolished the cross and dome-shaped monument over his grave (photo), leaving only the base. Luoyang is one of the least developed dioceses in China. The only church open and functioning is the Mother of Christ Church in Luoyang, built in 2005. All of the other

churches were either destroyed during the Cultural Revolution or had been confiscated and were never given back. The diocese has about 10,000 Catholics, served by 18 underground priests and one official priest (*UCAN* April 26; May 17 [also photo]).

April 23–24, 2011:

Easter: More than 21,287 baptisms in mainland China's Catholic churches – 3,500 baptisms in Hong Kong

This Easter, 80% of those receiving baptism in mainland China were adults, the Chinese Catholic newspaper *Xinde* (*Faith*) reported. This shows clearly the growing importance of evangelization efforts by both clergy and laity – and this, despite the fact that in the last year the faithful “have encountered very many challenges and difficulties,” it said. Using various research tools, including questionnaires sent to 101 dioceses, *Xinde* and the Xinde Center for Cultural Research (both Shijiazhuang) had calculated that there had been 21,287 baptisms. This figure, however, is incomplete for several reasons, since some dioceses or parishes did not return the questionnaires, others did not keep detailed written records of baptisms or had “many communities” to look after, the report said. Baptisms from the “underground” are probably not included in the total.

In the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong some 3,500 were baptized during the Easter Vigil this year, as compared to the 3,000 baptized there at Easter of 2010. In New York City's St. Joseph's Church, heart of the Chinese Catholic community in Chinatown, 181 Chinese received baptism. Of these, 125 had been born in the Southern Chinese Province of Fujian (*HKSE* April 23; *UCAN* April 29; *Xinde* June 10; *Xinde* online May 2).



Evangelization “Contact Card” distributed by the Hong Kong Central Council of the Laity. On the back side, in addition to the text “Friend would you like to get to know Jesus?” there is the telephone number of a “Faith Hotline” manned 24 hours a day.

April 25, 2011:

State reception: “10 years of interpreting the Koran” – Many challenges in the “Islam work”

Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and other officials met at the Great Hall of the People with the 200 representatives who attended the summing-up meeting on the 10th anniversary of the work of “interpreting the scriptures” of Islam. “Thanks to the central authorities’ serious attention and loving care and to the correct guidance and vigorous support of relevant departments, the work of ‘interpreting the scriptures’ has yielded ample results over the past 10 years, effectively promoting and developing those positive ideas in Islamic teachings that fit the socialist society, rebutting the fallacious and absurd doctrines promoted by the ‘three forces’ [separatism, extremism, and terrorism] to distort and misrepresent Islamic teachings,” Jia explained.

In future, the task of “interpreting the scriptures” must move ever closer to the reality of Islam in China, insisted Wang Zuo’an, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, addressing

the conference. He said that it has proven beneficial to tie together the “interpreting of the scriptures” with the promotion of political and legal guidelines in the “new sermons” (*wa'z*). When “interpreting the scriptures,” the *ahongs* (imams) in some areas, organized by the Islamic Association, also spread information about drug and AIDS prevention, family planning and other legal issues, and serve to dampen the “pilgrimage fever” (to Mecca), Wang explained. According to him, there are still many challenges in the “Islam work:” It is necessary to hinder the infiltration of extremist ideas; underground



Koran schools; the interference of religion in the fields of government, law and education; conflicts between different Islamic schools, and Islamic “group incidents” (*Xinhua* April 25; www.sara.gov.cn April 25).

Jia Qinglin greets Muslim representatives in the Great Hall of the People.
Photo: *Xinhua*.

April 28, 2011:

Results of 6th National Census made public – Chinese population is aging

In November 2010, the population of the People’s Republic of China (mainland only – not counting Hong Kong and Macau) numbered 1.3397 billion persons, an increase of 73.9 million compared to the previous census of 2000. 49.68% of the mainland population (i.e., 665.57 million) lives in urban areas. This percentage has grown by 13.46%. Guangdong (104 million) and Shandong (95 million) have nudged Henan (94 million) from its past position as the most populous province. The percentage of older people is rising rapidly: 13.26% of the population is 60 or older, while the under 14 group has shrunk to 16.6%. For every 100 newborn girls, there are 118.06 boys. – On April 26, at a study session of the Politburo, President Hu Jintao insisted on sticking to state family planning policies (*South China Morning Post* May 1; *Xinhua* April 26 and 28).

April 28 – October 22, 2011:

International Horticultural Exposition in Xi’an – Diocese opens “pilgrim hostel”

In the old imperial city of Xi’an the number of tourists is steadily growing, but so is the number of Catholic pilgrims from every corner of China. Every year dozens of pilgrim groups flock to Xi’an. As its “contribution to the Horticultural Exposition” and as a service for Catholics who come to Xi’an either to visit the Expo or as pilgrims, the diocese has emptied out – for the duration of the Horticultural Expo – two complete floors of the diocesan office building next to the Cathedral. Now holding 180 beds in 17 rooms, the space has been converted into a simple hostel for pilgrims. The temporary hostel will be served round the clock by volunteers from the diocese. There will be no “per night” fee charged for pilgrims, *Xinde* reported (April 20).

April 29, 2011:

UCAN: Report on Chinese Catholic blogging culture

Following research on the blogging culture among the churches of Asia, the Asian Catholic news agency *UCAN* has determined that blogging is playing a unique role for the Catholic Church in mainland China. In addition to the 80 year old underground Bishop Xie Tingzhe of Urumqi, who has been active on the internet for years now, at least two other mainland Chinese bishops publish their own blogs using pseudonyms. Many Catholics and also many priests in China now have blogs of their own since blogging is subject to fewer restrictions than publishing a website. Even *UCAN* is taking advantage of this phenomenon for its Chinese-language news service *CathNewsChina*. The website www.ucanews.com has been blocked for users in mainland China since March of 2010, so the news provided by *CathNewsChina* has been posted on a series of blogs which are changed from time to time (*UCAN* April 29).

April 30, 2011:

Bishop Lü Shouwang of Yichang (Hubei) dies at only 45

Bishop Francis Lü Shouwang recently succumbed to an acute pancreatic inflammation. With his death, the official Church in China has lost its first bishop of the younger generation. There is now not a single bishop left in the five official dioceses of Hubei Province. Bishop Lü, who belonged to the Tujia ethnic minority, was born in 1966 and studied at the major seminary in Wuhan, where he also taught following his priestly ordination in 1991. His predecessor appointed him vicar general in 1999. Two years after his predecessor's death, Lü was consecrated bishop in 2007 with the approval of both the Pope and of the government. The Diocese of Yichang, which lies along the middle reaches of the Yangtse, has 24 priests, 12 religious sisters and 30,000 Catholics belonging to the Han, Tujia and Miao nationalities (*UCAN* May 3; *Xinde* online May 1).

May 1, 2011:

Beatification of Pope John Paul II – Chinese Catholics celebrate



Celebration of the beatification in Fengxiang.
Photo: *UCAN*.

his memory is strong among Chinese Catholics, writes *UCAN*. Catholics in China celebrated his beatification. In the Diocese of Fengxiang the 89 year old Bishop Lucas Li on May 1 led a procession

bearing a large portrait of John Paul II. *Xinde*, the largest Catholic newspaper in China, featured full page articles, spread over a number of issues, on the life and accomplishments of the new Blessed and invited readers to send in contributions on the theme: “Pope John Paul II and I.” These contributions frequently described the Pope as a personal model for one’s own faith (*Fides* May 2; *UCAN* May 6; *Xinde passim*, *Xinde* online April 29. On reactions from the Chinese Church on the death of John Paul II, see *China heute* 2005, No. 3, pp. 66-69, 85-91 [in German]).

May 3, 2011:

Jinde Charities is signing up young “Ricci Volunteers” for social welfare projects

In its appeal, the Catholic organization Jinde Charities, with headquarters in Shijiazhuang (Hebei Province), is hoping to attract 40 volunteers for deployment in social welfare programs throughout China. The volunteers should be Catholic, 21–30 years old, healthy, single and ready to live a very simple life. They are required to have at least a senior middle school diploma, one year of work experience as well as a letter of recommendation from their parish priest. Before being commissioned and sent out in July of 2011, volunteers took part in a three-week course practical and spiritual preparation. Jinde will provide the volunteers with shelter and a small sum for daily living costs. It will also provide supervision and organize volunteer get-togethers for sharing experiences. Volunteers will spend anywhere from six to a maximum of 24 months at their assignments, according to a report from *Xinde*. For the 2010 “Ricci Year” Jinde sent out its first group of 21 volunteers to care for patients suffering from AIDS and leprosy and to provide assistance to old people in need. Several volunteers also helped out in a Catholic minor seminary as well as in a convent of religious sisters (*Xinde* May 10, 2011; *Xinde* online July 26, 2010).



2010 sending service: “Ricci Volunteers” of bless each other. Photo: *Xinde*

May 5, 2011:

Official representatives of the 5 religions reject US report on religious freedom

The state news agency *Zhongguo xinwenshe* (May 6) reported that the secretaries general of the administrative bodies of the five officially recognized religions met in a joint session and issued a written response to the 2011 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In their declaration, the religious representatives said that the section of the USCIRF report dealing with China is full of prejudices and does not coincide with the facts. China is a state ruled by law and its citizens enjoy full religious freedom. The Chinese government supervises religious organizations and sites for religious activities through registration and public recognition and, as outlined in the law, maintains a directory of all religious personnel in conformity with accepted international practice, they said. Religion enjoys “extremely high esteem in society.” Cult organizations acting contrary to the values of society and humanity and ethnic separatist activities carried out under the banner of religion have nothing whatsoever to do with religious freedom, the religious representatives said. Taking action against such groups in accordance with the law is in line with the will of the people and the wish of religious communities, they declared.

May 10, 2011:

State Administration for Religious Affairs offers best wishes for Buddha's birthday

Since its arrival in China more than 2,000 years ago Buddhism has deeply influenced the social history and traditional culture of the country, the State Administration of Religious Affairs wrote. In its "Message to Our Friends in Buddhist Circles" it affirmed, among other things, that in the New China the Buddhists of the three language groups (i.e., Han or Chinese Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism) have always stood faithfully by the Party and the government and have supported social progress, contributing to international exchange and to furthering a harmonious society (www.sara.gov.cn).

May 10, 2011:

Pope appoints Archbishop Filoni Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples

With this appointment a man who knows the situation in China very well has taken over the leadership of the Vatican department responsible for the "mission churches" and which is therefore also responsible for the Church in China. 65 year old Archbishop Fernando Filoni was the leader of the Vatican's study mission in Hong Kong from 1992–2001, during which time he functioned as the Pope's liaison with the Church in mainland China. From 2001–2006 Filoni was the Vatican's Nuncio to Iraq (remaining at his post throughout the war) and to Jordan. From 2006–2007 he was assigned to the Philippines, after which he worked as Substitute for General Affairs in the Vatican's Secretariat of State. According to one report he is also a member of the Vatican's China Commission. His predecessor, Cardinal Ivan Dias, retired from the office upon reaching the established age limit.

Observers said they expect that Archbishop Filoni's China experience will be of great help to him in his new position where he will have to deal frequently with the difficult questions regarding the Chinese Church. Catholic websites in China also reported on the appointment. Already on December 23 of last year Hong Kong Salesian Father (now Archbishop) Savio Hon took over the No. 2 spot in the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (*Fides* May 10; *HKSE* May 22; *UCAN* May 11; see entry of April 1, 2011).

May 10, 2011:

Diocese of Chengdu (Sichuan) elects bishop candidate

The priest Simon Li Zhigang, born in 1963, received 41 of the 45 votes cast by the electoral college, composed of 23 priests, 17 lay persons, 4 sisters and one seminarian. The See of Chengdu has been vacant since 1998. Li Zhigang has been acting as administrator for the affairs of the diocese since 2000 (*HKSE* May 22). To date he had not received any recognition from the Vatican. [Update following the press deadline: Fr. Simon Li Zhigang succumbed to cancer of the liver and died on June 18, 2011 (*Asianews* June 18)].

May 11, 2011:

Diocese of Shantou (Guangdong) elects bishop candidate under strong pressure from the authorities

15 priests, 5 sisters, 2 seminarians and 50 lay people have elected the only candidate, the priest Huang Bingzhang, with a vote of 66 “pro,” 3 “contra,” and 3 abstentions. The authorities have wanted to name Huang bishop for a long time, but have run into resistance since Shantou already has a bishop, 81 year old Bishop Zhuang Jianjian, who is not recognized by the government, *UCAN* reported. One priest has told that he was “accompanied” by several members of the security forces to the site of the election where the number of “helpers” in civilian clothing was greater than the number of electors. Other electors admitted that they voted for Huang out of concern for their careers or their families. According to *UCAN*, five of the 20 diocesan priests did not take part in the election. Three were detained under surveillance in their parishes, one was held by the police and one went into hiding. The priest Huang Bingzhang was born in 1967. Since his ordination in 1991 he has been the pastor of the Cathedral in Shantou. In 1998 he became a member of the National People’s Congress. He is also a Vice President at the national level of the Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic Church and Chairman of the Patriotic Association for the province of Guangdong (*UCAN* May 12).

May 11, 2011:

Government announces new guidelines on opening of bank accounts by sites for religious activities and institutes for religious education

The document bears the title: “Circular of the People’s Bank of China and the State Administration for Religious Affairs regarding the Opening of Entity Settlement Accounts by Sites for Religious Activities and Institutes for Religious Education” (中国人民银行国家宗教事务局关于宗教活动场所和宗教院校开立单位银行结算账户有关事项的通知). Its aim is to strengthen controls (*guanli*) over the sites for religious activities and institutes for religious education and “to promote healthy development.” According to the circular, religious sites and institutes can ask to open an entity settlement account (in China the distinction is made between bank accounts for entities [*danwei*, “units”] and accounts for private persons) with a bank. To open an account, the religious site or institute must present to the bank, among other things, its certificate of registration with the religious affairs department of the government, the number of which will be entered into the documents for the opening of the account. Religious sites and institutes which already have a bank account as a *danwei* must make the necessary adjustments in their accounts within one year of the announcement of the new measures. The text of the circular can be found on the website of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) at www.sara.gov.cn/zcfg/bmgz/8315. Already on January 11, 2010 the SARA had issued a document titled: “Administrative Measures for Monitoring the Finances of Sites for Religious Activities (for provisional implementation).”

May 12, 2011:

3rd anniversary of Wenchuan earthquake – Rebuilding churches

Especially in Sichuan people paused to remember the 87,000 victims of the Wenchuan earthquake. Chinese government media featured stories on the efforts to rebuild. The newspaper *Nanfang dushibao*

in Guangzhou however made veiled references, by way of vague allusions to the artwork of Ai Weiwei, to the activists who lost their freedom as a result of their research into the many school buildings which had collapsed. – On April 28, in Zhongba, Jiangyou City (Diocese of Chengdu) the newly rebuilt Sacred Heart Church was consecrated. On May 7 the parish of Xiaosishan laid the cornerstone for the reconstruction of its parish church. It is the fourth of 18 churches in the Diocese of Chengdu to be rebuilt (*Fides* May 14; *South China Morning Post* May 13; *Xinde* May 20).

May 12–24, 2011:

Delegation from State Administration for Religious Affairs visits Africa

According to its website, under the leadership of Director Wang Zuo'an a ten member delegation from the State Administration for Religious Affairs visited Kenya, Uganda and South Africa in the "search for possibilities for wider exchange and cooperation between the churches of China and Africa." The visit was occasioned by a joint invitation extended by the Global South Anglican Communion and the Anglican churches of the three African countries. Among other sites, the delegation visited Anglican schools, social welfare projects such as those for HIV/Aids patients and Bible Societies. Relations between the churches can help strengthen the long standing relations between the respective countries, said Wang Zuo'an in Kenya. Rev. Rosemary M'bogo, Provincial Secretary of the Anglican ecclesiastical province of Kenya, declared that they had also stressed the desire of the African churches to see an improvement in the treatment of Christians in China. Three quarters of all the Bibles in circulation in Kenya are printed in China (*Ecumenical News International* May 13 and 20; www.sara.gov.cn May 16, 20 and 24).

May 13, 2011:

Taiwan's Vice Minister of Justice defends use of death penalty

According to polls, almost 80% of the people of Taiwan are against abolishing the death penalty, Vice Minister of Justice Chen Shuohuang argued. The death penalty is allowed by law but is used only with the greatest circumspection, he said reacting to an accusation in the 2011 Amnesty International Report that Taiwan has regressed since 2010 in its efforts to abolish the death penalty (*Central News Agency website* May 13; see also text of the Declaration of the Bishops' Conference of Taiwan on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in *China heute* 2010, No, 2, pp. 85-86 [in German]).

May 18, 2011:

Pope Benedict XVI issues renewed call to pray for Church in China

During his general audience in Rome, the Pope issued a reminder of the upcoming Day of Prayer for the Church in China (May 24). The faithful in China "have a right to our prayers" and they very much need them. In an unusually long appeal the Pope spoke of "some" bishops who are suffering and who "find themselves under pressure in the exercise of their ministry. To them, to the priests and to all the Catholics who encounter difficulties in the free profession of faith, we express our closeness. [...] By our prayers we can obtain that their wish to remain in the one universal Church will prove stronger than the temptation to follow a path independent of Peter" (www.vatican.va).

May 18, 2011:

Diocese of Fengxiang (Shaanxi) elects bishop candidate in a “fair and free” process

The election was overseen by the Diocesan Curia. Officials of the local Bureau for Religious Affairs were invited as observers, they confirmed the validity of the election. 36 diocesan priests, six religious and six lay people unanimously (with one abstention) elected the priest Peter Li Huiyan (born 1965), sole candidate proposed by the local Ordinary, Bishop Lucas Li Jingfeng. The entire election procedure is in full accord with Canon Law as well as with the election regulations of the Chinese government, said the 89 year old Bishop Lucas Li in a statement to *UCAN*. Li Huiyan was elected in a process that was “open, just, fair and free,” he stressed. Lucas Li was originally an underground bishop before receiving government recognition in 2004 even though he did not join the Patriotic Association. One observer told *UCAN* that while the election method of Fengxiang was remarkable, it did not have any general significance for the Chinese Church (*UCAN* May 23; election report with photos: *Xinde* online May 22).



Episcopal election in Fengxiang: Distribution of the ballot papers (left) and the swearing-in of Bishop Lucas Li and the two vicars general. Photos: *Xinde* online (www.chinacatholic.org).

May 20, 2011:

AFP: Chinese government spokeswoman calls on Vatican to take concrete steps

“We hope that the Vatican can be clearly aware of the fact that China practises freedom of religious belief and of the continuous development of China’s Catholic Church,” said Jiang Yu, spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry in a statement to journalists. The government hopes that the Vatican will now “create conditions for the development of China-Vatican relations through concrete actions” (after *Times of Malta* / *UCAN* May 20).

May 20, 2011:

Episcopal consecration with “double approval” in Yanzhou

With the consecration of Johannes Lü Peisen (born 1966), the Diocese of Yanzhou (Shandong Province) has a bishop once again after a seven-year vacancy. Bishop Fang Xingyao of Linyi, Chairman of the Patriotic Association, was the principal consecrator at the ceremony in St. Joseph’s Church in Jining.

The co-consecrators were Bishops Zhao Fengchang (Liaocheng) and Li Mingshu (Qingdao). This was the second consecration this year that took place with the recognition of both the Pope and the Chinese authorities. All of the participating bishops are recognized by both sides. Bishop Lü was ordained priest in 1989 and since 1994 has taught in the Holy Spirit Seminary in Jinan. He is also the Secretary General of the Patriotic Association of Shandong Province. According to *Asianews*, he was transferred to the Diocese of Yanzhou in October 2010 and was elected bishop-candidate by the priests there.

