

2013 Statistical Update on Religions and Churches in the People's Republic of China

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Numerically measurable developments in the religions of China found their reflection in religious and secular media as well as in academic publications also in the year 2012, both in and outside the People's Republic of China. For various reasons numerical data on religious affiliation in the People's Republic of China tend to show great differences. The following brings data that relates to 2013 or was published anew and made known in 2013, occasionally supplemented with older data.



Provinces of China – Map and List of Abbreviations

AH Anhui, CQ Chongqing, FJ Fujian, GD Guangdong, GS Gansu, GX Guangxi, GZ Guizhou, HB Hubei, Heb Hebei, Hen Henan, HL Heilongjiang, HN Hunan, JL Jilin, JS Jiangsu, JX Jiangxi, LN Liaoning, NM Inner Mongolia, NX Ningxia, QH Qinghai, SC Sichuan, SD Shandong, SN Shaanxi, SX Shanxi, XJ Xinjiang, YN Yunnan, ZJ Zhejiang.

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This time, at the end of the statistics, we take a look at the Province of Henan in central China. A “special report” was dedicated to the province in the Blue Book of Religions 2013 (in the following: BB) of the state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The report is interesting because the authors endeavor to show the role of religious policy and the interplay between the religions in the development of recent decades.

Unless otherwise stated, the numbers given in the following refer to Mainland China (People’s Republic of China without Hong Kong and Macau).

Buddhism, Daoism and Popular Religion

No new statistics are available for 2013 for this large sector of religious life in China. Older surveys give a certain amount of orientation, such as the Chinese Spiritual Life Survey (CSLS) carried out in 2007.¹ Among other things it came to the following results:

- 185 million consider themselves Buddhists, i.e. 18% of the population over 16 years.
- 17.3 million have taken the triple refuge (in the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha), i.e. have formalized their adherence to Buddhism through ritual.
- 12 million of the adult population clearly identify with Daoism.
- 173 million have exercised some Daoist practices or participated in them, but these are difficult to distinguish from popular religion.

The BB has no national numerical data for Buddhism or Daoism (data for Henan Province see below). As in past years, in the up-to-date volume there is a chapter dealing with the traditional folk religion which apart from some exceptions is not officially recognized by the State as a religion.

Islam

- 23 million is the number of Muslims in Mainland China according to the official Chinese Islamic Association (CIA).²

Religious Formation

The article on Islam by Pan Shije in the BB deals among other things with the question of religious formation in Chinese Islam. As Pan explains, at the present time it rests on three main pillars:

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- 1 For the CSLS, from May to July 2007, a sample of 7,021 individuals aged 16 to 75 years was interviewed in 56 selected sites of different size as to their religious self-identification. In July 2010, Yang Fenggang from the Center on Religion and Chinese Society at Purdue University (West Lafayette, USA) presented the results of the study in Beijing. The CSLS study was referred to several times in the Blue Book of Religions of 2011 and 2012. For CSLS see also Wenzel-Teuber 2012, pp. 30-36.
 - 2 See, among others, “Chen Guangyuan dangxuan xin yi jie Zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui huizhang” 陈广元当选新一届中国伊斯兰教协会会长 (Chen Guangyuan Elected Chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association for the New Term), *Xinhua* Sept. 15, 2011.

Firstly that of the traditional “scripture hall education” (*jingtang jiaoyu* 经堂教育) that has been practiced since the 17th century in the communities of Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims. In the 21st century, however, as Pan writes, it has largely lost its importance due to the process of social transformation. In the Islamic Hui communities in the Northwest of China, it is still the basic form of training of ahongs (imams), according to Pan, however it is quantitatively and qualitatively no longer on the same level as formerly, among other things because the ahongs of the old generation have retired from teaching. In central China this form of formation has almost disappeared altogether.



Koran Institute in Zhengzhou – View of the main building and of a classroom.
Photos: www.chinaislam.net.cn.



The second pillar are the government-initiated “Islamic Koran institutes” (*yisilanjiao jingxueyuan* 伊斯兰教经学院) mainly founded in the 1980s. Pan criticizes the fact that the Koran institutes go no higher than training to “Bachelor level” and do not train any highly qualified specialists in religion or scholars of Islam. In addition less and less graduates take up the profession of ahong. There are 10 Koran institutes in the entire country which are run by the Chinese Islamic Association or its regional branches with govern-

ment authorization and support. At the end of 2012 they had the following numbers of students:

Table 1: Students at the 10 Islamic Koran Institutes in China at the End of 2012

Institute	Number of students
Chinese Koran Institute, Beijing	80
Kunming Koran Institute (YN)	128
Lanzhou Koran Institute (GS)	420
Ningxia Koran Institute (Yinchuan)	415
Qinghai Koran Institute	60
Xinjiang Koran Institute (Urumqi)	200
Zhengzhou Koran Institute (Hen)	80
Beijing Koran Institute	Further training courses for ahongs
Hebei Koran Institute (Shijiazhuang)	Further training courses for ahongs
Shenyang Koran Institute (LN)	Further training courses for ahongs

Table compiled from numerical data in Pan Shijie 2013, p. 104.