The Apostolic Vicariate of South Shandong was entrusted to the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) in 1882. It was renamed Yenchowfu in 1925 and was made a diocese in 1946. Today, the diocese has a bishop, nine priests, one deacon and about 10,000 Catholics. Saint Joseph Freinademetz SVD (1852–1908), canonized by Pope John Paul II in 2003, labored in Yanzhou as a missionary. For the first Bishop of Yanzhou, Johann Baptist Anzer SVD (1851–1903), see the article of Karl Josef Rivinius in *China heute* 2011, No. 2, pp. 118-125 [in German] (*Asianews* May 20; *UCAN* May 20).

May 2011:

Unrest in Inner Mongolia following death of Mongolian herder

In an attempt to prevent a coal transporting truck from crossing and damaging pasture land in the Xilingol League (prefecture), a Mongolian stock herder was run over and killed on May 10. Following his death, thousands of Mongols took to the streets in protest in Xilingol and in the regional capital of Hohhot. The protests were especially intense from May 23–31 but they were peaceful. The authorities reacted with massive contingents of armed police, internet shutdowns, and by sealing-off the universities. According to reports of the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center in New York, at least 90 persons were arrested. On June 8, the driver of the coal truck was sentenced to death.

In the opinion of commentators the background for the civil unrest is the marginalization of the Mongols – who only make up about 17% of the population of Inner Mongolia – due to the booming coal strip mining operations which are destroying the grasslands and with them the livelihood of many Mongolian stock herders. According to details provided in *Xinhua*, 15% of the entire Chinese coal reserve lies in the single prefecture of Xilingol. The authorities in Xilingol have closed down four strip mining operations since May 20, and have temporarily stopped work in 24 others for reasons of environmental damage, harassment of the local population and safety violations (*AP* May 31; *Radio Free Asia* June 7; *Reporters Sans Frontières* May 31; *Reuters* May 29; *South China Morning Post* June 1, 2 and 7; *Xinhua* June 1 and 8).

May 23–30, 2011:

50 years of diocesan partnership – Delegation of Diocese of Hong Kong visits Diocese of Essen

Hong Kong Bishop John Tong, Vicar General Dominic Chan, youth minister Paul Kam, Sr. Goretti Yeung, and lay representative Daniel So visited parishes, institutions and groups in various cities of the Diocese of Essen. Their program included, among other things, a meeting with the permanent deacons of the diocese as well as a visit to a mosque. On the occasion of the Day of Prayer for the Church in China, Bishop Tong, together with Bishop Franz-Josef Overbeck of Essen, celebrated a Pontifical High Mass in the Essen Cathedral on May 28. – The partnership between Essen and Hong Kong is the only existing partnership between a German and a Chinese diocese (www.bistum-essen.de).



On May 28, Bishop John Tong (left, right Vicar General Dominic Chan) blessed a statue of Our Lady of Sheshan erected by Fr. Roman Malek SVD at the Monumenta Serica Institute in St. Augustin. Photos: Joseph Xue.



May 24, 2011:

Supreme People's Court in Beijing sets limits on use of death penalty

According to *Xinhua*, Chinese courts were instructed to order a two-year stay of execution in the cases of those already condemned to death, if “immediate execution does not seem to be necessary.” Since 2007 all death sentences handed down by lower courts must be submitted for review to the Supreme People's Court which, according to *Xinhua*, has annulled 10% of all death sentences since that date. A commentary in the Hong Kong *South China Morning Post* says that China (which executes more people each year than any other country, and perhaps more than all other countries put together) finds itself in a dilemma with regard to the death penalty: On the one hand, China is facing international pressure to reduce the use of the death penalty. On the other hand, the Chinese public is angered by milder sentences handed down to corrupt officials or murderers (*South China Morning Post* May 30; *Xinhua* May 24).

May 24, 2011:

Day of Prayer for Church in China – More than 10,000 pray at Sheshan

UCAN reported that this year more than 10,000 pilgrims gathered at the Marian pilgrimage shrine on Sheshan mountain outside of Shanghai, where “Mary Help of Christians” is venerated (feast day May 24), and to which the Pope referred in his 2007 call for a Day of Prayer. This was undoubtedly the biggest crowd since the introduction of the Day of Prayer, to which the authorities had originally responded by severely restricting pilgrimages to Sheshan. The situation on Sheshan mountain had been tense, especially after the appeal of the Pope on May 18, yet on the actual day of the feast, there seems to have been relatively little visible police presence. During the solemn Feast Day Mass, Shanghai Auxiliary Bishop Xing Wenzhi said that worldwide prayer for the Church in China represented an “immeasurably strong force.” Following the example of the Blessed Mother, the faithful should put their trust in the Risen Lord and hope that the unity of the Church will be achieved soon.

On May 23–24, young Shanghai Catholics organized a 24 hour online prayer chain. Shanghai's underground Catholics were forced to pray in private houses on May 24, since the authorities had denied underground Catholics access to Sheshan mountain. However, one group of more than 400 underground Catholics from Wenzhou did manage to make the pilgrimage to Sheshan in 12 private buses on May 22, two days before the feast.

Parishes in other parts of mainland China also celebrated the Day of Prayer. There were reports of celebrations, for example, in Haikou (Hainan), Meizhou (Guangdong) and Beichang (Diocese of Xingtai, Hebei). In Nanyidian (Diocese of Linfen, Shanxi) a cross was erected on May 24 at the newly built Church of Our Lady Help of Christians. In contrast, *Asianews* reported that some parishes had announced that they would not be celebrating the Day of Prayer (*Asianews* May 18, 23 and 26; *Fides* May 23, 26 and 31; *UCAN* May 25; *Xinde* online May 26 and 30; www.catholicsh.org May 24).

May 28, 2011:

Baptism of 243 catechumens in the Cathedral parish of Tianjin

The catechumens had prepared for their baptism by taking part in a four-month long catechumenate course this past spring. Their average age was 32 years. 70% had diplomas from an advanced technical college (*dazhuan*) or higher. The parish's fall catechumenate course will begin on August 29 (*Xinde* online 30.05.).



Baptisms in Tianjin: 243 candidates for baptism fill the Cathedral on May 28, 2011. Photos: *Xinde* (www.chinacatholic.org).

May 31, 2011:

Government forbids traditional fast in Drepung Monastery near Lhasa

During the first two weeks of the Tibetan month of Saka Dawa, the Drepung Monastery near Lhasa traditionally practices a special fast called Nyung Ne. The authorities have forbidden this fast since the civil unrest in Tibet in 2008, said the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) in Dharamsala. It was announced earlier that the fast would be allowed in 2011, but according to information received by TCHRD, at the last moment the senior monks in charge were ordered to stop the preparations and to send home the large numbers of faithful who were already gathering at the monastery. Armed forces marched on the monastery in order to prevent protests. The TCHRD reported that 60 officials are currently in the monastery conducting a "legal education" course for the monks (www.tchrd.org May 31)

Beginning of June 2011:

No entry permit – 88 year old Cardinal Shan (Taiwan) cancels China trip

Cardinal Paul Shan Guoxi SJ had been invited to visit China by, among others, Wang Zuo'an, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs during the latter's visit to Taiwan in September of 2010. The trip had been planned for June 5–13, and was to include visits to Shanghai and to Henan, the Cardinal's home province. Shan announced at the beginning of June that he would not wait any longer for his entry permit. All of the other members of the party which was to travel with him had already received their visas (*UCAN* June 2).

About June 3, 2011:

Illicit consecration of Bishop in Wuhan postponed indefinitely

The consecration of Shen Guo'an as Bishop of Wuhan, for which there was no papal approval, was originally planned for June 9, according to *UCAN*. Prior to that the authorities had applied strong pressure on some of the diocesan priests who were in favor of maintaining Church principles, and on bishops in neighboring provinces whom they had asked to ordain Fr. Shen. According to local Catholics, Fr. Shen is not a suitable candidate and he himself does not want to become a bishop. Shortly thereafter, the consecration was postponed indefinitely. Authorities notified bishops in neighboring provinces of the postponement. The candidate himself confirmed this on June 7, saying that he had been informed of the postponement but did not know the reasons for it.

In a June 3 interview in *Asianews*, Archbishop Savio Hon Tai-fai, Secretary of the Vatican Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, made a "brother to brother" appeal to Fr. Shen: "I trust that you will do the right thing. The only right thing to do is to refuse."

Fr. Shen, who was born in 1961, is the Vice-Chairman of the Patriotic Association in Hunan and was elected bishop candidate in 2008. The official Church had created the Diocese of Wuhan in 2000 by combining the Dioceses of Hankou, Hanyang and Wuhan into one. Wuhan has some 20,000 Catholics, 25 official priests and 40 priests in the underground (*Asianews* June 3 and 7; *UCAN* June 1 and 7).

June 4, 2011:

Hong Kong: 150.000 gather to remember victims of Tian'anmen Square

Lee Cheuk-yan, Chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance for the Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China and one of the organizers of the Day of Remembrance, said that the arrests of Ai Weiwei (on April 3) and of numerous other Chinese human rights activists had definitely contributed to the increase in the number of those taking part in this year's candle-light vigil in Victoria Park. Police estimates put the number of participants at 77,000. According to reports, the crowd was mostly made up of young people, some participants were carrying Jasmine blossoms, symbol of the North Africa inspired "Jasmine Revolution." According to the *South China Morning Post* a growing number of mainland Chinese are also traveling to Hong Kong each year specifically for the June 4 commemoration. Prior to the candle-light vigil in Victoria Park the Hong Kong diocesan Justice & Peace Commission and other Catholic organizations held a separate prayer service (*Asianews* June 6; *South China Morning Post* June 5; *The Washington Post* June 4).

June 6, 2011:

Vatican issues Canon Law declaration on question of excommunications resulting from illicit episcopal consecrations

China is not specifically mentioned in the “Declaration on the Correct Application of Canon 1382 of the Code of Canon Law,” issued by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. Nonetheless, observers are generally of the opinion that the episcopal consecration in Chengde last October and the threat of further illicit consecrations (see entry of April 11, 2011) were the real reasons for the declaration. According to Canon 1382, participation in an episcopal consecration which takes place without Papal mandate incurs the penalty of a excommunication *latae sententiae* [i.e., a penalty which takes effect automatically by the very fact itself of the act of participation]. The new declaration states that this penalty applies not only to the principal consecrator and to the one illicitly consecrated but also to the Bishops who function as co-consecrators (Point 3). Canon 1324, § 1,5°, however, envisions mitigating circumstances if the action was done by “a person who acted coerced by grave fear, even if only relatively grave, or due to necessity or grave inconvenience.” This mitigating circumstance (as well as the fact of physical force which frees one from penalty) has to be established for each and every one of those who participate (Point 4). Since the action of participation is an occasion of scandal and confusion for the faithful, the participating Bishops are called upon to “reestablish their authority through signs of unity and repentance.” The declaration reiterates the fact that it is forbidden for anyone who has incurred the penalty of excommunication to take part (as celebrant) in any Eucharistic celebration, to administer or to receive the sacraments, or to exercise any ecclesiastical office. Nevertheless, any sacraments administered under such sacrilegious circumstances would still be valid, even if gravely illicit (Point 5). It may also be that the Holy See, under certain circumstances, might even see itself constrained to impose direct penalties. If an excommunicated bishop has demonstrated genuine repentance, he has the right to be freed from the excommunication. Only the Holy See can make such a determination and lift the excommunication (Point 6). – The declaration, dated June 6, appeared in *L’Osservatore Romano* on June 11 (*Asianews* June 13; *UCAN* June 14; www.vatican.va).

June 8, 2011:

Ye Xiaowen: Why the Chinese Communist Party can unite religious believers


According to Ye Xiaowen (until 2009 Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs and since then Party Secretary of the Central Institute of Socialism, in a leading article published in the *People’s Daily Online*), this is due to the fact that the Party, which does not itself believe in the existence of deities, carries out a policy of guaranteeing freedom of religious belief. This policy expresses first of all the fundamental methodology of the Party of proceeding from what exists materially and objectively. Secondly, this policy expresses the Party principle of serving the people and of preserving the people’s fundamental rights – among which is the right to freely choose one’s own religious belief. Thirdly, it is necessary for China that religions play a positive role in China. Atheists and believers both have commonly shared fundamental interests. Fourthly, the policy of religious freedom is a part of China’s historical and cultural tradition. The harmonious coexistence in China of adherents of various religions together with non-believers stands as another Chinese marvel second only to China’s economic miracle (*People’s Daily Online* June 8).

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People's Republic of China: Churches and Religions Annual Statistical Overview 2010/2011

Roman Malek

Translated by David Streit



In a certain sense we can speak of a breakthrough in the area of statistics on religion in the People's Republic of China since statistical data on the religious affiliation of the Chinese are being officially published with ever greater frequency, and in so doing the previously unofficial statistical data of the various organizations are being at least partially included in the publications. The extent of the breakthrough becomes even clearer if we take a look at the *Blue Book of Religions* (*Zongjiao lanpi shu* 宗教蓝皮书) for the year 2010, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Its title is *Zhongguo zongjiao baogao* 中国宗教报告 (2010). *Annual Report on China's Religions* (2010) (Beijing 2010). The statistics presented have also been disseminated by *China Daily* and by other media.

The *Blue Book* (henceforth *BB*) also presents statistical data on Christianity.¹ The review *Dangdai zongjiao yanjiu* 当代宗教研究 (Contemporary Religious Studies), published by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, presents another example. In the second issue for 2010 there appeared a detailed study on Protestant religious personnel (*jiaozhi ren-yuan* 教职人员), which is based on a census, though neither names of places or provinces are given. From these studies we learn, for example, that in place N.N., 33% of Protestant religious personnel have a university or college education, while 27% have only an elementary education. Furthermore, 26% have attended secondary school and 14% have obtained a senior middle school diploma. These and similar statistics, which do not appear for the first time in this publication, naturally contribute details to the overall map of the general condition of religions in China although they are still too few and far apart for us to be able to use them to draw broad general conclusions.

This article was first published under the title "Volksrepublik China: Kirchen und Religionen. Statistischer Jahresüberblick 2010/2011" in *China heute* 2011, No. 1, pp. 27-40.

1 For a discussion of the work, see Anthony Lam, "A Review of the Development of Christianity in China from the latest edition of *Blue Book of Religions* (2010)," in: *Tripod* 2010, No. 159, pp. 54-62. For a French translation, see *Eglises d'Asie* 2011, No. 544, pp. 22-27. The information of the *BB* is also available online.

The following statistical data naturally take into account the data from the *BB* and other official publications. They are, however, assembled as every year (cf. *China heute* 2010, No. 1, pp. 22-33) on the basis of information published during the course of the year and culled in particular from the reviews *Xinde (Faith)*, *Tripod*, and *Zhongguo Tianzhujiào*, *South China Morning Post*, *Times Online*, *China Daily*, from the news agencies, especially *UCAN* and *Xinhua*, or published on the internet (www.asianews.it; www.fides.org; www.pewforum.org; www.assistnews.net; www.chinapartner.org among others) as well as from other (mostly private) unpublished sources. These data are in no way to be deemed complete or exhaustive. As is ever the case, religious statistics vary widely and sometimes even appear to be contradictory. At most they can give indications of general tendencies in the condition of the religions, and particularly in the situation of Christianity and of the Catholic Church in the PR China.

These statistical data are being supplemented by other statistical information, which attempt to give a picture of the ever changing context in which the religions and churches in China live and work, and through which they are continually challenged.

According to the data of the *BB*, the number of Christians (Protestants) in the People's Republic of China is about 23 million (1.8% of the population), for which the distinction is made between baptized (67.5%) and unbaptized (32.5%) Christians. The number of Catholics is reckoned at 5.7 million (presumably without the so-called "underground Catholics").

The study also shows growth in the other officially recognized religions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam. The number of Protestant churches and meeting points is given as being over 55,000 – most of which have been established or built in the last ten years. To date, more than 80 million Chinese Bibles have been printed.

As indicated in the *BB*, the statistics presented are simply "lowest estimates." As Janice Wickeri has partially established in her presentation of the numbers for the Protestant Christians, but which can be more or less generalized for all the religions, three points should be kept in mind: 1) Statistics on religions are a sensitive topic for local officials, who often do not want to have any census and for pragmatic reasons do not wish to have to deal with large numbers of faithful; 2) Statistics are also a sensitive topic for the faithful themselves, since they still do not dare to acknowledge their religiosity publicly, not knowing how, by whom, and for what purposes such data might be used; 3) Those who are not yet baptized do not readily identify themselves as "Christians," since the churches themselves do not officially recognize them as such, or because they themselves want to understand their "being Christian" as not affiliated with a specific church.²

Understandably, there are also different statistics about the number of Christians depending on which "camp" one is in and depending on one's sympathies. Thus some sources give the number as between 40 and 130 million. Already in 2006, the then-director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (Bureau for Religious Affairs), Ye Xiaowen,

2 For a general view of the problem of religious statistics in the PR China see also Benoît Vermander, "Religious Revival and Exit from Religion in Contemporary China," in: *China Perspectives* 2009, No. 4, pp. 5-8. Yao Xinzhong and Paul Badham offer a social analysis of statistical data from various religions (including Christianity) in the PR China in their book *Religious Experience in Contemporary China* (Cardiff 2007).

estimated the number of Christians at about 130 million, though this information was denied by the Foreign Ministry. Other groups and researchers speak of about 54 million Christians in China. The semi-official statistical data generally do not take into account the “unregistered” faithful of the house churches or the Catholic underground Church.

Now as before, only Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism are officially recognized. The Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a certain recognition in areas where a Russian minority is to be found. The *BB* deals above all with the recognized religions, although it is interesting that it also includes an article on the various manifestations of Confucianism in popular culture as well as an article on the re-awakening of the (not officially recognized) popular religion.

With regard to the recognized religions, the *BB* ascertains that the development of Buddhism is being impaired by economic commercialism, even though it seems to be going through a “golden age” of development; Daoist ideals are being undermined by secularization; Muslims in China sense that there is a growing chasm between the history of their religion and modernity; and the Catholic Church finds itself with the dilemma of being squeezed between state promoted independence and the wish to normalize relations with the Vatican.

Approximately 86% of Chinese have some kind of religious belief, even though it may not be publicly practiced or acknowledged. Of the various religions, some observers note a strong growth in Buddhism (approx. 18% annually). It is estimated, for example, that there are currently more than 200 million practicing Buddhists. The number of visitors to the more than 130,000 religious sites throughout the country (many of which are admittedly also tourist attractions), seem to bear out this observation. Some famous temple complexes bring in as much as 100 million Yuan annually and have become significant economic factors in their respective regions.

The Catholic Church

For the Catholic Church in the PR China the statistics for the year 2010 indicate a diverse variety of data. In the following layout the data for the years 2009/2010 were brought up to date and contrasted with those of the *BB*, compiled by Wang Meixiu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute for World Religions (pp. 89-110). It is evident that the data of the *BB* were simply taken over from *Xinde* and are not based on any new census, although there are some significant complementary data as well as conclusions. Further numbers come from the Holy Spirit Study Centre (HSSC) in Hong Kong. Number of bishops and dioceses with/without bishops here and in the following as of December 2010.

Catholics

	5.714,853 million (<i>Xinde</i>)
Official	5.7 million (HSSC)
Estimates	12 to 14 million
<i>BB</i>	same figure as <i>Xinde</i> , although it is admitted (p. 98) that in the Catholic Church there is a “special situation” (<i>teshu qingkuang</i> 特殊情況) and

that therefore the number of Catholics might be more than 6 million – it could be anywhere from 6–12 million.

Even though the *BB* does not go into detail, this is the first time that the admission is being made that the number of Catholics is larger than in the official figures, even though it still does not rise above 1% of the population. These Catholics find themselves among 1.3 billion Chinese (1 Catholic to approximately 300,000 non-Catholics), that is, they constitute a minority and are, in addition, a “marginal group.” It would be good here to add as well the view of the statisticians that Catholics are not keeping up to the general population of the country in terms of proportional growth.

Dioceses

Official	97 (40 without bishop)
<i>BB</i>	100
HSSC	138 (116 active, 22 “inactive”); this is the number of dioceses which still exist from the canonical erection of the Hierarchy in China in 1946, even though some of them are not “active.”
De facto	79 “active” and 27 without bishop (see below: the line-up of bishops and dioceses).

Bishops

Official	65 (HSSC)
Underground	38 (HSSC)
De facto	99 (total) (see the line-up of bishops and dioceses below)

Priests

3,397 (*Xinde*). *BB* gives this figure as including all bishops, priests, and deacons.

Compared with the total number of Catholics, this is a very modest number: approximately one member of the clergy per 3,000 Catholics. This ratio differs, of course, from region to region. Some dioceses have a surplus of priests. Yet there is a lack of inter-diocesan cooperation and mutual support. One further problem with the statistics for priests is that while we have the more or less real number of newly ordained priests, we have no data about the number of priests who die each year.

Official	1,900 (HSSC)
Underground	1,300 (HSSC)

Sisters

5,451 (*Xinde*). *BB* gives the same figure.

Official	3,800 (HSSC)
Underground	1,550 (HSSC)

Here, too, we come to the conclusion that while we have the more or less correct number of sisters who pronounce vows, we have no statistics for the number of sisters who die annually.

Convents

106 (*Xinde*). *BB* gives the same figure.

Sisters' Novitiates

Official 40 with approximately 100 sisters in formation (HSSC)

Underground 20 with approximately 100 sisters in formation (HSSC)

Here the number of those actually entering or departing during novitiate is not known.

Seminaries and Seminarians

10 with approximately 628 seminarians (*Xinde*)

BB same

Official 10 with 630 seminarians (HSSC)

Also here, the annual statistics for those entering or leaving the seminary before completing formation are not known.

Minor Seminaries

30 with 630 seminarians (*Xinde*)

BB same

Official 30 with 600 seminarians (HSSC)

Underground 10 with approximately 550 seminarians (HSSC)

The statistics of *Xinde* for the year 2010 make mention of 350 **religious in "male orders"** (*sic!*). *BB* also mentions 350 religious in male orders (*nan xiuhui* 男修会) and comments (p. 98, note 2), that these religious belong to international congregations such as the Franciscans, the Society of the Divine Word (SVD), and the Jesuits. This admission is, in fact, a real breakthrough, since in the past there was total official silence about the existence in PR China of male religious belonging to international orders, all of which are still officially forbidden.

With reference to the **number of churches**, all of the statistical sources are in agreement. It is generally said that there are about 6,000 churches and chapels in China. *BB* mentions 5,967 churches and chapels.

The social and cultural work of the Catholic Church is beginning to grow in importance. The *Xinde* Institute for Cultural Studies has produced a list (admittedly incomplete) of these establishments in various Chinese dioceses (see *China heute* 2010, No. 1, pp. 23ff.).

Xinde-Information names 422 Catholic institutions. The *BB* refers to more than 400 institutions (p. 98), among which are three publishing houses, three research institutes, 220 small clinics, 11 hospitals, 81 homes for the aged, 22 homes for the handicapped or rehab centers, 44 kindergartens, and 35 regional or diocesan social service organizations. The report also notes that more than 80 religious sisters work in state health organizations. On principle, only those institutions are indicated which are under the official Church. Since the statistics from 2010 have not changed much, they were not repeated this year.

New Leadership Boards of the Catholic Church in PR China

The 8th National Assembly of Catholic Representatives in the PR China (see *China heute* 2010, No. 4, pp. 208f.) finally met in December of 2010, after numerous postponements. At this assembly the new leadership of the official Bishops' Conference and of the Patriotic Association were "elected." Without going into the complex problems of this very controversial decision, the line-up of the new Church functionaries is as follows:

Bishops' Conference

Chairman: Bishop *Ma Yinglin (Kunming)³

Vice-Chairmen: Bishops Fang Xingyao (Linyi), *Zhan Silu (Mindong), Fang Jianping (Tangshan), Li Shan (Beijing), Pei Junmin (Liaoning), Yang Xiaoting (Yan'an)

Secretary General: Bishop *Guo Jincai (Chengde)

Honorary Chairmen: Mr. Liu Bainian and Bishop Jin Luxian (Shanghai)

Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association

Chairman: Bishop Fang Xingyao (Linyi)

Vice-Chairmen: Bishops: *Ma Yinglin, *Guo Jincai, Shen Bin (Haimen), Meng Qinglu (Hohhot); Priests: Lei Shiyin (Leshan), Huang Bingzhang (Shantou), Yue Fusheng (Harbin); Sister Wu Lin (Hubei) und Mr. Shu Nanwu (Nanchang)

Secretary General: Mr. Liu Yuanlong (Beijing)

Advisors: Bishops: *Tu Shihua (Huangshi/Beijing), Liu Jinghe (Tangshan), Li Mingshu (Qingdao), Yu Runchen (Hanzhong); Lay: Yu Jiadi (Anhui), Lu Guocun (Guangdong), Zhou Xiaowu (Shanghai), Liu Deshen (Chongqing)

Honorary Chairmen: Mr. Liu Bainian und Bishop Jin Luxian

Bishops Deceased in 2010

1. Wang Chonglin (1921–2010), Zhaoxian (Hebei)
2. Jiang Taoran (1926–2010), Shijiazhuang (Hebei)
3. Yang Shudao (1919–2010), Fuzhou (Fujian)

* Consecrated without appointment from the Holy See.

Bishops Consecrated in 2010

1. Cai Bingrui, Xiamen (Fujian)
2. Han Yingjin, Sanyuan (Shaanxi)
3. Li Suguang, Nanchang (Jiangsu)
4. Meng Ningyou, Taiyuan (Shanxi)
5. Meng Qinglu, Hohhot (Inner Mongolia)
6. Shen Bin, Haimen (Jiangsu)
7. Wu Junwei (Yuncheng, Shanxi)
8. Xu Jiwei, Taizhou (Zhejiang)
9. Yang Xiaoting, Yan'an (Yulin, Shaanxi)
10. Yang Yongqiang, Zhoucun (Shandong)
11. *Guo Jincai, Chengde (Hebei)

Installation as Official Bishops

The installation of former underground bishops as officially recognized diocesan bishops is a new and controversial phenomenon in the Catholic Church in China – controversial and hotly disputed in various regions principally because it leads to further divisions. Motivated by Pope Benedict XVI's 2007 letter to the Catholic Church in China, some underground bishops are either attempting to register with the State Administration for Religious Affairs so as to be able to work out in the open, or they are being manipulated and used by the Patriotic Association and installed as "official bishops." To date, the following cases are known:

1. An Shuxin, installed as the official Bishop of Baoding (Hebei)
2. Du Jiang, installed as the official Bishop of Bameng (Shanba, Inner Mongolia)
3. Zhu Weifang, installed as the official Bishop of Wenzhou (Zhejiang)

Since there now continue to be, as always in the past, conflicting statistics on the number of bishops and dioceses, we present below an alphabetical **list of the bishops in the PR China** for the year 2010 [changes until mid-June 2011 in brackets]. The list includes all bishops – ordinaries, coadjutors, auxiliary bishops, and retired bishops – irrespective of their "affiliation" to either the underground or to the official Church; they are all bishops of the Catholic Church in China:

1. An Shuxin 安树新, Baoding (Heb)
2. Cai Bingrui 蔡炳瑞, Xiamen (FJ)
3. Cao Xiangde 曹缙德, Hangzhou (ZJ)
4. Chen Shizhong 陈适中, Yibin (SC)
5. Dang Mingyan 党明彦, Xi'an (SN)
6. Du Jiang 杜江, Shanba (NM)
7. Fan Zhongliang 范忠良, Shanghai (SH)
8. Fang Jianping 方建平, Tangshan (Heb)
9. Fang Xingyao 房兴耀, Linyi (SD)
10. Fang Zhigang 方志刚, Wenzhou (ZJ)

11. Feng Xinmao 封新卯, Hengshui (Heb)
12. Gan Junqiu 甘俊丘, Guangzhou (GD)
13. Gao Hongxiao 高宏孝, Kaifeng (Hen)
14. Gu Zheng 顾征, Xining (QH)
15. Guo Chuanzhen 郭传真, Jinan (SD)
16. Guo Jincai 郭金才, Chengde (Heb)
17. Han Jide 韩纪德, Pingliang (GS)
18. Han Jingtao 韩井涛, Siping (JL)
19. Han Yingjin 韩英进, Sanyuan (SN)
20. Han Zhihai 韩志海, Lanzhou (GS)
21. Hao Jinli 郝进礼, Xiwanzi (Chongli, Heb) [died March 9, 2011]
22. He Zeqing 何泽清, Wanzhou (CQ)
23. Hou Guoyang 侯国阳, Chongqing (CQ)
24. Hu Xiande 胡贤德, Ningbo (ZJ)
25. Huang Shoucheng 黄守城, Fu'an (FJ)
26. Huo Cheng 霍成, Lüliang (SX)
27. Jia Zhiguo 贾治国, Zhengding (Heb)
28. Jin Daoyuan 靳道远, Lu'an (Changzhi) (SX)
29. Jin Dechen 靳德辰, Nanyang (Hen)
30. Jin Luxian 金鲁贤, Shanghai (SH)
31. Lan Shi 蘭石, Sanyuan (SN)
32. Li Hongguang 李宏光, Yuncheng (Jiangzhou, SX)
33. Li Hongye 李宏业, Luoyang (Hen) [died April 23, 2011]
34. Li Jiantang 李建唐, Taiyuan (SX)
35. Li Jing 李晶, Yinchuan (NX)
36. Li Jingfeng 李镜峰, Fengxiang (SN)
37. Li Liangui 李连贵, Cangzhou (Heb)
38. Li Mingshu 李明术, Qingdao (SD)
39. Li Shan 李山, Beijing (BJ)
40. Li Side 李思德, Tianjin (TJ)
41. Li Suguang 李稣光, Nanchang (JX)
42. Li Yi 李毅, Changzhi (SX)
43. Liao Hongqing 廖宏清, Meizhou (GD)
44. Lin Jiashan 林加善, Fuzhou (FJ)
45. Liu Guandong 刘冠东, Yixian (Heb)
46. Liu Jinghe 刘景和, Tangshan (Heb)
47. Liu Jingshan 刘静山, Yinchuan (NX)
48. Liu Shigong 刘世功, Wumeng (NM)
49. Liu Xinhong 刘新红, Anhui (AH)
50. Lu Xinping 陆新平, Nanjing (JS)
51. Lü Shouwang 吕守旺, Yichang (HB) [died April 30, 2011]
52. Ma Cunguo 马存国, Shuozhou (SX)
53. Ma Xuesheng 马学圣, Zhoucun (SD)

54. Ma Yinglin 马英林, Kunming (YN)
55. Ma Zhongmu 马仲牧, Chengchuan (NM)
56. Meng Ningyou 孟宁友, Taiyuan (SX)
57. Meng Qinglu 孟清录, Hohhot (NM)
58. Pei Junmin 裴军民, Shenyang (LN)
59. Qian Yurong 钱余荣, Xuzhou (JS)
60. Shao Zhumin 邵祝民, Wenzhou (ZJ)
61. Shen Bin 沈斌, Haimen (JS)
62. Shi Enxiang 师恩祥, Yixian (Heb)
63. Shi Hongzhen 石鸿桢, Tianjin (TJ)
64. Su Yongda 苏永大, Zhanjiang (GD)
65. Su Zhimin 苏志民, Baoding (Heb)
66. Sun Zhibin 孙知宾, Yidu (SD)
67. Tan Yanquan 谭燕全, Nanning (GX)
68. Tong Changping 同长平, Weinan (SN)
69. Tong Hui 童辉, Yan'an (Yulin, SN)
70. Tu Shihua 涂世华, Puqi (HB), resides in Beijing
71. Wang Chongyi 王充一, Guiyang (GZ)
72. Wang Jin 王荃, Yuci (SX)
73. Wang Milu 王觅录, Tianshui (GS)
74. Wang Renlei 王仁雷, Xuzhou (JS)
75. Wei Jingyi 魏景仪, Harbin (HL)
76. Wu Junwei 武俊维, Yuncheng (SX)
77. Wu Qinjing 吴钦敬, Zhouzhi (SN)
78. Wu Shizhen 吴仕珍, Nanchang (JX)
79. Xiao Zejiang 肖泽江, Guiyang (GZ)
80. Xie Tingzhe 谢庭哲, Urumqi (XJ)
81. Xing Wenzhi 邢文之, Shanghai
82. Xu Honggen 徐宏根, Suzhou (JS)
83. Xu Jiwei 徐吉伟, Taizhou (ZJ)
84. Yang Xiangtai 杨祥太, Handan (Heb)
85. Yang Xiaoting 杨晓亭, Yan'an (Yulin, SN)
86. Yang Yongqiang 杨永强, Zhoucun (SD)
87. Ye Ronghua 叶荣华, Ankang (SN)
88. Yu Runshen 余润深, Hanzhong (SN)
89. Yuan Wenzai 袁文宰, Haimen (JS)
90. Zeng Jingmu 曾景牧, Fuzhou (JX)
91. Zhan Silu 詹思禄, Mindong (FJ)
92. Zhang Huaixin 张怀信, Anyang (Hen)
93. Zhang Weizhu 张维柱, Xinxiang (Hen)
94. Zhang Xianwang 张献旺, Jinan (SD)
95. Zhao Fengchang 赵凤昌, Liaocheng (SD)
96. Zhao Kexun 赵克勋, Xuanhua (Heb)

- 97. Zhu Baoyu 朱宝玉, Nanyang (Hen)
- 98. Zhu Weifang 朱维方, Wenzhou (ZJ)
- 99. Zong Huaide 宗怀德, Sanyuan (SN)

The following **dioceses** currently have **at least one bishop**. The list includes all dioceses with a bishop, irrespective of whether they were combined by the official Church or – as in the unofficial Church – listed according to the old canonical hierarchy as drawn up in 1946:

1. Anhui 安徽 (AH): Liu Xinhong
2. Ankang 安康 (SN): Ye Ronghua
3. Anyang 安阳 (Hen): Zhang Huaixin
4. Baoding 保定 (Heb): Su Zhimin; An Shuxin
5. Beijing 北京 (BJ): Li Shan
6. Cangzhou 沧州 (Xianxian 献县, Heb): Li Liangui
7. Changzhi 长治 (SX): Li Yi
8. Chengchuan 城川 (NM): Ma Zhongmu
9. Chengde 承德 (Rehe 热河, Heb): Guo Jincai
10. Chongqing 重庆 (CQ): Hou Guoyang
11. Fengxiang 凤翔 (SN): Li Jingfeng
12. Fu'an 福安 (Mindong 闽东, FJ): Huang Shoucheng
13. Fuzhou 福州 (FJ): Lin Jiashan
14. Fuzhou 抚州 (JX): Zeng Jingmu
15. Guangzhou 广州 (GD): Gan Junqiu
16. Guiyang 贵阳 (GZ): Wang Chongyi; Xiao Zejiang
17. Haimen 海门 (JS): Yuan Wenzai; Shen Bin
18. Handan 邯郸 (Heb): Yang Xiangtai
19. Hangzhou 杭州 (ZJ): Cao Xiangde
20. Hanzhong 汉中 (SN): Yu Runshen
21. Harbin 哈尔滨 (Qiqihar 齐齐哈尔, HL): Wei Jingyi
22. Hengshui 衡水 (Jingxian 景县, Heb): Feng Xinmao
23. Hohhot 呼和浩特 (NM): Meng Qinglu
24. Jinan 济南 (SD): Guo Chuanzhen; Zhang Xianwang
25. Kaifeng 开封 (Hen): Gao Hongxiao
26. Kunming 昆明 (YN): Ma Yinglin
27. Lanzhou 兰州 (GS): Han Zhihai
28. Liaocheng 聊城 (Yanggu 阳谷, SD): Zhao Fengchang
29. Linyi 临沂 (SD): Fang Xingyao
30. Lu'an 潞安 (Changzhi 长治, SX): Jin Daoyuan
31. Lüliang 吕梁 (Fenyang 汾阳, SX): Huo Cheng
32. Luoyang 洛阳 (Hen): Li Hongye [died April 23, 2011]
33. Meizhou 梅州 (GD): Liao Hongqing
34. Mindong 闽东 (FJ): Zhan Silu
35. Mindong 闽东 (Fu'an 福安, FJ): Huang Shoucheng
36. Nanchang 南昌 (JX): Wu Shizhen, Li Suguang

37. Nanjing 南京 (JS): Lu Xinping
38. Nanning 南宁 (GX): Tan Yanquan
39. Nanyang 南阳 (Hen): Jin Dechen; Zhu Baoyu
40. Ningbo 宁波 (ZJ): Hu Xiande
41. Pingliang 平凉 (GS): Han Jide
42. Puqi 浦圻 (HB): Tu Shihua
43. Qingdao 青岛 (SD): Li Mingshu
44. Sanyuan 三原 (SN): Zong Huaide; Lan Shi; Han Yingjin
45. Shanba 陕坝, Bameng (NM): Du Jiang
46. Shanghai 上海 (SH): Fan Zhongliang; Jin Luxian; Xing Wenzhi
47. Shenyang 沈阳 (LN): Pei Junmin
48. Shuozhou 朔州 (SX): Ma Cunguo
49. Siping 四平 (Changchun 长春, JL): Han Jingtao
50. Suzhou 苏州 (JS): Xu Honggen
51. Taiyuan 太原 (SX): Li Jiantang; Meng Ningyou
52. Taizhou 台州 (ZJ): Xu Jiwei
53. Tangshan 唐山 (Heb): Liu Jinghe; Fang Jianping
54. Tianjin 天津 (TJ): Li Side; Shi Hongzhen
55. Tianshui 天水 (GS): Wang Milu
56. Urumqi 乌鲁木齐 (XJ): Xie Tingzhe
57. Wanzhou 万州 (CQ): He Zeqing
58. Weinan 渭南 (SN): Tong Changping
59. Wenzhou 温州 (ZJ): Fang Zhigang; Zhu Weifang; Shao Zhumin
60. Wumeng 乌蒙 (NM): Liu Shigong
61. Xi'an 西安 (SN): Dang Mingyan
62. Xiamen 厦门 (FJ): Cai Bingrui
63. Xining 西宁 (QH): Gu Zheng
64. Xinxiang 新乡 (Hen): Zhang Weizhu
65. Xiwanzi 西湾子 (Chongli 崇礼, Heb): Hao Jinli [died March 9, 2011]
66. Xuanhua 宣化 (Zhangjiakou 张家口, Heb): Zhao Kexun
67. Xuzhou 徐州 (JS): Qian Yurong; Wang Renlei
68. Yan'an 延安 (Yulin 榆林, SN): Tong Hui; Yang Xiaoting
69. Yibin 宜宾 (SC): Chen Shizhong
70. Yichang 宜昌 (HB): Lü Shouwang [died April 30, 2011]
71. Yidu 益都 (SD): Sun Zhibin
72. Yinchuan 银川 (NX): Liu Jingshan; Li Jing
73. Yixian 易县 (Heb): Liu Guandong; Shi Enxiang
74. Yuci 榆次 (SX): Wang Jin
75. Yuncheng 运城 (Jiangzhou 絳州, SX): Li Hongguang; Wu Junwei
76. Zhanjiang 湛江 (GD): Su Yongda
77. Zhengding 正定 (Shijiazhuang 石家庄, Heb): Jia Zhiguo
78. Zhoucun 周村 (SD): Ma Xuesheng; Yang Yongqiang
79. Zhouzhi 周至 (SN): Wu Qinjing

De facto, the following 27 **dioceses** have **no bishop** at all (either official or underground):