The third pillar, the private Arabic schools (*minban Alaboyu xuexiao* 民办阿拉伯语学校), has developed strongly since the 1980s. Pan speaks of an “Arabic school fever.” The Chinese Muslims have a tradition of learning Arabic, Pan states, the interest has grown strongly, however, due to the increase of economic ties with Arab countries. Most of the private Arabic schools are found in Gansu, Ningxia, Yunnan and Henan. According to Pan in some provinces the schools are promoted by the government, in others, on the other hand, they are not permitted which sometimes leads to children being sent to school in a distant province. Only a small number of graduates from these Arabic schools become ahongs.³

Confucianism

Revival of the Traditional Academies (*shuyuan* 书院)

In Mainland China (unlike in Hong Kong) Confucianism does not count officially as a religion. Nevertheless the BB has an article about Confucianism, as in previous years. Among other things, the author Zhao Fasheng addresses the revival of the traditional *shuyuan* in the 21st century.⁴ These academies have existed in China since the Tang era (618–907), their main focus lay on teaching and researching the Confucian classics. Zhao writes that during the Qing era (1644–1911) there were around 5,000 *shuyuan* in the country; they were suppressed or turned into modern schools by the Qing government in 1902. At the end of 2011, according to Zhao, there were again 591 *shuyuan* which were mainly founded in the years following 2005 – thus the phenomenon is still fairly young. 142 of these 591,

3 Pan Shijie 2013, pp. 104 and 110. – On the different forms and problems of Islamic education in China see also Elisabeth Allès, “Muslimisches religiöses Schulwesen in China” [Muslim Religious Education in China], in: *China heute* 2005, Nos. 1-2, pp. 32-40.

4 Zhao Fasheng 2013, pp. 194-200.

that is 24%, are run by the government. The rest are the foundations of private individuals, not only Confucian intellectuals but also business people, attorneys, retired civil servants and teachers, etc.

Table 2: Regional Distribution of the Modern *shuyuan*

Province / Autonomous Region / Municipality	Number of <i>shuyuan</i> per province
Beijing	82
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hongkong	30–45
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Henan, Hebei, Shanxi, Sichuan	20 and more
Fujian, Yunnan, Jilin, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hubei, Anhui, Guangxi	10
Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hainan, Guizhou, Chongqing, Macau, Taiwan, Tibet	under 10

Table compiled from numerical data in Zhao Fasheng 2013, p. 195.⁵

Zhao distinguishes four different types of newly founded *shuyuan*:

- *shuyuan* with main focus on research and exchange in the academic field. This type corresponds most to the *shuyuan* of ancient China. There are 45 of such *shuyuan*. Example: Shichahai *shuyuan* 什刹海书院 in Beijing, founded in 2011.
- *shuyuan* with main focus on teaching in *guoxue* 国学 (“national studies” [on traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism]) for children and youth from kindergarten to middle school. 190 (32.15%) of the 591 *shuyuan* belong to this group. Some have all-day classes and combine modern obligatory subjects with traditional teaching. Examples: Qibaoge *shuyuan* 七宝阁书院 and Sihai Kongzu *shuyuan* 四海孔子书院 in Beijing. Others provide supplementary classes at weekends or in vacation time. There are also mixed forms.
- *shuyuan* which offers *guoxue* teaching for adults. Some of these *shuyuan* are aimed at the elite of politics and business, working mainly in conjunction with universities. Their expensive courses serve self-cultivation, offering tuition not only in the Confucian classics, but also in traditional and modern leadership and management methods. Example: Huashang *shuyuan* 华商书院 [Shenzen, with branches in other cities] founded in 2006.
- *shuyuan* for children and adults which work free of charge and have as their goal the dissemination of traditional culture. Example: Yunshen *shuyuan* 云深书院 in Xinzhou (HB). This academy, founded and financed by a business man, offers *guoxue* tuition at weekends and in addition is dedicated to popularizing ancient rituals, such as on reaching adolescence or for weddings.⁶

5 For the numerical data Zhao refers to the following study: Zhao Yaojie 赵瑶杰, “2011 nian Zhongguo xiandai shuyuan fazhan baogao” 2011年中国现代书院发展报告 (Report on the Development of the Modern *shuyuan* in China 2011) in: *Beijing di er jie shuyuan chuantong yu weilai fazhan luntan lunwenji* 北京第二届书院传统与未来发展论坛论文集 (Proceedings of the Second Beijing Forum on Tradition and Future Development of the *shuyuan*).