1. Anlong 安龙 (GZ)
2. Chengdu 成都 (SC)
3. Chifeng 赤峰 (NM)
4. Datong 大同 (SX)
5. Hankou 汉口 (HB)
6. Heze 荷泽 (SD)
7. Hongdong 洪洞 (SX)
8. Hunan 湖南 (HN)
9. Jiangmen 江门 (GD) [as of March 30, 2011: Liang Jiansen 梁建森]
10. Jilin 吉林 (JL)
11. Jingzhou 荆州 (Shashi 沙市, HB)
12. Leshan 乐山 (SC)
13. Nanchong 南充 (SC)
14. Puyang 濮阳 (Hen)
15. Shangqiu 商丘 (Hen)
16. Shantou 汕头 (GD)
17. Shiqian 石阡 (GZ)
18. Xiangfan 襄樊 (HB)
19. Xichang 西昌 (SC)
20. Xingtai 邢台 (Heb)
21. Xinyang 信阳 (Hen)
22. Yantai 烟台 (SD)
23. Yanzhou 兖州 (SD) [as of May 20, 2011: Lü Peisen 吕培森]
24. Yidu 益都 (SD)
25. Zhengzhou 郑州 (Hen)
26. Zhumadian 驻马店 (Hen)
27. Apostolic Vicariate of Tibet (Xizang 西藏)

Priestly Ordinations

The *BB* lists 71 priestly ordinations for the year 2009, spread over 19 provinces (p. 99). As always, it is difficult to unearth exact statistics for priestly ordinations, especially in the unofficial Church. Here are the priestly ordinations known about with certainty for the year 2010:

- Anyang (Henan) 4
- Bameng (Inner Mongolia) 2
- Beijing 2
- Guiyang (Guizhou) 3
- Jinan (Shandong) 5
- Jinzhong (Yuci, Shanxi) 2
- Laohekou (Hubei) 1
- Linyi (Shandong) 2
- Macau 1

Mindong (Fujian) 2
 Nanning (Guangxi) 4
 Puzhong (Shanxi) 2
 Shanghai 6 (4 for Wenzhou)
 Shantou (Guangdong) 1 (first ordination in 10 years)
 Taiyuan (Shanxi) 2
 Xingtai (Hebei) 2
 Yichang (Hubei) 4
 Yongnian (Hebei) 2
 Zhanjiang (Guangdong) 2

Vows of Religious Sisters

According to the *BB*, 118 religious sisters professed perpetual vows in 2009 (p. 100). For 2010 the following numbers are known:


Datong (Shanxi) 1 temporal vows
 Handan (Hebei) 3 perpetual vows
 Hengshui (Hebei) 2 first vows, 4 temporal vows
 Linyi (Shandong) ? first vows
 Nanchong (Sichuan) 2 perpetual vows
 Qingdao (Shandong) 3 novices, 2 postulants
 Wenzhou (Zhejiang) 3 perpetual vows, 26 temporal vows
 Xianxian (Hebei) 3 perpetual vows
 Yongnian (Hebei) 6 perpetual vows

New Churches

Despite all obstacles being put in the way, many churches are still being built in China today – with all of the problems that go along with such activity. The related problems and complications are referred to in *China heute* (2009, No. 1, pp. 47-52 and 57-60). Happily, by the way, new churches being built in China are at least being built in a modern style, as the journal *Yage* reports (see also *China heute* 2010, No. 4, pp. 267f.). In 2010 churches were either newly built or restored in the following locations:

Baotou (Inner Mongolia)
 Daoli, Sanyuan (Shaanxi)
 Fushun, Shenyang (Liaoning)
 Haikou (Hainan): Laying of cornerstone
 Heze (Shandong): Cathedral
 Jianzhuang, Handan (Hebei)
 Lanzhou (Gansu): Consecration of a church built in 2006
 Laoheishan, Dongning (Heilongjiang)
 Qibao (Shanghai): Restoration of a church built in 1912
 Tancheng, Linyi (Shandong)
 Wangzong, Ningguo (Anhui)

- Weixian, Handan (Hebei)
- Wuhan (Hubei)
- Xianxian (Hebei)
- Xiweizhuang, Cangzhou (Hebei)
- Yongfuxian, Guilin (Guangxi)
- Zhunge'er (Inner Mongolia)



In Lanzhou (Province of Gansu) a 2.5 meter high marble statue of the Sacred Heart of Jesus was erected in front of the cathedral. On the base there is an inscription in Chinese and English with the words of Mt. 11,2: “Come unto Me, all who are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest.” St. Francis of Assisi’s “Prayer for Peace” is inscribed on the opposite side.

The new statue of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (left) and the inauguration ceremony (bottom).
Photos: Website of Lanzhou Diocese, www.catholiclz.org



Baptisms in 2010

Even though there are, on average, approximately 100,000 baptisms a year in China, they do not lead to the overall growth of the Church since this number more or less matches the estimated number of Catholics who die each year. According to the evaluation of *Xinde*, baptisms in the year 2010 show several noteworthy features: 1) There were more baptisms than in the previous year; 2) The neophytes were predominantly young people; 3) The educational level of the neophytes was higher than it has been in previous years; 4) Through these baptisms the situation of the faithful has changed in terms of evangeliza-

tion: there are now 25% of new believers who need to be evangelized. The following is a selection of the numbers of baptisms for 2010. For further, more exact data for individual parishes see www.chinacatholic.org.

Anyang (Henan)	31+51+26 (Easter)
Bameng (Inner Mongolia)	15 (August 15)
Baoding (Hebei)	15 (Easter), 17 (August 15)
Beijing	56 (Easter)
Cangzhou (Hebei)	29 (August 15), 19 (August 22)
Chongqing	96 (Easter), 38 (August 15)
Ezhoushi (Hubei)	9 (Easter)
Fenyang (Shanxi)	4 (August 15)
Haimen (Jiangsu)	20 (Easter)
Handan (Hebei) (various churches of the diocese)	45+99 (Easter), 30 (August 15)
Heilongjiang	18 (Easter)
Hengshui (Hebei)	28 (Easter), 38 (August 15)
Hongkong	3,000 (Easter)
Huangping (Guizhou)	20 (August 15)
Innere Mongolei	17+14 (Easter)
Jinan (Shandong)	26 (Easter)
Lanzhou (Gansu)	9 (Easter)
Mianzhu near Chengdu (Sichuan)	180 baptisms after the 2008 earthquake
Nanchong (Sichuan)	30 (Easter, predominantly young people)
Ningbo (Zhejiang)	16 (August 22, among whom are children of migrants)
Ningxia	11 (August 15)
Puning (Guangdong)	6 (August 15)
Puzhong (Shanxi)	14 (Easter)
Renqiu (Hebei)	30 (Easter)
Sanyuan (Shaanxi)	10 (Easter)
Shantou (Guangdong)	11 (August 15)
Taiyuan (Shanxi; various churches of the diocese)	55+28+60+21 (Easter)
Tianjin	34 (Easter), 206 (June 5), 39 (August 15)
Tianshui (Gansu)	13 (August 15)
Wenzhou (Zhejiang)	23 (hearing impaired)
Xi'an (Shaanxi)	50+14 (Easter)
Xiamen (Fujian)	7 (Easter)
Xingtai (Hebei)	24+19 (Easter)
Xining (Qinghai)	5 baptisms of Tibetans
Yibin (Sichuan)	21 (August 15)
Yinchuan (Ningxia)	90 (Easter)

Statistical Examples from the Dioceses

Diocese of Hengshui (Jingxian, Province of Hebei): The minor seminary at Hengshui accepted 20 new students of the 27 who had applied. Since its opening in 1994, the seminary

has educated 350 boys. Of these, 50 went on to the major seminary, although only 7 were eventually ordained priests.

Diocese of Hong Kong: There are over 350,000 Chinese and more than 170,000 foreign-born Catholics, for a total of about 530,000. Between 1950 and 2010 more than 480,000 persons were baptized in Hong Kong (approximately 5,000 in 2010). The diocese has 51 parishes, 1,600 catechists, and 1,200 men and women commissioned for various ministries. Hong Kong has more than 360 church run schools, of which 274 are Catholic and 90 are Anglican, with the remainder belonging to other denominations. Church schools are presently fighting for their independence, that is, they are trying to avoid a requirement that they create a governing board which would be independent of church control.

Diocese of Jiayi (Chiayi, Taiwan): This diocese comprises the City of Jiayi and the Districts of Jiayi and Yunlin. There are 12,000 Catholics, 31 diocesan priests, 18 religious priests, 1 deacon. 400 baptisms during the course of 2010. The diocese was erected in 1952 as an Apostolic Prefecture and 1962 promoted to a diocese.

Diocese of Jiangxi: Today this diocese combines the dioceses of Nanchang, Yujiang, and three other dioceses. It received a coadjutor bishop in 2010. There are more than 100,000 Catholics and 40 priests. Matteo Ricci lived in Nanchang in 1595, and it was in Nanchang that his first Chinese tracts were produced.

Diocese of Jinzhong (Yuci, Shanxi): Jinzhong was created in 1931. It has more than 20,000 Catholics, 30 priests, 29 seminarians, and 30 sisters belonging to the diocesan congregation of the Assumption of Mary. The diocese runs a clinic.

Diocese of Lanzhou (Gansu): There are more than 35,000 Catholics, 38 churches, 30 priests, 200 sisters from the three congregations of the Holy Family, the Holy Spirit, and the Daughters of Our Lady of China. There are 80 sister novices and 40 seminarians.

Diocese of Sanyuan (Shaanxi): More than 40,000 Catholics, 40 churches and 12 chapels, 38 priests, three sisters' congregations totaling several hundred religious.

Diocese of Shantou (Guangdong, erected 1946): There are 130,000 Catholics, 150 churches and chapels, 20 priests, 40 sisters (Congregation of Our Lady Queen of all Hearts). In 2010, 120 young men and women participated in a pastoral course to prepare them to assist the priests with religious instruction during their summer holidays.

Diocese of Taichung (Taichung, Taiwan): 26,464 Catholics in five deaneries, 35 parishes, 71 priests, 10 brothers, 114 sisters, 9 catechists, and 4 seminarians. The diocese is celebrating 100 years of evangelization.

Diocese of Taizhou (Zhejiang): 6,000 Catholics, 25 churches and five chapels, five priests, and nine sisters. Most of the faithful live in rural areas. After 50 years without a shepherd, the diocese finally received a bishop in 2010.

Diocese of Xining (Province of Qinghai), created in 1937 as an Apostolic Prefecture and cared for by the Divine Word Missionaries (SVD). Today Xining has more than 3,000

Catholics, six priests, and 17 sisters. The faithful gather for worship in three churches and 19 mission chapels.

Diocese of Yan'an (Yulin). Approximately 40,000 Catholics, 20 priests, and 24 sisters. The diocese encompasses a territory of 80,000 km². Bishop Yang Xiaoting was named as coadjutor in 2010. In March of 2011 he was installed as ordinary of the diocese.

Diocese of Yichang (Hubei): 22 priests, 11 sisters, and more than 20,000 faithful divided into 16 parishes.

Diocese of Zhaoxian (Hebei): more than 60,000 Catholics, 60 priests, 124 sisters, 170 students in the minor seminary, 52 in the major seminary, 1,145 churches and chapels. The Bishop of the diocese, Raymund Wang Chonglin, died in 2010.

Diocese of Zhengding: an underground diocese in Hebei Province; for which the official name is Shijiazhuang. There are over 150,000 Catholics, 60 churches and chapels, 100 priests, 60 seminarians, and numerous sisters in a couple of diocesan congregations. The former official Bishop of the diocese, Jiang Taoran, died in 2010. The legitimate Bishop Jia Zhiguo lives “underground,” and he is arrested frequently each year. In doing this, the government is trying to “coax” him to “come out” of the underground.

Shijiazhuang (Hebei): The Regional Major Seminary in Shijiazhuang, which featured in the news in 2010 due to the protest action undertaken by the seminarians, has provided formation for 472 seminarians since its opening in 1984. 420 of them have been ordained, and in that time, three of them have been appointed bishops.

Taipei: In 2010 the Regional Major Seminary in Taipei numbered 12 seminarians, the first time that the number had risen above 10. Of these, nine are from Taiwan and three are from Malaysia. Two come from the Archdiocese of Taipei itself, two from Hualian, two belong to the Order of Clerics Regular (Camillians), and one each comes from the Dioceses of Xinzhu, Taizhong, and Jiayi.

In Taiwan there are currently seven dioceses. There are 373 churches with resident priests. In addition, there are 354 mission stations and 120 chapels, which are only open during certain hours of the day. In the Diocese of Xinzhu (Hsinchu) alone, there are 76 such chapels. Since the number of faithful in Taiwan is continually declining, some churches and chapels are being used for other purposes. Thus the Cathedral of Hualian was converted into a museum. In the Diocese of Jiayi (Chiayi) 30 places of worship were converted into public service centers or other social organizations. Two churches have been converted into homes for the aged.

Up-to-date List of Catholic Internet Sites

In attempting to visit the pages given below, please be aware that they may not always open without problems. Everything depends on the moment-to-moment situation in the country and some sites may be blocked by the authorities for one reason or another.

Catholic Diocesan Websites

Baoding	www.bdcatholic.org
Beijing	www.catholic-bj.org
Beijing, Seminary	www.bjnsccl.com
Beijing Shangzhi Institute	www.shangzhi.org
Beijing <i>Tianguang bao</i>	www.tianguangbao.org
Chengde	www.catholic-cd.org
Chengdu	www.cddioocese.com
Chongqing	www.singo.org.cn/bbs
Dali	www.catholicdl.org
Dalian	www.dlcatholic.org.cn
Fengxiang	www.fxjq.org
Guangxi	www.catholicgx.org
Guizhou	www.gztzj.cn
Handan	www.hdcatholic.org
Hanzhong	www.hzdiocese.org
Harbin	www.bchjh.org
Heilongjiang	www.cgm66.cn
Hengshui	www.hstzj.com
Jilin	www.jlcatholic.com
Jilin, Seminary	www.jlseminary.com
Jining	www.catholicjn.org
Langfang	www.ccbbs.org
Lanzhou	www.catholiclz.org
Leshan	www.lstzj2009.com
Liaoning	www.lnjq.org ; www.lncatholic.org
Linyi	http://linyijiaoqu.blog.sohu.com
Macao	www.catholic.org.mo
Nanchong	www.nctzj.org
Nanjing	www.iyesu.cn
Nanyang	www.nycatholic.org
Ningbo	www.nbcatholic.org
Qiqihar	www.qqhrcatholic.org
Quanzhou	www.qztzj.org
Sanyuan	www.syjql.cn
Shanghai	www.catholicsh.org
Shenyang, Seminary	www.syseminary.org
Shijiazhuang, Jinde	www.jinde.org
Shijiazhuang, Seminary	www.hbcseminary.org
Sichuan, Patriotic Association	www.sctzj2006.com
Taiyuan, Diocese	www.tycatholic.cn
Taiyuan, Seminary	www.shanxixiuyuan.com
Tangshan	www.tsjq.org

Tianjin	www.catholic.tj.cn
Xi'an	www.rcxa.org
Xi'an, Caritas	www.caritasxa.org
Xianxian (Cangzhou)	www.xianxiancc.org
Xingtai	www.ccxtd.cn
Xuanhua	www.xhchina.org
Yunnan	www.catholicyn.org
Zhejiang	www.cczj.org
Zhouzhi	www.cnzcatholic.org

Other Relevant Catholic Sites

<http://catholicexchange.com>
<http://catholic-liturgy.org.hk>
<http://kkp.catholic.org.hk> (Diocesan newspaper *Gongjiao bao*)
<http://windowp.org>
www.amityteachers.net
www.cathlinks.org
www.catholiccentre.org.hk
www.catholic-liturgy.org.hk
www.catholic.org.hk
www.catholic.org.tw/theology
www.catholic.org.tw/witness
www.catholicworld.info
www.ccccn.org
www.cccjz.com
www.cecc.gov

This site contains the Annual Report of the China Commission of the US Congress, with detailed information on, among other things, political prisoners in the PR China and violations of human rights.

www.chinacatholic.org (*Xinde / Faith*, Shijiazhuang)
www.chinesemartyrs.ca
www.fides.org
www.hkcabi.org.hk
www.jlcatholicbible.com
www.kcg.org.tw
www.musicasacra.org.hk
www.pimehlc-org/homeen.html

This is the recently reorganized website of the PIME missionaries of Milan, Italy, who have been working in Hong Kong since 1858. The site gives comprehensive information on the priests, laity, and activities.

www.riccibase.com
www.sbofmhk.org
www.theology.org.hk

www.vatican.va/chinese/index.html

New to the Vatican site are the Chinese translations of the *Code of Canon Law* (CIC) and of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Previous versions of the website already contained the translation of the Bible and some of the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

Additional information about interesting sites can be found at the website of the Holy Spirit Study Centre:

www.hsstudyc.org.hk/en/en_link_mainland.html

Protestant Christians in China

According to the latest statistics, which can be found in the *BB* (pp. 190-212) and which were also compiled by Janice Wickeri,⁴ there are in China 23,050,000 Protestants of various denominations, that is, 1.8% of the population. The data are based on surveys taken in recent years. Other articles speak of 34-36 million Protestants.

There are, however, still further, higher figures, which are compiled from various sources and which include, among others, groups which have absolutely no connection or only a loose connection with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and with the China Christian Council. Thus, according to some articles, the Seventh Day Adventists in China have 4,000 communities with approximately 400,000 adherents.

67.5%, or 15.56 million, are counted as baptized Christians; 32.5%, or 7,490,000, are not yet baptized. 69.9% of the Protestants are women, an overwhelming majority. More than half (54.6%) of the Christians have only primary school education, only 2.6% have education at junior college level or above. The majority of Protestants, more than 60%, is from 35-64 years old. Most Protestant Christians live in East China and along the Yangtze.

The survey was taken in 54,360 households having a total of 211,750 persons in 2,718 villages and 321 districts. Households with no Christians in the family filled out only one questionnaire. Those households with Christians filled out a questionnaire for each Christian. Altogether, 63,680 questionnaires were handed out. 100% were returned. The survey questionnaire put the following 19 questions: 1) Number of persons in the family; 2) Gender; 3) Age; 4) Ethnic group; 5) Family status; 6) Educational level; 7) Profession; 8) Religious affiliation; 9) The age at which the person became a believer; 10) In which year was that? 11) Reasons for becoming a believer; 12) How did one come into contact with religious belief; 13) Frequency of participation in religious activities; 14) Location at which one participates in religious activities; 15) Attitude to other religions; 16) Attitude towards the tradition of "grave-sweeping" and *qingming*; 17) Are non-believers ready to be friends with believers? 18) Why do non-believers not believe? 19) Within the family are there believers of other religions? Janice Wickeri summarizes the results of the survey in the following points:

4 JW [Janice Wickeri], "Chinese Protestant Christians: Who, What, Where, Why – Findings of A Questionnaire Survey of Chinese Protestant Christian Households by the Institute of World Religions Research Group," in: *Amity News Service* 28 (2010) 10-12, pp. 6-8.

Growth of Protestantism: The Protestant churches have grown most rapidly since 1993. Believers from before 1965 make up only 3% of all Protestant Christians. 5.7% became Christians between 1966 and 1981; 17.9% between 1982 and 1992; 42.4% between 1992 and 2002; and 31% between 2003 and 2009. This means that 73.4% of Protestant Christians became believers since 1993.

Regional distribution: The regional distribution of Protestant Christians is as follows: East China 42.5%; Central China 29.2%; Northeast China 11.4%; Southwest China 6.6%; North China 4.9%; Northwest China 3.8 %; South China 1.6%.

Motives for conversion: 68.8% gave personal illness or the illness of a family member as the reason for becoming a Christian. In reality what is meant is the recovery from illness of oneself or of a family member. For 15% family traditions and influence were the crucial factor. 44% were introduced to Christianity by members of their immediate family or by other relatives. 46.5% were brought to Christianity by other believers or by friends.

Participation in religious activities and registration: 57.8% of Protestant Christians take part in religious activities “often”; 38.2% “sometimes” and only 3.9% admit that they do not take part. 67.9% go to registered churches and meeting points; 20.2% frequent unregistered churches and meeting points; 26.7% attend services in the homes of friends; 22.4% have services in their own homes. The survey shows that believers with a higher educational level generally go to the registered churches.

Age of Protestant Christians

- 35–64: over 60%
- 14 and younger: 0.6%
- 15–24: 3.7%
- 25–34: 5.9%
- 35–44: 16.1%
- 45–54: 23.4%
- 54–64: 24.6%
- 65 and older: 25.7%

Educational Level of Protestant Christians

- Primary school or less: 54.6%
- Junior middle school: 32.7%
- Senior middle school or technical middle school: 10.1%
- Junior College (*dazhuan*) and higher: 2.6%

Age at time of conversion: The survey shows that almost half of all Protestant Christians (44.4%) converted between the ages of 35 and 54. But there are regional differences. In Northeast China 54% converted between the ages of 35 and 54. In South China, however,

22.7% were younger than 14; 24.4% were between 25 and 34. This can be traced back to a greater influence of the family in South China. All told, 5.9% of Protestants were younger than 14 at the time of conversion; 9.5% were between 15 and 24; 16.5% between 25 and 34; 22.5% between 35 and 44; 21.9% between 45 and 54; 17% between 55 and 64; and 6.8% at age 65 or older.

Attitude toward other religions: 17.8% of Protestants regard other religions as “just as good as their own,” while 47.5% are of the opinion that other religions are not as good as Christianity.

Attitude toward the “grave-sweeping” and toward the qingming festival: The survey was trying to determine the extent of acceptance of traditional Chinese customs. 52.9% consider the “grave-sweeping” as a “traditional custom” and 57% believe that it is a form of “remembering the dead.” According to the census, most people identify with these traditional customs. 18.1%, for example, are of the opinion that these customs “protect the family.” However, 15.1% were convinced that these customs belong to the realm of “superstition.”

The Orthodox Church in the PR China

According to statistics drawn from various sources, the total number of Orthodox Christians in all of China is somewhere between 8,000 and 20,000 members. In an interview on March 16, 2011, Metropolitan Hilarion, in charge of Foreign Affairs at the Moscow Patriarchate, said that about 15,000 Orthodox Christians live in the PR China, even though officially there are no Orthodox priests present. He named Beijing, Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia as the main areas of the Orthodox Church (cf. *Interfax*, 16 March 2011). According to data compiled by Piotr Adamek SVD, of the Monumenta Serica Institute, Orthodox Christians are spread over the following areas of China:

Harbin (Heilongjiang)	120–200
Inner Mongolia	5,000–8,000
Xinjiang	3,000–9,000, of which
Urumqi	2,000–3,000
Kuldja/Yining	100–400
Dacheng/Czuguczak	2,000
Beijing	200–400
Shanghai	100
Hong Kong	150
Taiwan	200

Smaller communities of Orthodox Christians (15-20 persons) can be found in Tianjin, Guangzhou, and in Yunnan.

I. Patriarchate of Constantinople

- 1 Bishop (Metropolitan of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, Nektarios Tsilis)
- 2 Priests (1 in Hong Kong, 1 in Taiwan)

- 1 Church (Cathedral of St. Luke, Hong Kong: 704 Universal Trade Centre, 3 Arbuthnot Road, Central)
- 1 Chapel (Holy Trinity Community, Taipei: 4th Fl. No. 389-12 Shi-Yuen Road, Hsin-Dieng City)

II. Moscow Patriarchate

- 2 Chinese clerics in Shanghai (Michel Wang Quansheng, 87, and Protodeacon Evangel Lu Yaofu, 83)
- 4 Russian priests visit China on occasion and celebrate the liturgy
- 15 Seminarians from the PR China are currently studying in Russia

Churches

(a) accessible to Chinese:

St. Nicholas Church in Urumqi (Xinjiang)

St. Nicholas Church in Yining (Xinjiang)

Mother of God Church in Harbin (Heilongjiang)

St. Innocent of Irkutsk Church in Labdarin/Ergun (Inner Mongolia)

(b) accessible only to foreigners:

Ss. Peter and Paul Parish in Hong Kong

Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God in Beijing (in the Russian embassy)

Community in Shanghai (Liturgies are celebrated in the Russian consulate)

House chapel in Guangzhou

Community in Shenzhen

Community of the Most Holy Trinity in Macau (since 2009; no chapel of its own)

Internet Sites on the Orthodox Church in China

chinese.orthodoxy.ru – a webpage with information on the Orthodox Church in China.

No longer updated.

godaughter.com – a webpage of the Orthodox Church in Taiwan. In Chinese.

omhksea.org – a webpage of the Orthodox Metropolitan of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia (Patriarchate of Constantinople). In English and Greek.

orthodox.cn – a webpage of the Orthodox Fellowship of All Saints of China, USA, in collaboration with the Orthodox Brotherhood of Ss Peter and Paul in Hong Kong (Moscow Patriarchate). In Russian, English, and Chinese.

orthodox.tw (also: theological.asia and theology.cn) – a webpage of the Orthodox Church in Taiwan with material on theology und liturgy. In Chinese and partially in English.

orthodoxy.hk – a webpage of the Orthodox Brotherhood of Ss Peter and Paul in Hong Kong (Moscow Patriarchate). In Russian and English.

pravostok.ru – a webpage of the Orthodox Church in Russia, which sometimes carries information on the church in the Far East.

rusca.ru – a webpage of the Association for Russian Culture “Voskresenie” with information on the Orthodox Church in China. In Russian.

Blogs: There are also numerous blogs in Chinese, for example: orthodox.8bbs.cn (a Forum for Chinese members of the Orthodox Church); douban.com/group/orthodoxy (a Forum on Orthodox theology); johnsanidopoulos.com/search/label/Orthodoxy in Asia (Mystical theology. The Weblog of John Sanidopoulos).

Miscellany on the Chinese Context

According to preliminary figures of the National Bureau for Statistics (NBS) the **population** of China at the end of 2010 has reached 1.341 billion. The number of farmers-turned-workers grew to 242.23 million. The number of rural workers working outside their home towns increased by 5.5% to 153.35 million. According to figures of the NBS, 26.88 million live in poverty. According to forecasts of the Chinese Bureau for Population and Family Planning, the number of Chinese will reach almost 1.4 billion by 2015, and 1.65 billion by 2033. Of these, more than 700 million will live in the cities. This means that for the first time in the history of China the urban population will outnumber those living in rural areas. More than 200 million persons will be over 60 years of age. At present, China's population is 2.5 times larger than it was at the time of the founding of the PR China in 1949. The number of those over 65 increased last year by 7.25 million to 166.14 million (that is, 12% of the total population).

By 2010, the **population of Tibet** reached the figure of 2.93 million inhabitants, which means that it has doubled in the last 50 years. In 1959 1.23 million persons lived in Tibet. The average life expectancy of Tibetans increased during that same period from 35.5 years to 67 years.

Taiwan: The birth ratio in Taiwan is 1.05 births per woman (in the PR China the figure stands at 1.8). This means that there has been a dramatic reversal from 1951, when the rate was 7.04 births per woman and from 1984 when the rate was 2.1 births per woman. In 2010 a total of 191,310 children were born in Taiwan (3.7% fewer than in the previous year). This reality will have social consequences in areas such as the number of children in schools. The Ministry of Education predicts that by 2021 more than 164 schools will have to be closed. It will also mean that the population is aging. Today, one of ten persons is 65 years old. In future, it will be one out of every three. The change in birth patterns is also reflected in an imbalance between the sexes. Annually 109 boys are born to every 100 girls (from this, the Ministry of Health concludes that each year approximately 4,000 baby girls are aborted). These processes will naturally also have a trickle down effect on care for the elderly.

Children and women. In the PR China approximately 3 million children are “hidden” every year, due to the fact that they were not born according to the “One Child Policy.” They

were a second or a third child. However, it is common for parents to be able to regularize things by paying local authorities an “administrative fine” of at least 2,000 Yuan. According to statistics of the Ministry of Public Security, the Chinese police between April 2009 and May 2010 freed 4,743 abducted children and 8,703 women. More than 12,000 perpetrators were incarcerated.

According to government statistics, of the 7.1 million inhabitants of **Hong Kong**, 846,800 persons are living below the **poverty level**.

In **Taiwan** the Ministry of the Interior estimates that the number of families living below the **poverty level** is approximately 108,000 – almost 10,000 more than in the previous year.

More than 22 million persons and more than 7.4 million hectares of land in China are plagued by continual **water shortages and drought**, especially in the Provinces of Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, and in the City of Chongqing. There are also water distribution problems in the northern Provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, Gansu, and Ningxia. Official statistics show that almost half of the Chinese population does not have access to clean water, which causes almost 200 million illnesses and more than 60,000 deaths each year. Hydro dams built in China, such as the dam on the Lancang (Mekong) River, are the cause of water shortages farther down along the lower stretches of the river, that is, in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. In the region it is common to talk about “hijacking” the rivers.

The number of **HIV and AIDS cases**, according to activists in the PR China, could actually be ten times higher than official statistics indicate. The official numbers indicate more than 700,000 cases. Already three years ago, UNAids gave the number of HIV infected as more than 700,000 and of actual AIDS patients as 85,000. The official news agency *Xinhua* reported that according to official statistics of the Ministry of Health, there were in China 50,000 deaths among those infected with AIDS. The provinces hardest hit are Yunnan, Henan, Sichuan, Guangdong, Xinjiang, and Guangxi.

In **Hong Kong** there were 396 new known cases of **HIV infection** in 2010 (the previous year there had been 435). The total number of those infected with HIV is currently at 4,443 persons.

Suicide. According to statistics of the Taiwanese Ministry of Health for the year 2010, there were 4,063 incidents of suicide in Taiwan during 2009 (that is, approximately one every two hours!) – 65 less than in the previous year. The majority are males. The Ministry of Health runs a suicide prevention center which is open round the clock.

Internet. According to official Chinese statistics there are in China at least 384 million internet users, that is, 28.9% of the population. The annual increase amounts to 31.95 mil-

lion users. There are 3.23 million websites, and 233 million people telephone via internet. In addition, there are over 220 million bloggers in China.

According to their own statistics, in 2010 the **Chinese Communist Party** had 78 million members, an increase of 2 million, or 3%, since 2008. A report of *Renmin ribao* of June 28, 2010 says that in 2010 20 million applied for membership, but only 10% were accepted.

NGOs (Non-governmental organizations). According to statistics published by Deng Guosheng of Qinghua University, there are currently 425,000 registered NGOs in the PR China (there were only 4,500 in 1988) and approximately one to three million non-registered smaller and larger NGOs.

Christians in Hong Kong, according to a survey of the Church Renewal Movement, are characterized by weak social awareness. Of the 1,142 Protestant Chinese-language churches in Hong Kong only 20.6% have any kind of social outreach program, and social service stands at the end of a list of 20 themes of pastoral work. Most programs involve religious instruction (88.5%) and Bible (81.6%). Engagement for social purposes is generally prompted by current catastrophes and is temporary. The survey also shows that about half of the circa 600,000 Protestants take part in religious services each week. In 99.6% of the churches the service is conducted in Cantonese. Only 26 churches offer a service in English (2.1%). Nine other churches use Japanese, Korean, or another language (0.7%).

A small survey among the **Catholics in Hong Kong** (2,653 persons) has revealed that 30.6% did not do any Bible reading during the last year. 73.3% read the Bible only occasionally. As a reason for this, most of those questioned (43.1%) said that they were too busy. 800 admitted that they do not pray every day (28.1), again giving the excuse that they were too busy. 45% have not gone to confession in the last year, and 25.7% claim that it is not necessary since God is merciful.

In 2010 there were 22.85 million **university students in the PR China**, of whom 5 million came from poor families. Through the so-called “Green Channel,” that is, with state help and subsidies, 585,000 students were enrolled in a university. Every year families have to pay about 8,000 Yuan for the university studies of one child. For rural families this could mean an entire year’s income.

Students from the PR China. For the year 2011, Taiwanese universities and institutes of higher learning plan to admit approximately 2,000 students from the PR China. – During the 2009/2010 academic year, there were 128,000 Chinese students studying in the USA – a 30% increase over the previous year.

There are more than 300 “**Confucius Institutes**” spread over more than 90 countries of the world.

Chinese in Africa: The Chinese population in Madagascar and Mauritius amounts to more than 50,000 persons. The biggest Chinese group, about 300,000, lives in South Africa, with a “China Town” in Johannesburg. All in all, there are approximately one million mainland Chinese living in Africa. There are 50 Chinese-African “friendship schools” and also “Confucius Institutes” in 16 countries. The number of Africans studying in China has also risen to about 5,500 (especially in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xiamen, and Guangzhou).

There are currently about 54,000 Korean students in China. Overall there are more than 800,000 Koreans with residence in China, represented by an organization called “The Korean Community in China” (KCC). Koreans represent the largest group of foreigners in China. 150,000 live in Qingdao, 120,000 in Beijing, 80,000 in Shanghai, the rest are spread over various other cities. The Catholics among them are officially cared for pastorally by Korean priests.

Surveillance. Going by the statistics of various news agencies, the number of security or surveillance cameras mounted in different cities for the purpose of general surveillance is growing. In Urumqi there are about 60,000 cameras in the streets; in Guangzhou there are 2.2 million (also in connection with the Asian Games); in Chongqing 310,000, in Beijing 470,000, and in the smaller city of Xining 5,000. The total number of security cameras mounted in Shanghai in connection with Expo 2010 is not known. According to cautious estimates, Chinese cities are currently being watched by about seven million cameras. Others are being mounted or are in the planning.

A Look at the Statistics of 100 Years Ago

A comparison of the statistics of today with those of 100 years ago is always instructive. The Chinese Mission, as *Die Katholischen Missionen* report for 1910 (No. 5, pp. 125ff.), was making gratifying progress, according to reports sent in to the editors. Here are but a few examples – concentrating this time on regional development, since it is the historical reason for the Catholic Church becoming rooted in these regions.

The Lazarist Mission (Vincentians, CM) included seven Apostolic Vicariates (North-, East-, West-Zhili, Nord-, East-, South Jiangxi and Zhejiang), and counted 286,000 Christians in 3,580 parishes. The journal notes a particularly strong growth of Christians in what is today the Diocese of Baoding, at that time North-Zhili. 520 sisters worked in the schools and hospitals, together with 2,300 men and women teachers. The mission had almost 1,500 churches, chapels, and mission stations. “Following the Boxer troubles, there has been a strong movement to Christianity. The Christians assembled, filled with new courage, and on top of the ruins more beautiful churches rose up than there had been before. In the individual mission areas, a much more cohesive organization was introduced.”

According to the same sources, there was an equally gratifying progress in the French Jesuit (SJ) missions of Jiangnan (No. 4, p. 96). The statistics describe 25 mission districts, 1,191 parishes, 184,364 baptized, 110,758 catechumens, 8,383 adult baptisms (of which

1,230 were deathbed baptisms), 6,517 infant baptisms, 1,680 marriages, 645 boys' schools with 15,226 pupils, 589 girls' schools with 10,216 pupils. 153 priests were laboring in the mission, of whom 24 were Chinese Jesuits and 41 were diocesan priests – all together 194 priests. “Thus far 103 Chinese priests have gone out from the mission seminary, of whom 26 were Jesuits. 7 work in North-Shandong, 5 in Hubei, and one each in Guangdong and Hong Kong. ... Of the 103, 5 completed their studies in Europe, 4 in the Holy Family Seminary in Naples, and one in the Propaganda in Rome” (No. 5, p. 26).

For the Apostolic Vicariate of Southeast-Zhili (today in the Province of Hebei) the journal noted (1910, No. 3, p. 73) the following: 65,024 Christians, 8,861 catechumens, 341 churches and chapels, 1,630 “outstations,” 2 major and minor seminaries with 87 students, 5 colleges with 613 pupils, 9 schools for virgins, 62 schools providing meals (*Kostschulen*) with 1,793 pupils, 253 elementary schools with 4,204 boys, 285 elementary schools for girls with 3,765 pupils. 71 priests (of whom 20 Chinese) worked in the mission. There were 17 brothers (5 Chinese), and 620 catechists. 2,927 adults had been baptized and 16,689 children.

The mission in South-Shandong, cared for by the Divine Word Missionaries (SVD), had a population 100 years ago of almost 12 million “heathen,” 51,941 baptized Christians, 42,051 catechumens, 178 churches and chapels as well as 1,006 “houses of prayer.” The personnel consisted of one bishop, 63 European and 13 Chinese priests, 12 lay brothers, 36 sisters (15 Franciscan Missionaries of Mary – FMM and 21 Holy Spirit Missionary Sisters – SSpS), 767 male catechists, and 341 female catechists. The mission had a major seminary with 80 seminarians, two catechetical schools with 10 male students and 95 female students, four middle schools for boys with 201 pupils, three state-recognized middle schools with 250 pupils, 48 small Chinese schools with 533 pupils, other schools with more than 3,700 pupils, seven orphanages caring for 557 children, one home for the aged with 72 “guests,” one hospital in Qingdao as well as a number of clinics with a “dispensary for the poor” (No. 6, p. 150).

Final Statement of the 8th European Catholic China Colloquium

At the end of the 8th European Catholic China Colloquium from September 16–19, 2010 in Freising near Munich, Germany on the topic “Chinese in Europe – Trends and Catholic Perspectives” the participants made proposals for a final statement on the particular situation and various problems of Chinese migrants in Europe and a possible improvement of their situation. The final version of this statement under the title “‘I was a stranger and you made me welcome.’ Chinese in Europe – a Christian Answer” was drawn up in the China-Zentrum after consultation with all conference participants.

“I was a stranger and you made me welcome” Chinese in Europe – a Christian Answer

More and more Chinese are living in Europe, permanently or temporarily. While in some European countries Chinese immigration has a long history, in other countries it is a more recent phenomenon. Russia and Eastern Europe are major destinations for the new migrants. Another new destination is Southern Europe where there can be tens of thousands in some Chinese communities. In several European countries, Chinese students are the largest single ethnic group amongst the students from abroad attending local universities.

One hundred representatives of Catholic initiatives and organizations in Europe cooperating with Chinese partners, together with Chinese lay Catholics, priests, and sisters living or studying in Europe as well as several representatives of the Protestant and Russian Orthodox Churches met from 16–19 September 2010 at the 8th European Catholic China Colloquium in Freising (Germany) to discuss the topic “Chinese in Europe – Trends and Catholic Perspectives.” The participants of this meeting see the following needs and make the following appeal:

1. Chinese living in Europe should be perceived in their diversity and heterogeneity. They should be welcomed as individuals with their specific personal and social background.
2. Genuine concern and caring for the basic human needs of Chinese migrants are important. Crucial for the immigrants is the acquirement of communication skills, including knowledge of the local language, culture, customs and regulations, to support their integration into the local context. Local Christian communities could provide training and help on these and other important issues. Lobbying on behalf of the Chi-

nese migrants, especially the victims of human trafficking and labour abuse, is necessary.

3. Migration has a spiritual and cultural potential, and provides opportunities for human enrichment for both the migrants and the receiving countries. Real intercultural encounters and sharing on both sides need to be encouraged. We hope that the local churches can play a more integrative role, especially among the young Chinese and the university students from China. Local Christians are encouraged to learn Chinese. We invite individual bishops and bishops conferences of Europe to consider this statement, to intensify their support for the Chinese community where this is already in vogue, and to start new initiatives where necessary. At the same time, we encourage religious congregations to recognise their responsibility to serve as a bridge between the Chinese in Europe and the local Church.
4. There is a special mission with the Chinese Catholic communities in Europe to extend their pastoral care towards Catholic Chinese and to introduce Christianity to non-Christian Chinese. However, the basic approach is the caring love for the people, especially those in need, regardless of whether they are Catholic or not, trying to lead from a thoroughly human care and concern to the knowledge of Jesus Christ.