6 Zhao Fasheng 2013, pp. 196-197.

Zhao comments that since the *guoxue* tradition was interrupted for several generations and most of the founders and promoters of the modern *shuyuan* prefer the traditional culture but are not intellectuals in the subject matter, some of these schools experience problems such as a fundamentalist, narrow view of Confucianism or a complete disregard of western classical texts in their tuition. One additional problem for *shuyuan* which have all-day instruction for children and youth is that they are outside the regular school system and their students usually do not receive a school leaving certificate. Whereas in some places they are combined with regular primary and high schools, *shuyuan* in other places are repressed by the local educational authorities.⁷

Emergence of “Community Confucianism” (*shequ ruxue* 社区儒学)

Zhao Fasheng describes this new phenomenon as a “highlight of popular Confucianism in 2012” and for that reason it is briefly mentioned here, even though he does not give any statistical data. Communities (*shequ* 社区) are administrative areas in cities in which community committees directed by the local government offer community services. Some communities in cities such as Qingdao, Beijing or Shenyang have, according to Zhao, started arranging *guoxue* summer camps for the local youth or for families. Others offer *guoxue* courses all year round. Other measures reported by Zhao include putting up banners with maxims of Confucius’ *Analects*, a theme board on Confucius’ “six arts,” street parties or an edition of the *Analects* especially compiled for all households in the community.

There are also drives at the city level and beyond. According to Zhao special interest was achieved by the project “Fotile Bamboo Slips” (*Fangtai qingzhu jian* 方太青竹简), an initiative of the kitchen appliance manufacturer Fotile of Ningbo and the newspaper *Nanfang zhoumo* of Guangzhou which in collaboration with various universities was intended to make the “national studies” popular especially among the youth. Zhao reports further that in 2012 *guoxue* instruction was even given in the prisons in Beijing and on Hainan Island.⁸

The examples cited by Zhao show that the drive to propagate Confucian ideas (understood in whatever way) was promoted at least in part by the authorities and that the bodies responsible for the propagation, unlike organizations of other religions, were allowed to collaborate in these actions with newspapers, schools, etc.

Christianity in General

For some time now, also official state media have been pointing out the large number of Christians who exercise their faith outside the officially registered communities. One example for this is Liu Dong writing on 20 November 2013 in the *Global Times*: “According to official figures, China had more than 25 million Protestants and 6 million Catholics

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

8 Zhao Fasheng 2013, pp. 184-186.

by 2012, and this doesn't even include the large number of believers who prefer to attend unofficial, underground churches rather than those sanctioned by the government.”

Protestantism

20 million Protestant Christians, of whom 70% are in rural areas, and 53,000 Protestant churches and meeting places – according to the official Protestant governing bodies (China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement).⁹

23.05 million Chinese, of whom 67.5% are baptized, consider themselves Protestant Christians (regardless of membership in formal or informal groups) – according to a 2008/2009 household survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS 2010). This number has since been repeated in many Chinese publications.¹⁰

58.04 million Protestant Christians was the estimate of the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (Washington, DC) in a study published in December 2011 (PFRPL 2011).

Some international estimates of various sources are even higher. One example is the evangelical mission organization Asia Harvest which comes up with 83.5 million Protestant Christians.¹¹

Between 2008 and 2012 in the (official) Protestant church of China there were

2.4 million people baptized as new members of the church;

5,195 churches and meeting places newly built or rebuilt;

3 new theological seminaries were established;

1,057 pastors, 482 teachers (second pastors) and 1,443 presbyters / elders ordained or installed in office;

17,5 million Bibles published by the two Protestant bodies, raising the number of Bibles published since the end of the Cultural Revolution to over 62 million.¹²

9 For some years these figures have been on the website of the official Protestant bodies at www.ccctspm.org/quanguolianghui/lianghuijianjie.html (last viewed March 18, 2014).

10 The results of the CASS study were presented in Malek 2011, pp. 32 and 51-53. For the resulting discussion, see Wenzel-Teuber 2012, pp. 30-32.

11 <http://asiaharvest.org/wp-content/themes/asia/docs/christians-in-china/China.htm>. Asia Harvest reports 84 million Protestant Christians for China, incl. Hong Kong and Macau; after subtracting the numbers given by Asia Harvest for Hong Kong and Macau 83.5 million remain for Mainland China. In the same table the number of Catholics in China is given as 21.3 million (Mainland China 20.8 million).