Dialogue and cooperation between the Church in China and the Church in Europe concerning the Chinese migrants in Europe is necessary. This includes the question of Chinese priests caring for Chinese migrants in Europe. Cooperation between the Chinese communities and the local parishes should be encouraged. Stronger efforts in terms of ecumenical cooperation in this apostolate would be appreciated.

A better networking and coordination of efforts among Chinese Catholic communities on a European level is needed. More interaction and exchange of ideas should be fostered. To start with, it would be helpful to establish a databank of all Chinese Catholic communities and local communities involved with Chinese in Europe and their activities.

The Participants of the 8th European Catholic China Colloquium

15 December 2010

The Chinese in Europe: Origins and Transformations

Gregor Benton

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, people all round the world, including in Europe, saw the Chinese among them as aliens, a prejudice that survived into the present century. This attitude peaked in 1900 with the Yellow Peril scare, which predicted Chinese would swamp the world unless the West acted. The attitude was practically universal. It was especially entrenched in Europe, which had no tradition of transoceanic immigration and feared it as an unknown. It was also found in countries formed by immigration, like the United States, where any migrant could be an American patriot – but a Chinese migrant couldn't. In the 1960s, even some academics went along with the idea that Chinese immigrants are clannish and inassimilable, by studying Chinese communities outside China as if they were outposts of China rather than part of the societies around them and using them to formulate theories about China, as if the difference between Chinese society in China and Chinese society overseas was minimal.

Those who did look seriously at Chinese overseas were more interested in the big communities of Asia and America than the smaller, poorer, less influential communities in Europe. Even today, commentators often ignore the Chinese in Europe, but less so than used to be the case. There are three reasons for the change. Governments in Europe have started to take multiculturalism and minorities – including the Chinese – seriously. China is emerging as a new superpower. And Chinese migration to Europe has rocketed.

I start my talk with a brief history of early Chinese migration to Europe. One of my arguments is that there is not one Chinese community in Europe but many. The best way to capture this diversity is by exploring it as a process.

Chinese in the early twentieth century paid little regard to Europe's frontiers and criss-crossed them at will. Their European migrations were continental in scale. The first to settle, in the nineteenth century, were sailors who jumped ship in Liverpool, Hamburg, Marseilles, Amsterdam, and elsewhere, where they set up small Chinatowns. Most were Cantonese. As seafarers, they found it easier than land-tied immigrants to stay in touch with co-nationals in ports across Europe and the world. Their Chinatown economy revolved around cooking and laundering, jobs they were familiar with from life at sea.

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The second group, numbering hundreds, walked from China into Western Europe, along the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway, or came by sea. Most were from two counties, Qingtian 青田 in Zhejiang 浙江, a coastal province, and Tianmen 天门 in inland Hubei 湖北. Both counties had a tradition of migrating within China. The Qingtianese peddled soapstone statuettes and other trinkets. The Tianmenese were acrobats and healers. The Qingtianese spread all over Europe after 1900, hawking goods around towns and villages. Some set up tiny communities. They kept in touch with one another across Europe but kept apart from other Chinese. None seems to have reached Britain, where Cantonese held sway.

A third group arrived in the Great War, when the Allies hired hundreds of thousands of men from all over China to dig trenches in France, Belgium, and Russia. Thousands stayed after the war and spread across Western and Northern Europe. Most settled in France, where many became factory workers, the only Chinese in Europe to have done so. They rarely interacted with the Cantonese and Qingtianese.

A fourth important stream in the twentieth century were Chinese from European colonies: British colonies like Malaya and Guyana; Dutch colonies like Indonesia and Suriname; French colonies like Mauritius and Vietnam; and Portuguese colonies like East Timor and Mozambique. Tens of thousands of Chinese from Indochina went to France after the Vietnam War in 1975. These migrants differed from the other groups: they had citizenship in Europe. Most knew English, Dutch, Portuguese, or French. Many were educated, relatively wealthy, and resourceful. They had experience of living outside China as a minority, and they took old ethnic institutions with them to their new destinations. Few had much to do with the already settled groups of Chinese they encountered in Europe.

The fifth, and last, early stream of Chinese to Europe, starting in the 1950s, were peasants from Hong Kong's New Territories 香港新界. As Commonwealth citizens, they were free up until the 1970s to settle in Britain, where they entered the restaurant niche and competed successfully against established Chinese owners. When the restaurant sector in Britain became saturated, some moved to the European mainland.

Some people talk about the Chinese in Europe as if they were a single entity, but they are not and never were. The five streams I have listed were united only by a Chinese ancestry. The seafarers, the wartime labourers, and the petty traders had little or no contact and lacked a common language. Sometimes one group worked for another, but the relationship was difficult and rarely lasted. The mainlanders were cut off from China by the Second World War and Mao's Revolution, and their children assimilated. Chinese from European colonies were even more likely to assimilate. The Hong Kongers kept up a tie to the New Territories, but the tie weakened in the 1970s, when laws were passed preventing new immigration. The Hong Kongers brought over their families to beat the ban and settled down to run takeaways and educate their children.

Few Chinese except those from former colonies entered the mainstream economy. In the early days, white workers gave Chinese migrants a hostile reception and barred them from jobs in industry. The Chinese reacted by creating their own small economy, an ethnic niche, on the margins of the main economy. This early experience of racist exclusion survived in the collective memory of later generations, and was refreshed by new experiences

of discrimination. Members of other ethnic groups – West Indians, South Asians, etc. – asserted their rights to jobs and fair treatment, but Chinese never made a fist. Even within each segment there was scant collective spirit. Instead, Chinese competed with each other. Each family sought private salvation in hard work and, for the youngsters, study.

Changes in the Chinese Presence in Europa since the 1980s

Such was the situation until around 1980, when developments in China led to big changes in Chinese emigration across the world, including to Europe. After Mao's death, China's travel regime was liberalised. Chinese were again able to go abroad. Some reinvigorated the traditional communities. Others opened up new frontiers.

Previously, the Chinese in Europe came from just a few counties in Guangdong 广东 and Zhejiang. Now, a more broadly based exodus began. Some new migrants came from old sending places, but most came from places like Fujian 福建 and northeast China with no tradition of migration to Europe or no tradition of migration at all. Some worked in Chinatown as cheap labour, others branched into new sectors. I now want to talk about changes in the Chinese presence in Europe, and to look in particular at four trends:

- New Chinese migration to Russia and Eastern Europe
- New Chinese migration to Southern Europe
- Human trafficking, a crime to which Chinese are especially vulnerable
- The experience of Europeans of Chinese descent

These topics cover a wide range of Chinese, from the least safe and settled to the most. But even Chinese who prosper meet threats as well as opportunities; and even Europeans of Chinese descent encounter substantial odds.

New Chinese Migration to Russia and Eastern Europe

Russia and Eastern Europe are major destinations for the new migrants. Moscow had Europe's first Chinatown, established in the seventeenth century by traders who crossed the border China shares with Russia. Chinese migrants played a big role in the Russian Revolution of 1917, but their community was destroyed by Stalin's purges in the 1930s. Eastern Europe has a much shorter history of Chinese immigration. Not until the 1980s did Chinese arrive in large numbers, after the post-Mao reforms led to the opening of Far Eastern and Siberian Russia to Chinese, which led to a boom along the border. Using the trans-Siberian railway as their conduit, traders took goods to European Russia and to Eastern Europe, in a shuttle trade. Hungary, Eastern Europe's most open economy, was a favourite destination. By 1991, Hungary's Chinese population had shot up from around zero to 40,000. At first the shuttle traders sold their goods at stations along the railway track. Later, they graduated to open-air markets and shops.

These migrants have remained more mobile than Chinese in Britain, France, and the Netherlands. This is partly because their migration is new and exploratory. It is also because some Chinese see Russia and Eastern Europe as poor, unpromising destinations, mere transit points for onward migration to the West.

These new migrants come from more provinces and more social backgrounds than those who founded Western Europe's communities. So they have not divided into dialect groups like other overseas Chinese, and Mandarin is their lingua franca.

How many Chinese live in Russia and Eastern Europe? It's impossible to say. In 2000, around 237,000 were registered in Russia, but most were commuters rather than settlers, and this figure did not include undocumented migrants. Most lived in hostels, an indication of their transitory nature, or of official barriers to their regularisation. Most Chinese in Eastern Europe and European Russia run their own businesses. Most in the Russian Far East and Siberia work in agriculture, forestry, and building, for a pittance – \$7 a month in 1993.

In eastern Russia, fewer Chinese have switched from the shuttle trade to a settled existence than in European Russia and Eastern Europe. This is because the cost of the shuttle is less (for China is closer) and eastern Russia is rarely a final destination. In European Russia and Eastern Europe, shuttle traders form companies and become legal residents where possible. Most give up carrying their goods by train and use containers to transport them. Yet they keep strong links with China and travel back seeking business opportunities. This is because they have better contacts with enterprises in China than Chinese in Western Europe. Also, China is closer and they themselves are less settled.

Because of these closer ties with China, some academics see the new migrants in Russia and Eastern Europe as transnational citizens, who come and go at will in the new global age. This is a positive and optimistic view, but not a very convincing one. In considering the new migrants, one must distinguish between ordinary Chinese and the *élite*. Transnational mobility and the cosmopolitan life remain a dream for most. Some observers argue that the proliferation of Chinese transnational political organisations in Russia and Eastern Europe supports their theory, for these organisations vigorously protest their patriotism and maintain close ties with China. However, their membership is usually thin. Their legitimation lies in their leaders' personal contact with Chinese authorities, not any social work they do in the community. They are not really relevant to ordinary Chinese. The most one can say is that Chinese traders in Russia and Eastern Europe are more dependent on China for capital, goods, and business information than Chinese in Western Europe, and this ties them more strongly to the Chinese state.

Transnational ties of this sort are due in part to the newness of the communities. As migrant communities, they are by definition more closely tied with their sending places than older communities. It is interesting to note that the oldest of the new Chinese communities in Eastern Europe, in Hungary, are evolving in a similar direction to the older communities in Western Europe. Mixed marriages are common and the children are bilingual and study at Hungarian universities. In short, they are becoming Chinese Hungarians.

But most Chinese in Russia and Eastern Europe have not yet begun to settle in the same way as in Western Europe. They retain strong ties to China, and many still ponder more promising options than the poor and unstable transition economies of Russia and Eastern Europe. This reluctance to sink roots is strengthened by the growth of anti-Chinese feeling in these places.

New Chinese Migration to Southern Europe

Another new destination is Southern Europe. There have been tiny Chinese groups in Spain, Portugal, and Italy for a hundred years, but today's communities are tens of thousands strong. Newcomers were drawn to Southern Europe in the 1980s by pre-existing ties to the old communities, but since then their economy has evolved quite differently from the traditional niches. This is because of developments in both Europe and China. I will look mainly at Prato in Tuscany, where 90 per cent of Chinese are from Wenzhou 温州 in Zhejiang. Much of what I say also goes for other parts of Southern Europe.

Prato was for centuries a stronghold of the European textile industry, run along family lines, but in the 1980s this industry entered into crisis. The Tuscan family itself was changing. Big firms became more flexible and effective, so family firms were less able to compete. New migrants from Wenzhou began to take over parts of the textile enclave, which Italians were already vacating. They reproduced old Tuscan practices, also using family resources. They did not create the Tuscan crisis, although they are often accused of that. Their presence in Tuscany was a product of the crisis, and a response to it.

In China, Wenzhou became famous after Mao's death for developing a family-based system of workshops. In the early 1980s, thousands of Wenzhounese travelled around China selling buttons, bags, clothes, and shoes made in Wenzhou and set up thousands of small factories in other places. They also started going overseas, including to Tuscany. Wenzhou capital flowed abroad, to Italy, France, and Spain, and eventually started flowing back to China. Today, overseas Wenzhounese invest hundreds of millions of Euros in Wenzhou enterprise.

In the past, China's governments usually cared little about the fate of their nationals overseas. Today, however, Beijing and Wenzhou are keen to facilitate this migration and local authorities compete to establish themselves as migrant-exporting regions, like the old ones in Guangdong and elsewhere.

The Chinese experience in Tuscany has many novel features, and some observers call it a "new model." Chinese in Tuscany engage in manufacture rather than trade and services, like other Chinese in Europe, and are more integrated into the wider economy. Yet in other ways the model is older than it looks, and the idea that it represents Chinese migrants' liberation into the economic and social mainstream and a new way forward is an illusion. Most migrants work for Chinese, producing goods for consumption by non-Chinese. They try to avoid competing with local whites and instead compete with other Chinese, in sectors the Italians are vacating. When they manage to breathe new life into these sectors, organisations like the Northern League accuse them of taking Italian jobs. So it is not surprising that many Chinese in Prato view themselves as excluded from Italian society or confined to its lowest rung.

Human Trafficking

Many new migrants in Europe were at one time or still are illegal. Twenty per cent of global migration is illegal. However, there is much variation between countries and among different groups of Chinese. In the UK, few Fujianese have the necessary papers, whereas

in Hungary most Chinese do. In Italy, Portugal, and Spain illegal migrants have repeatedly been legalized by amnesties.

Illegal Chinese immigration and human trafficking by snakeheads are hot topics of debate in Europe. Trafficking causes endless misery for tens of thousands of migrants, and is associated with two mass tragedies: the suffocation of 58 Chinese in a lorry at Dover in England in 2000, and the drowning of 23 Chinese at Morecambe Bay in 2004.

Why do people turn to traffickers and what can be done to stop them? The root cause lies in the rich countries' immigration policies, and the solution is to end or loosen discriminatory immigration regimes.

The term trafficking is rarely defined with clarity and precision. It is often equated with people smuggling, but the two differ radically. Smuggling implies the consent of the person smuggled, whereas trafficking relies on deceiving or using or threatening to use force against the trafficked person, usually after the journey starts. Smuggling ends when the journey ends, but the traffickers subject their victims to forced labour until they have paid their debt to the trafficker, which can take years.

The extent of trafficking is hard to quantify. In the 1990s, US sources said that each year 100,000 Chinese were trafficked to Europe, for a fee ranging from US\$10,000 to \$50,000. This fee was usually in the form of a loan on which interest of up to 30 per cent was charged, deducted from wages. Those who don't pay are beaten, ransomed, or tortured. The victims are helpless, for they are illegal and rarely speak local languages.

The snakehead is not the only beneficiary. Chinatown employers also exploit the trafficked workers' illegal status. They pay them badly, work them long hours, house them poorly, and bully or beat them.

Beijing is not happy with this trafficking, which fuels crime in China and harms China's image, so it has passed laws against it. But Beijing is more worried about the violation of its borders than the violation of the victims, who are often punished alongside the trafficker if they are caught or return to China. There is insufficient provision for intergovernmental cooperation to fight the traffickers, and China lacks appropriate laws on forced labour, which is an inevitable outcome of trafficking.

European governments also dislike the trafficking, but also do little or nothing to improve the treatment of Chinese and other migrant workers. In 1990, the United Nations created the Migrant Rights Convention, which extends universal human rights to all migrant workers, but none of Europe's migrant-receiving countries has ratified it.

The Experience of Europeans of Chinese Descent

Trafficking is a misfortune of the new migrants. I end by looking at a group opposite in circumstance and character, but who also face problems many commentators ignore. I refer to younger Chinese born in Europe.

How do Europeans of Chinese descent think of themselves? What is their identity? And how do other Europeans view them? People often assume that identity is instinctive and automatic, but this assumption is untrue and dangerous. New generations, immigrants' children and grandchildren, do not stick to the ancestral identities they inherit. Instead, they create new identities, which add to the changing national identity of the

country of their birth. These new identities are not replicas of the stereotyped Britishness or Frenchness or Italianness politicians talk about. They synthesise ancestral heritage with habits and outlooks of the countries where the young people make their friendships and relationships and go to school and work. Young people, especially migrants' descendants, question the state-sponsored idea of identity, with its nationalist assumptions of a homogenous culture. These youngsters are not sojourners or exiles from China. Yet they are also uncomfortable with the sharp boundaries between cultures that states tend to favour. Their world-view is more likely to be fluid, and rich with subtle inflexions.

The Chinese are among the most divided of Europe's ethnic minorities: divided by language, origin, class, and – with the passage of time – generation. They are scarcely less diverse than the indigenous Europeans. Few other ethnic minorities are as varied. Other ethnic groups are united by their identity, especially where ethnicity overlaps with, say, religion. The coincidence of ethnicity and Islam is an example: it provides a strong cement for some minorities. The Chinese, however, have no binding church.

Here is an awful irony: Chinese lack a unifying distinctiveness, but people perversely imagine them as cohesive to the point of clannishness and bound by common interests. Even Europeans of Chinese descent suffer this misperception. Members of dominant communities question their loyalty and see them as “immigrants” or members of a “diaspora” who are not legitimate inhabitants of their homeland. They assume that anyone visibly Chinese belongs to a separate, cohesive community. But these youngsters are cultural and political citizens of their place of birth, which is their homeland.

Why is this important? On the whole, Chinese in Europe in recent years have suffered less discrimination than in the past and less than other non-white ethnic groups. However, violent attacks against them are not unknown. In Rome, fascists demolished shops owned by minorities, including Chinese, and beat up the owners. Chinese in Belfast have been repeatedly attacked. Anna Lo, an ethnic Chinese member of Northern Ireland's Assembly, received a death threat when she spoke up for displaced Roma. In Russia, many people see Chinese as a demographic threat and some politicians want them expelled. This happens because dominant communities wrongly see them as outsiders.

Chinese are vulnerable to bigotry in the UK because of their dispersal across urban suburbs and villages, a pattern dictated by the takeaway trade. They are also vulnerable in the Chinatowns in Paris, Milan, and Budapest, which present concentrated targets. Up to now, the attacks have been sporadic and limited, but sinophobia is on the rise in Europe. The anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia in the late 1990s show how nationalism can explode into xenophobic violence.

In parts of Europe, anti-minority, anti-immigrant sentiment is more and more shaping state policy. In response, youth movements, ethnic organisations, and civil-rights campaigns have arisen in some minority groups. This has not yet happened among Chinese, but it might do if current trends persist.

Chinese outside China have always suffered ethnic stereotyping. A new element in the stereotyping of young Chinese in some European countries is the idea that they are a “model minority” destined to do outstandingly well at school and work. But while many young Chinese thrive, this stereotype perpetuates wrong beliefs. It implies career success

is a Chinese propensity, and downplays the disproportionate number of Chinese in Europe who don't "succeed." It implies Chinese are different from other minorities. It isolates them by falsely raising them above the rest. And it obscures the discrimination even Chinese professionals encounter: they need better grades than white colleagues, they must perform better for the same pay, and they bump up against Chinese-resistant glass ceilings. Although the "model minority" idea is light years away from the Yellow Peril one, it also has a sinister implication: that Chinese are superhuman, not just human. So the "model minority" idea is another obstacle for Chinese to overcome.

Summary

1. There is not one Chinese community in Europe but there are many.
2. These communities are based on the pioneers' place of origin in China or outside China, their "dialect," the circumstances and time of their arrival in Europe, and their material and cultural resources.
3. The communities are split along lines of class and generation.
4. Relations between the different Chinese communities, and within each, are not necessarily harmonious or based on a belief in mutual interest.
5. A graphic illustration of this is Chinese entrepreneurs' exploitation of the victims of snakeheads.
6. Despite these differences, majority whites tend to see Chinese as a single community, and as clannish, introverted, and bound by internal solidarity.
7. This perception of Chinese as a united community and a potential threat was most marked in the early twentieth century, but it never went away.
8. Today, xenophobic views about Chinese are resurfacing. In Italy, Ireland, Eastern Europe, and Russia, attacks on Chinese are increasing.
9. The exclusion of Chinese from mainstream jobs consigned them to ethnic niches. At sea, they worked below deck. On land, they did catering and laundering.
10. These were women's jobs that most male whites shunned: by doing them, Chinese avoided competing with organised white male labour.
11. Some Chinese groups occupy different economic niches, others compete in the same niche, or one group works for the other, before going independent.
12. Chinese have practised self-exclusion from mainstream jobs because of the collective memory of racism.
13. The Chinese economy in Prato and Budapest looks different at first sight from that in Liverpool and Amsterdam. At bottom, however, both are ethnic enclaves, based on the principle of Chinese exclusion.
14. Chinese today are increasingly pictured as a model minority. This depiction ignores their special problems, and the disproportionate number that fail.

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Fiery Dragons: Chinese Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, with Special Focus on Hungary and Romania

Dorottya Nagy

The 26th of May 2010 will not be easily forgotten by many Chinese migrants in Romania. At dawn on that day, a huge fire broke out at the Red Dragon Market Complex (Complexul Comercial Dragonul Roșu), situated in the north-eastern outskirts of the country's capital, Bucharest. It was real money-burning for a few hours. Dozens of Chinese entrepreneurs had their stored goods, authorization papers, official documents, cash money, and other, more personal items turned to ashes. The event was not a ritual burning of paper offerings to commemorate deceased ancestors, yet such an interpretation after the event becomes part of the hermeneutical package connected to bereavement. Nearly two-thousand stores, and about forty million Euro, went up in smoke.

This was not the first time the Red Dragon caught fire. Minor “fire events” are quite regular in this area. In November and December 2009 there were smaller incidents in the area of the market.¹ In April 2010 numerous shops run by Chinese merchants were closed down due to “illegal transactions.” Romanian media reported on firemen injured by furious Chinese merchants, who were “illegally” conducting their commercial activities in the marketplace. One report mentioned that firemen were rescued by some twenty policemen who, it appears, happened to be at the right place at the right time.²

The Red Dragon,³ the extension of an already-existing Chinese Market opened in 2003 (situated at the Piata Europa, Europa Market), was the firstfruits of the still-to-be completed Chinatown project owned by the Niro Group,⁴ which also planned to build a resi-

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1 www5.libertatea.ro/stire/doi-pompieri-batuti-de-chinezii-din-dragonul-rosu-266902.html, accessed on 29 June 2010.

2 *Ibid.*

3 www.dragonulrosu.ro/, accessed on 27 July 2010.

4 The Niro Group has a controversial history and status both among Chinese migrants and non-Chinese in Romania, being often associated with criminality and corruption, rooted in the Communist secret service ancestry of its leadership.

dential area⁵ called China Towers and an office area called the China Business Center. All these would spread over eighty thousand square meters and would require a planned investment of two hundred million Euro. The Red Dragon commercial centre is one of the largest Chinese markets in Central and Eastern Europe with about six thousand stores. It attracts an average of ten thousand visitors during the week and some twenty thousand visitors at weekends.

Romanian language media commented on the May incident from different perspectives. The focus of the reports was the death of a Romanian fireman who, by trying to save the life of some of his colleagues, lost his own. The fireman hero was commemorated both as a victim of the “Niro mafia” and the “illegal and criminal Chinese entrepreneurs.” There were speculations that the cause of the fire should be traced back to Niro leadership, suggesting that it was in their own interests⁶ to clean up some commercial buildings in order to make the Chinese merchants move into the newest locations of the complex, which were about to be opened a few weeks later. Tensions over the payment of taxes between the Chinese entrepreneurs and the Niro leadership were also mentioned. The Romanian media did not give any attention at all to the actual victims, the Chinese businessmen and women. Reader responses demonstrated a polarized interpretation of the Chinese presence in Romania. On the one hand there were those fuelling anti-Chinese discourses, labelling Chinese migrants in Romania as criminals, clear signs of the bad effects of globalisation, as dirty, and as parasites; on the other hand there were those who viewed Chinese entrepreneurs as providing many Romanian citizens not only with job opportunities but literally also with affordable clothes and goods.⁷

The incident reached even *The People's Daily Online*, but this latter, on the 27th of May, reports in a very general way on a fire in a Chinese market, on the death of a fireman “but so far there has been no report of casualties.”⁸ Reader responses were almost absent.

While the Dragon was still on fire, a group of Chinese Christians gathered for prayer. People's dreams had gone up in smoke and there were prayers for friends and enemies and most of all prayers for comfort. “... and again I lost everything. I left behind my roots and moved to the city. With hard work I made a living there. Then I came to Romania and hoped that I could make it further. I am working day and night, I try to be honest and follow the rules. ... and again, I have lost everything. How often can a man start anew?” asks a middle-aged Chinese businessman while rummaging around his burned-out shop.

This vignette highlights some of the important dimensions of Chinese migration: unpredictability, tensions, trade, prosperity, and spiritual/religious dimensions. The following article offers a general and short description of Chinese migration to Central and East-

5 The plans around the residential area, the dreams of Central and Eastern Europe's largest China Town, seem to have been abandoned.

6 The fact that the burned-out buildings had valid insurance became part of the argument against the Niro group.

7 E.g. www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-7319509-update-incendiu-propoortii-complexul-dragonul-rosu-din-capitala-pompier-pierdut-viata-alti-4-sunt-raniti; www.adevarul.ro/locale/bucuresti/Bucuresti-_Pompier_mort_la_datorie-la_incendiul_de_la_Dragonul_Rosu_0_268773362.html, accessed on 15 June 2010. Some of the responses even make theological statements about God's judgment on the Chinese and the Romanian politicians who were responsible for the death of the young fireman.

8 <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7002582.html>, accessed on 19 June 2010.

ern Europe (CEE) with a special focus on Hungary and Romania.⁹ The article pleads for attention to the human dimension within the migration processes discussed here. In order to shape space for the human dimension, the present paper introduces the case of the Chinese Christian communities in CEE and their significance in shaping the dynamics of migrants' behaviours, community formation, and contacts with the "local"¹⁰ population. The main argument of the presentation is that the globalisation of Chinese migration and the globalisation of Chinese Christianity go hand in hand and that the latter influences to a high degree the shape of what is called contemporary world Christianity.

Globalisation – Modernity – Mobility

The Chinese presence in CEE can be placed in the theoretical framework pinned down by three keywords: globalisation, modernity, and mobility. The appearance of the Chinese element in the globalisation discourse, the post-1978 modernity rhetoric of the PRC, and the role and means of mobility accentuated within both discourses connect the case of Chinese migration to CEE to the larger picture of Chinese contemporary migration worldwide.

Chinese globalisation has been conceptualised and perceived in its diversity as "China's increased diplomatic and military prowess and role as an emerging regional or even world superpower, the massive flows of capital and commodities to and from China, the much greater prominence of Chinese language and culture outside China, and the spectacular growth and much greater heterogeneity of migration from China."¹¹ The post-1978 modernity rhetoric conceived mobility as a necessary means through which, in manifold ways, civilisation, success, and development could be pursued. In this sense, the "new Chinese migration" is realized through adventurous yet responsible, successful, and patriotic individuals,¹² but most of all through "modernizing" people. The negotiation and construction of the meaning of "Chineseness" belongs organically to the constructed framework, as does the interpretation of Europe and within it the encountered realities of CEE.¹³ In these exercises a remarkable rivalry of nationalism-bounded modernity arises. Chinese migrants view most of the CEE countries where they reside as left behind, un-

9 Data originates in fieldwork done among Chinese migrants in Hungary and Romania between 2003–2010.

10 The term "local" refers to the non-Chinese population of the region. The author is aware that Chinese migrants residing in this region are also locals.

11 Frank N. Pieke *et al.*, *Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2004), p. 12. Chinese globalisation here is defined as "multiple, transnational social spaces straddling and embedded in diversifying smaller regional or national systems on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as a part of a unifying global system," p. 11.

12 See Pál Nyíri, "Expatriating is Patriotic? The Discourse on 'New Migrants' in the People's Republic of China and Identity Construction among Recent Migrants from the PRC," in: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (2001), pp. 635-653; "The 'New Migrant': State and Market Constructions of Modernity and Patriotism," in: Pál Nyíri – Joana Breidenbach (eds.), *China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism* (Budapest: Central European University 2002).

13 "Modernizing" here underlines the active involvement of Chinese migrants in modernisation processes not only within the PRC but also in the places and countries of their migration. In this imaginary it is also through Chinese migration that new modernities in CEE become visible. See also Aihwa Ong – Donald M. Nonini, "Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative Modernity," in: Hong Liu (ed.), *The Chinese Overseas: Routledge Library of Modern China*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge 2006), pp. 344-372; and Pál Nyíri – Igor Saveliev, *Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia* (Burlington: Ashgate 2002).

derdeveloped, less modern compared to the phenomenal modernisation they partially experience and largely imagine in PRC cities. In their turn, many CEE citizens perceive Chinese migrants as underdeveloped, lacking civilization, and backward.

The globalisation, modernity, and mobility framework has not only economic, cultural, and political dimensions but an influential religious dimension as well. Chinese Christian communities in CEE are but one concrete manifestation of the religious dimension of the globalisation – modernity – mobility triad.¹⁴ Europe, and within it what is called CEE, has become the platform where this triad once again manifests itself in new times, under new circumstances, and with new actors.¹⁵

Chinese Migration – CEE Correlation

After placing Chinese migration and CEE into the larger framework of Chinese globalisation, a short note on the Chinese migration – CEE correlation has to be made. The labelling of geographical areas is meant to support communication and facilitate understanding. Similar to the geographical label “China,” “Central and Eastern Europe” is more than a geographical label. It evokes not only geographical categorization debates (which countries belong to this area, and within it, which countries are Central and which are Eastern) but also debates over cultural, religious, political, social, and economic heterogeneity. China is big and complex. Compared to it, CEE is small, yet still complex. This observation should guide any study on the Chinese migration – CEE correlation. Despite the existence of constructs and shared meta-theories, Chinese migration is further diversified due to the specific characteristics of a given country. Some of the shared mega-terms are: post-communism, post-socialism, xenophobia, nationalism, economic and political transition, and (the fight against) corruption, but these have particular manifestations and practical consequences for the Chinese migrants dwelling in the different CEE countries. For example, a Chinese migrant in Romania and Hungary will often be compared with Romani people, whereas in the Czech Republic such a comparison would not easily be made, and if it were made it would mean something else.

The history of the diplomatic relations between China and the different Central and Eastern European countries is also diverse. Although most of the CEE countries recognized the new Chinese state in 1949, in most cases, the recognition was more an act of communist solidarity than friendly enthusiasm. On the other hand, most of the CEE countries developed cultural and technical relationships with China. The break between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s again influenced these international relations. It can be also observed that throughout the 1990s CEE did not have “China fever”; rather, the Chinese got “CEE fever” (or at least the Eastern Europe fever, *Dong'ou re*). After 1989,

14 See Peter Beyer, *Religions in Global Society* (London: Routledge 2006). Although globalisation calls for revisiting the very concept of religion, the phenomena denoted by the term play an important role in contemporary world-shaping processes. Christianity, perceived as a religion, continues to be formed and re-formed through migration processes.

15 For more on new Chinese migration to Europe see Gregor Benton – Frank N. Pieke (eds.), *The Chinese in Europe* (London: Macmillan 1998); Flemming Christiansen, *Chinatown, Europe: An Exploration of Overseas Chinese Identity in the 1990s* (London: Routledge 2003). Vol. 41 of the *International Migration* (2003) is also dedicated to this topic.

CEE became one of the distinctive locations of new Chinese migration. During this time, CEE countries were still in the euphoric celebration of getting rid of the Communist system (at least formally) and they looked more to the West. They hoped for encounters with “the West,” for investments and western development. This “catching-up” with the West did happen to a certain extent: much effort was made to join NATO and the European Union as safeguards of democracy.

Times changed. The first four CEE countries entered the EU,¹⁶ which imposed an already-developed or developing China policy.¹⁷ Yet interest in China soon became part of national policies as well. The interest of the CEE states in China can be easily explained by China’s growing economic and political power. Yet, the flipside of the question: why China showed interest in CEE remains puzzling. In any case, since the turn of the millennium, China-CEE relations have intensified and strategic and structural steps have been undertaken to develop further economic, technological, and cultural partnerships.¹⁸ The present paper argues that Chinese migrants to CEE have been crucial within this process. Something which started on an individual, fortune seeking level at the time when the first Chinese small entrepreneurs appeared on the post-1989 CEE stage, has gradually been transformed into a corporally and structurally dominating Chinese presence in the region. And it is thanks to such a transformation that after the fire accident in the Red Dragon, the Chinese Embassy in Romania could mediate between different groups of interests.

The increasingly visible Chinese presence in CEE may be captured in the image of the dragon, both iconographically and connotatively. Dragons’ fire is not only about damage and loss but also about fuelling socio-economic, cultural, and religious change. CEE, initially perceived as a transit area for Chinese migration to Western Europe and North America, has also become a place of settlement, where Chinese migration can be perceived in terms of both first and second generations.¹⁹

Historicizing Chinese Migration to CEE

Taking into account the complexity factor described in the previous section, it is difficult to sum up the more than twenty years of history of Chinese migration to CEE. Reviewing

16 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, are also known as the Visegrád Four.

17 See *The China Quarterly* 2002, No. 169, dedicated to the topic of China–Europe relations. Relevant to this issue is the work of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM, founded in 1996 and its only physical institution, the Asia Europe Foundation, ASEF, founded in 1997) which provides room for “greater mutual understanding between Asia and Europe through intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges.” Migration, in its complex forms, is one of the constant agenda points of the meetings. See www.asef.org and www.aseminfoboard.org, accessed on 21 July 2010.

18 Representatives of China and nine CEE countries (in this case: Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia) held a meeting at the Poland Pavilion of the Shanghai Expo 2010 in order to further develop and strengthen cooperation. “Advanced technologies, low-cost labor, talents and strategic location were mentioned as the strong points of the region for the expansion of Chinese companies. [...] The opening of several Confucius Institutes in the region (Hungary, Romania) is a clear example of China’s cultural globalisation. Executives from several Chinese corporations shared their success stories of business development in Central and Eastern Europe.” See <http://en.expo2010.cn/a/20100726/000009.htm>, accessed on 28 July 2010.

19 The author does not favour the first and second generation terminology, yet the scope of the present paper does not permit the introduction of alternatives.

the academic literature on the topic, it becomes obvious that the popularity of the research into the Chinese migration novelty which characterised the late nineties and early years of the new millennium has somewhat stagnated. More up-to-date field research on the topic and an analytical approach would be desirable.

Numbers

One way of historicizing the phenomenon is to look at statistics and numbers. Such an attempt in the present case is a contested one. Numerical data on Chinese migration to CEE are highly deficient. Considering pure government-provided statistical data on Chinese migration in CEE, it can be observed that after an initial spectacular growth of the Chinese presence, there followed in almost all CEE a period of stabilisation, and even decrease in the number of Chinese migrants (in the broadest sense of the word). Providing plausible numerical data on Chinese migrants in CEE is difficult. Estimates always differ somewhere between the strict official statistics and the local legends and myths about the Chinese population. Therefore obtaining and presenting accurate numerical data seems to be a “mission impossible,” yet it is worth speculating on this line of historicity.

For the first decade of the new Chinese migration to CEE some conventionalised estimates have been made. If the historicizing exercise starts with the visa-free agreement signed in 1988 between the PRC and Hungary, then the size of the Chinese population in CEE (in Hungary) shows a spectacular growth from zero to some fifty thousand migrants in the early nineties. The Tian'anmen events also contributed to the enlargement of the group. After a short life of less than three years, the visa-free agreement between Hungary and the PRC ended. As a consequence, many Chinese migrants left Hungary and tried to settle in other CEE countries, especially in Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. Another centre of dispersion of Chinese migrants to CEE was Russia, from where migration channels flowed to Belarus, Ukraine, and other CEE countries. The importance of the numerical data in this period lies in the emergence of Chinese migration into a regional phenomenon which also generated research and much attention from the media. It is incontestable that Chinese migration to CEE also has an illegal dimension, which further modifies the numerical statistics.

The Chinese migration expert Pál Nyíri made an attempt to systematise the numerical data of the first ten years of Chinese migration to CEE. According to his research, around 1999–2000, ten years after the initial Chinese migration boom, the number of the Chinese migrants was between ten to twenty thousand in Hungary, around two thousand one hundred in Poland, some five to six thousand in Czech Republic, between fourteen and twenty thousand in Romania, some five thousand in Bulgaria, some twenty to thirty thousand together in Serbia and Montenegro, only about two hundred in Croatia, and about three hundred in Slovenia.²⁰

20 Pál Nyíri, *Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia: A Middleman Minority in a Transnational Era* (London: Routledge 2007), pp. 49-75.

For recent years, official figures report on roughly five thousand work permits issued to PRC citizens in Romania in 2008,²¹ yet local informants talk about twenty thousand Chinese living in Romania. Between the period 1996 to 2006, China was sixth out of the ten top countries (and the only Asian country) with the highest inflows to Romania. For 2007, Hungary reported that eight percent of the almost twenty-three-thousand immigrants were PRC citizens. It also mentioned that asylum applicants from China were still frequent. The size of the Chinese migrant groups in Hungary and Romania were more or less equal, with numerical stabilization of Chinese migration taking place in both countries. Poland reported some eight hundred work permits issued for PRC citizens for the same year. Reports from Slovakia do not report on the significance of the Chinese migrants in 2008 and 2009.

This short attempt to gather and interpret the numerical data helps to show that, after active initial attention given to the new phenomenon, more recently even the already poor statistical data provision has dropped. This may be explained by the still underdeveloped migration policies in CEE, but it can be also a sign of an official denial of the migration question. For the scope of the present study it is sufficient to note that the importance and relevance of Chinese migration to CEE does not depend on the support of spectacular numbers. The story is more about a small group of people, who are part of a larger group of people (the Chinese Overseas Community) and connected to an even larger community which is being conceptualised in terms of its Chineseness, whatever that might imply.

Social Stratification

A second attempt in historicizing could start with the question: who were and are the Chinese migrants in CEE? Field research immediately pushes on to the next question: who were they in China and what do they become, who are they in CEE? Detecting geographical origins is not the biggest difficulty, yet it does bring with it the danger of oversimplification. Detecting social stratification is much more difficult, because social positions are flexible.

Conventional categorizations acknowledge regional diversity concerning places of origin. In this way, the population of Chinese migrants in CEE consists of a clear group of Fujian and Zhejiang migrants, respectively a group of Northeast people, mainly considered less educated, and the so-called Northern people, who are generally considered more educated. The new Chinese migratory flows to CEE present a complex socio-demographic picture. Diversity appears also in methods of entry (legal – illegal), age of migrants, and “occupations” of migrants. In addition to small and substantial entrepreneurs typical for the first decade, in recent years, low-skilled workers (used and misused in the textile or construction industries and in agriculture) and students colour the palette.

The appearance of second-generation migrants also indicates changes in social stratification. Children of first-generation uneducated or less educated migrants may reach higher social status through education. As one twenty-four-year-old Chinese man for-

21 Data gathered from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, www.oecd.org, accessed on 26 July 2010.

mulated: “The pure fact that I can speak both Chinese and Hungarian perfectly, and that I studied English as well, puts me in the luxury position of being able to reject certain jobs I do not find interesting. Many of my Hungarian friends do not have such choices.” Although it is legitimate to research Chinese migration along such divisions, field work testifies too many exceptions which question the existing prototypes. Social stratification goes beyond the argument of places of origin.

A note has to be made on the attitude of the so-called local population of the CEE countries towards Chinese migrants. Generally speaking, nationalistic and xenophobic manifestations are regular in CEE. In this context, Chinese migrants are often mentioned in discourses on criminality, mafia, human smuggling, and the “yellow peril.” Yet, there is a visible “local” circle (employees, lawyers, physicians, journalists, translators, etc.) constructed around Chinese migrants, which through their direct encounters with the migrants help in constructing a different image of the Chinese people in CEE.

High mobility, including migration and settlement practices, continue to characterize Chinese migration to CEE and act as the major means through which global transnational networks are formed, maintained, and shaped. Chinese migrants also remain one of the major groups through which to perceive and understand the transformation of CEE countries into immigration countries and arenas of transnational migrations.

The present study avoids speaking about “the” Chinese community in CEE. It is important to note that Chinese migrants create multiple types of communities and/or community-like associations (business, language, culture, charity, and others) and these effectively contribute to networking and create a sense of belonging. Community formation based on religious affiliation is one of the stronger means of networking and nurturing communal belonging. The present paper focuses on the community-forming role of Christianity for the Chinese migrants in CEE.

New Developments in Hungary

For a substantial period of time, starting in the early nineties, Hungary, with its Four Tigers open area market situated in Budapest, used to be the distribution centre of Chinese imports to CEE. Other dominant open-air markets in CEE countries were connected to this and in this way wholesale business was conducted. In recent years, the distributive role has been taken over by Poland.²² Yet Hungary still preserves a strong position in China-CEE relations and its Chinese population is still one of the largest in CEE. Examples of the prospering China-Hungary relationship are: important investments by the Chinese Party in Hungary; Hainan Airlines, together with Malév Airlines, having started direct flights between Beijing and Budapest; Hungary was the first CEE country to open a branch of the Bank of China; and a Chinese-Hungarian bilingual school has been opened with about two hundred pupils (of which sixty percent are Chinese).

The current role of Chinese migrants in Hungarian society is often compared with the role of the Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century: they are needed but they are

22 However, the China Brand Trade Center, which operates in the Asia Center of Budapest, claims to be the European distribution centre of Chinese goods.

not necessarily loved. The more than two decades of Chinese presence in Hungary show that those Chinese migrants who have managed to “settle” in Hungary have achieved remarkable economic success. Next to the image of the Chinese small trader and the Chinese restaurant keeper there is developing the image of a “respected” Chinese business partner.

New Developments in Romania

The history of Chinese migrants in Romania is inseparable from the history of corruption in Romania. Corruption is the condition which shapes thousands of Chinese lives in this country. Economic, political, and social instability, which still characterises present-day Romanian society, is another condition which has influenced the history of Chinese migration to Romania. During the last decade, an influential, successful Chinese business class has become visible, yet next to this there is still a large group of small traders whose daily struggle with corruption and instability makes the future of the Chinese presence in Romania unpredictable.

Starting in the last few years, a new phenomenon of Chinese migration to Romania can be observed. As a consequence of the spectacular mass labour emigration of Romanian citizens to Western Europe, the Romanian labour market has been opened up for Asian, predominantly Chinese, workers. The “import” of these workers is, however, once again part of the story of corruption and instability. The experience of Chinese workers in the textile and construction industries is characterised by labour misuse (in 2007 Chinese women brought to a textile factory in Romania were offered around 350 Euros’ salary per month) and the breaking of promises by intermediating agencies. As a consequence, reports on strikes and protests by these workers have become frequent headlines in Romanian newspapers. Frustration, disappointment, and despair dominate fieldwork stories.

In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese represent the third largest community of migrant workers in Romania after Moldovans and Turks. It seems that the Chinese migrants in Romania have found their way within the social reality of corruption, instability, and high risk and to a certain extent have succeeded in integrating into the post-1989 Romanian society.

Chinese Migration to CEE – Christianity Correlation

The present study has already pointed out the importance of religion in its relationship to the migratory processes. Interactions between Chinese migrations and Christianity have a long history. The appearance of the first Chinese migrant churches in the North American migration context of the second half of the nineteenth century are one of the best places to start investigating these interactions. With time, Chinese Christian communities in North America, and later also in the United Kingdom, founded countless missionary organisations through which to realize their vision to Christianize their fellow Chinese migrants and indeed the whole Chinese people, firstly in North America, and later within the global Chinese overseas community. Besides these Chinese missionary organisations founded on

non-Chinese language territories, there also emerged Chinese missionary organisations on Chinese language territories, these as a result of Western missionary enterprise.²³

It is through diverse migratory processes and, within them, the encounters of Christianity with Chinese people, that, at the beginning of the third millennium, through the formation of global networks and their parallels in Chinese missionary organisations, Chinese migrants are targeted worldwide. As such, Chinese churches, Christian fellowships and communities as well as Chinese missionary organisations are influential actors of what is called the globalisation of Chinese migration. It is within this framework that Chinese migrants to CEE encounter the Christian message and, as a consequence, Chinese migrant churches and Christian communities are formed.

From the early period of Chinese migration to CEE, several Chinese missionary organisations started to operate in the region. In some countries (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria) this resulted in the formation of several smaller Chinese Christian communities. These communities can be labelled as charismatic or evangelical, corresponding to the missionary encounters. One of the most active missionary organisations in the region is the UK-based Chinese Overseas Christian Mission (COCM) which operates with the motto “Reaching the Chinese to Reach Europe.” COCM has planted churches in most European countries and it aims at an ecumenical cooperation amongst all Chinese churches in Europe. In this way, Chinese churches in Europe offer an alternative means of networking for Chinese migrants, where social, cultural, and spiritual “capital” can be shared. Migrant churches, communities, and fellowships create a sense of close belonging, while the language of sisterhood and brotherhood helps give a feeling of family. A sense of moral obligation and accountability is created by the frequent and intensive meetings and the shared and collectively confessed faith. This makes the church community the most influential organisation in the life of Christian migrants. Migrant Christian communities enable migrants to create new social networks and social support systems in a foreign, unfamiliar, and from time to time even hostile environment.

The present paper argues that Chinese migration to CEE and its encounters with Christianity create communities with great potential to shape the everyday life and history of the wider group of Chinese migrants, and that they also play an important role in shaping the image of Chinese migrants among the “local” population. The paper proceeds to develop these arguments through the examples of Chinese Christian communities in Hungary and Romania.²⁴

Chinese Christian Communities in Hungary and Romania

The political leadership in both Hungary and Romania often accentuates the Christian character of these societies. Christianity, and her historically negotiated representatives,

23 It is important to note that Chinese people, and Chinese migrants, are also targets of non-Chinese missionary organizations. This leads to exceptional cases, where the formation of Chinese migrant churches is connected with the activity of non-Chinese missionaries. E.g. the first Chinese Christian converts in Budapest are linked to the missionary activity of a Korean missionary.

24 A thorough study on Chinese Christian communities in Hungary and Romania can be found in Dorottya Nagy, *Migration and Theology: The Case of Chinese Christian Communities in Hungary and Romania in the Globalisation-Context* (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum 2009).

are given a prominent role in these societies through their Christian heritage, with Hungary as *regnum Marianum*, and through the strong interwovenness of the Romanian Orthodox Church with state affairs. Yet it is not these forms of Christianity which appeal to Chinese migrants.

As already stated before, it is not through “local” Christians that Chinese migrants experience conversion to Christianity. The Christianity of Hungarians and Romanians often appears in the rhetoric on Hungarian and Romanian backwardness. “They say they are Christians, yet if you do not keep your eye on them, they steal as much as they can” – complained one of the informants when talking about the issue of Orthodox Christianity and Romanians. “The taxi chauffeurs hang crosses on their car mirrors but often they refuse to give us a ride” – explained another informant. Chinese migrants encounter “real” Christianity through the lives of devoted, born again missionaries, “who in spite of leading a successful life in the West, in spite of high positions and success in society, listen to God’s call and leave everything behind to serve Chinese people all around the world.” Chinese migrants encounter Christianity in such incarnational ways and it is expected that once they become Christians they follow the incarnational model as well. Christianity for Chinese migrants in Hungary and Romania is all about life-conduct and witness. “Words do not help. You can’t speak to your fellow-countrymen who know who you are, where you come from, and what kind of life you had before; you have to show them that you have changed, that money does not save you.”

Although missionization occurs through the channel of missionaries who often have little or no knowledge about the “host” societies, Chinese migrants tend to show a high eagerness to contextualise their faith. Bible-studies, prayer-meetings, women’s and youth groups are excellent occasions on which to observe such contextualisation. Chinese migrants read the Bible with the question in mind: what does this have to say about the present situation? What kind of implications does this have for one’s life and work in the given circumstances? Missionaries do influence theological thinking but the ultimate faith paradigm is constructed in terms of its pragmatism and functionality.²⁵

Historicizing Chinese Christian Communities in Hungary and Romania

Similar to the general issue of Chinese migrants in CEE, one can approach the history of the Chinese Christian communities through numbers, social stratification, and other sociological categories. The number of Chinese Christians in Hungary and Romania is much easier to indicate than the number of Chinese migrants in CEE. Chinese Christian communities are open organisations where members can be easily counted, yet it is important to say that numbers of members and communities frequently change. It can be said that most of the Chinese Christian communities were founded in the capital cities (also the locations of highest concentrations of Chinese migrants) but fellowships and Bible study groups have also been formed in places with smaller Chinese populations. The size of Chinese Christian communities varies between twenty people and a hundred-and-eighty to two hundred people attending some of the Sunday services.

25 Missionaries often complain about the immaturity of Chinese migrants’ Christianity. It would be the topic of another article to investigate the question of immaturity versus that of contextualisation.

Mandarin is the *lingua franca* of these communities and it is in Mandarin that the unifying message of Christianity is preached (sub-ethnic identities are given less importance). The issue of identity construction is raised through asking what it means to be a devoted citizen of the PRC and a devoted Christian. Patriotism and Christian devotion (*women Zhongguoren* [we Chinese] and *women Jidutu* [we Christians]) go hand in hand. Being a good Christian means becoming an even better Chinese person, and through it a witness to the wider world, outside China, “wherever God calls us to go.”²⁶ Contrary to the classical sociological arguments that religious belonging contributes to assimilation and social integration into the “host” society, fieldwork highlights that while Christian communities of Chinese migrants in Hungary and Romania choose to interact on different levels with the “host” societies, the primary aim is never assimilation or socio-cultural integration. Chinese Christian communities are among the few (im)migrant NGOs which provide charity and social services for the needy.

From the Beginnings to the Present in Hungary

The beginnings of the Chinese Christian communities in Hungary (CCCH) go back to 1991, when a Korean Methodist missionary gathered a core of already Christian Chinese migrants and started a fellowship for and with them. At first, church services were held in a school building. Later, the community was able to use the rooms of the Hungarian Methodist Church in Budapest.

The official registration of the church with the Hungarian authorities could only happen in 1992. By that time more than one hundred members were attending the Sunday services. In this first period, COCM helped the community with short term missionaries and Christian literature. By 1993 the church had developed a clear structure with the leadership of six co-workers: one responsible for mission, one for service/worship, one for education, two for finances, and one without a special task. Through the contacts with the COCM, CCCH developed contacts with other Chinese missionary organisations worldwide and also with other Chinese Christian communities in Europe. The most important of these was the contact with the Chinese Christian Church in Vienna, which also supported the CCCH financially. In 1995 three new Chinese fellowships were started in three other Hungarian cities with larger groups of Chinese entrepreneurs (Szeged, Nyíregyháza, Miskolc).

Informants, recalling the history of their community, mention that in 1994 inner tensions disturbed the life of the community. Tensions resulted in divisions and, after the first division, splits and the emergence of new communities became a regular pattern characteristic of CCCH. Many new, mutually competitive missionary organisations arrived in Hungary and their work also led to the emergence of new communities or splits within already-existing communities. Missionaries themselves often explained this phenomenon as due to the “immaturity” of the Chinese Christians in Hungary, but one could pose

26 On Christianity and Chinese nationalism see Dorottya Nagy, “Where is China in World Christianity?,” conference paper presented at “From World Mission to Interreligious Witness: Visioning Ecumenics in the 21st Century,” Dublin, 16–18 June 2010.

questions also about the missionary strategies adopted and to what extent those were responsible for the divisions and separations. Theologically speaking, one can observe that divisions occurred on the charismatic versus evangelical line.

At the present time there are four larger Christian communities in Hungary and, depending on the activities of the missionaries currently ministering, from time to time efforts are made to bring these groups together. On the level of the individual believers there is a higher degree of mobility. Some attend Bible study groups at one community and church services at another. Youngsters also move with much greater flexibility around the different communities.

The first almost two decades of CCCH history tell a story of complex community formation and growth. It is evident that these communities are part of the global network of Chinese Christian communities but they also try to act locally. Acting locally means being “missionary” towards other Chinese fellow citizens in Hungary and, beyond that, being missionary towards Hungarians or other ethnic groups in the country. One of the four communities is engaged in mission work among the Romani people in Hungary. This is an exceptional example of how two differently marginalised groups in the same society encounter each other in the dimension of missionary activities. Acting locally also means diaconal engagement among the “local” population.

Contacts with Hungarian Christians are sporadic or non-existent. One of the communities rents one of the Reformed Churches of Budapest and through this, mutual contacts were at first initiated between the Chinese and Hungarian communities. However, communication problems (not being able to speak each other’s language) discouraged the contacts, and later, when the second generation started to become visible, these contacts were not re-established. In this sense, the CCCH represent one of the many Christian lines paralleling each other on the palette of Christian communities in Hungary.

From the Beginnings to the Present in Romania

The history of the Chinese Christian communities in Romania (CCCR) has from its very beginning been connected with the COCM. Besides this, countless other Chinese missionary organisations have supported missionary work among Chinese migrants in Romania, such as the Chinese Christian Testimony Ministry, the China Soul for Christ Foundation, the Chinese Bible Church of Maryland, and the Gospel Operation International for Chinese Christians. Although there have been internal tensions during the years, the community has managed to stay together.

The first long-term missionary to Chinese migrants moved to Romania in 1997. The first years of church building were viewed in the paradigm of Acts 2: church planting and church building meant the realization of an ideal community. In the initial stages, gatherings and Sunday services were held in the Anglican Church in Bucharest. Later, the community started to rent an apartment for weekly activities and the rooms of the Betania Baptist Church in Bucharest for Sundays and special events. The apartment, maintained by a couple who live there, has become an open house where Chinese Christians can be found every day, where communal meals are served, and problems and joys are shared. In spite of some difficulties concerning the leadership of the community at times, the COCM

has managed to remain the spiritual caretaker of the church, providing spiritual supervision and pastoral assistance in the person of regular itinerant missionaries.

The arrival of Chinese construction workers in Romania has led to the ministry of the CCCR being extended. Local Chinese Christians act as missionaries among construction workers, organising fellowships, evangelisation, and prayer meetings for them. Since these employees have a strict working schedule, CCCR members visit them in their accommodation. “This is a new way of being church. You can’t expect them to come to our church; they work more than twelve hours per day; they are exhausted. We go to them and have fellowship with them. Our life is not easy but in most cases we are our own boss; they are misused. Their life is full of hardships and suffering. They do this for their families.” Chinese construction workers are also present in other Romanian cities, in one of which (Iasi) the CCCR has already started a fellowship.

After several failed attempts to register the community as an independent Christian Church in Romania,²⁷ the leadership of the community agreed on “officialising” and “localizing” themselves through the Baptist Union in Romania. In 2009 the CCCR, with about seventy members,²⁸ became a member church of the Romanian Baptist Union, and had to choose a biblical name for their registration. The identity marker “Chinese” was not allowed to be adopted, with the argument that the Baptist community in Romania does not want to accentuate ethnic differences. The official name of the CCCR therefore became Bethlehem Baptist Church. Within COCM discourses this name is always completed with the addition of “Chinese” to it.

The wish of the community to have its own, permanent minister has still not been able to be fulfilled, but most of the members are content with the work of the itinerant missionaries. One of them is an ordained female missionary, which from time to time causes tensions in the relationship between the CCCR and the Baptist Union because the latter does not allow or recognize female ordination.

The CCCR has recently bought 1500 square metres of land where they plan to build their own church building and community centre as well as a building where they could start running a Chinese school. The dream of a self-owned church building has been in existence for many years. These developments demonstrate that there is a group of “settled” Chinese Christians. The COCM leadership considers the CCCR a strategic community, from where missionary enterprises to neighbouring countries (in the Balkan and CEE) can be developed.

Through its incorporation into the Baptist Union, the CCCR has become part of a minor Protestant network in Romania. It has also, at least in matters of structure, chosen a denominational route. The history of the CCCR remains open-ended. The coming years will demonstrate how this structural incorporation, the links with the COCM, and the power of the CCCR itself will shape the life and ministry of the community. In the concluding remarks on Chinese Christian communities in Hungary and Romania, Nagy writes about the complex reality of the migration – Christianity – ethnicity trian-

27 The registration of new churches in Romania involves strict legislation that is not geared towards small communities.

28 One hundred to a hundred and twenty people regularly attend Sunday services.

gulation. “It can be concluded that theology and migration always come together within that triangulation. [...] this triangulation takes place in three major concentric circles. The circle of the personal ‘I’, the so called autobiographical circle; the circle of ‘we’ which is being realised through the formation of migrants’ new homogeneous ethnic communities and churches; and the circle of ‘they’, which is the circle of relating to the environment outside the two previous circles.”²⁹

The cases sketched above portray the dynamics of the “I” circle, where individual migrants, in their search for a better life, encounter or re-discover the meaning of the Christian message for their lives. The conversion and “confirmation” stories then contribute to the creation and strengthening of the “we” circle. Individual believers consciously work on community formation. For these two circles, transnational missionary involvement is crucial. The emerging of the third concentric circle is still in an embryonic state but here and there some signs of its existence can be detected.

The future of these communities depends to a great extent on the socio-political and economic dynamics both within China and in CEE countries. Such dynamics can further encourage or discourage Chinese migration to CEE. The future of the already existing “settlements” will be shaped by the attitude of the second generation now growing up: children born in CEE and children born in faith-practising families. The question of whether these children will be able to form the bridge between Chinese Christian communities and the non-Chinese Christian communities in CEE cannot yet be answered.

Concluding Remarks

The Chinese migration to CEE – Christianity correlation calls attention to the human dimension of the migration process. Migration is always about people, individuals, and communities, who relate to each other through complex relationships. Migrants are people; with unique life stories, desires, aspirations, successes, and misfortunes. It is important that while studying new, exotic migration phenomena and analysing complex socio-economic and political processes, the human dimension does not get lost.

Chinese migration to CEE not only colours the map of worldwide transnational migration but also calls attention to the changes within the colourful map of worldwide Christianity and to the consequences this might have on the localities where these changes appear. Within the context of CEE, it was not African migrant churches but Asian migrant churches, and more specifically Chinese migrant churches, which embodied the new phenomenon of the so-called “non-Western” Christianity’s (missionary) presence in the so-called “Western” and “western-aspirated” territories. The dynamics of Chinese Christian communities worldwide calls for further research with respect to the globalisation – modernity – mobility framework.

Chinese migration to CEE highlights a shared post-socialist context and a shared Communist past, which play important roles in the encounters between Chinese migrants and “locals.” How migration, and in particular Chinese migration, contributes to new develop-

²⁹ Nagy, *Migration and Theology*, p. 194.

ments within the transitory communities of China and CEE still needs to be investigated. Another topic of investigation could be the worldviews which guide people, both migrants and non-migrants, within the post-socialist, post-communist context.

The introductory vignette in this paper reported on a fiery dragon. One could go on playing with the symbol of the dragon, so powerful within Chinese culture. One of the ways to do so is to talk about “taming fiery dragons.” This, instead of rounding up and drawing conclusions, opens up manifold trajectories for discussion and creates room for questions about Chinese migration to CEE, and even beyond. In the endlessness of possibilities in talking and identifying fiery dragons, it is important to note the existence of dragons that are on fire in ways that do not “go up in smoke.”

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