12 CCC-TSPM 2013. This source gives the numbers from the work report of the two official Protestant bodies presented at the 9th National Assembly of Chinese Protestants (September 8–11, 2013) by Elder Fu Xianwei. – In her report on the 9th National Assembly this author made a mistake (in: *China heute* 2013, No. 3, pp. 141-143, here p. 142): She wrote, according to Fu Xianwei the number of Protestants in China rose to 24 million; in fact he said: the number of Protestants in China rose by 2.4 million.

Theological Seminaries

- 21 (official) theological seminaries with 300 professors and 3,700 students
 4,500 students have completed their studies in the last 5 years, 42 were sent during the same period for studies abroad.¹³

Catholic Church

The following figures for the Catholic Church in Mainland China in 2013 are based on information provided by the Holy Spirit Study Centre (HSSC)¹⁴ of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and of the governing bodies of China's official Catholic Church (Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and Chinese Catholic Bishops' Conference, PA-BiCo). Other important sources are the reports of the Shijiazhuang based Catholic newspaper *Xinde* 信德 (Faith) (xdb), its website www.chinacatholic.org (xdo) and the Faith Institute for Cultural Studies (FICS), working under the same roof, as well as the Catholic news agency *UCAN* (Hong Kong / Bangkok).

- 12 million total number of Catholics, according to estimates of the HSSC, including both the official part of the Church and the Catholics in the underground
 6 million number of Catholics, according to the official Catholic governing bodies (PA-BiCo)

Dioceses

- 138 of which 116 are active, 22 inactive (HSSC)
 97 according to data of the official Church (PA-BiCo)

Bishops

- 66 bishops in the official Church (HSSC)
 37 bishops in the underground Church (HSSC)

Priests

- 2,000 in the official Church (HSSC)
 1,400 in the underground Church (HSSC)

Seminaries and Seminarians

- 10 major seminaries (seminaries for philosophy and theology) with 510 seminarians (HSSC) [2 of these 10 seminaries are currently temporarily closed]
 10-12 minor seminaries with 400 seminarians (HSSC)
 10 underground seminaries with about 450 seminarians (HSSC)

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ I would like to thank the Holy Spirit Study Centre for making available the figures on the Catholic Church in Mainland China (as of end of 2013).

Sisters

- 3,400 in the official Church in about 80 congregations (HSSC)
- 1,500 in the underground Church in about 80 congregations (HSSC)

Sister Novitiates

- 40 in the official Church with 50 sisters in formation (HSSC)
- 20 in the underground Church with 100 sisters in formation (HSSC)

Baptisms

For many years now, the official Catholic governing bodies have given the annual number of baptisms in the Catholic Church of Mainland China as 100,000 (PA-BiCo).

In 2013, for the sixth time running, the FICS provided baptismal statistics for Easter, the most significant baptism date in the year. According to this data, 16,748 persons were baptized in the Catholic communities of Mainland China at Easter 2013. The province with the most baptisms (3,647, i.e. about 22% of the Easter baptisms nation wide) was Hebei which also has the most Catholics in China. For the first time only baptisms during Easter Vigil and on Easter Sunday were counted. As stated in the report in *xdb*, in previous years many dioceses counted all baptisms between January 1st and Easter which is why the number of “Easter baptisms” for 2012 was higher, namely 22,104. A difficulty with the statistics of the 101 dioceses polled by the FICS lies according to the authors in the fact that many dioceses and parishes do not register the baptisms. Baptisms in the underground communities are probably only partially covered.

Over 70% of the 16,748 baptized persons were adults, thus first generation Christians. In the opinion of the authors of the report this reflects the fact that awareness and zeal for evangelization are increasing in many places and more is being done for it, for instance through further training and a variety of methods. Admittedly a large number of the dioceses and parishes still carry out “only pastoral ministry and no evangelization,” in fact there are even parishes in which for years no adult catechumens have been baptized, the authors write. In most city parishes evangelization is done systematically in the context of three to six month courses of preparation for baptism; as a result there are baptisms several times a year so that the numbers at Easter say but little about the year as a whole, stated the report (*xdb* April 11).

Example of Baptisms in a City Parish with Systematic Courses for Catechumens

The Xikai Cathedral parish in the north Chinese metropolis Tianjin conducts four courses of baptismal preparation every year, the catechumen participants of which are baptized in a joint ceremony each time. The 4th course of 2013 covered a total of 30 hours of instruction taking place on Saturday afternoons, spread over more than two months and ending with an examination. 150 catechumens were baptized and confirmed on 14 December by the parish priest and three curates of the parish. In the Sunday Mass the following day

Table 3: Baptisms in Mainland China at Easter 2013

Province / Municipality	Diocese	Number
Anhui		100
Beijing		230
Chongqing	Chongqing	150
	Wanzhou	415
Fujian	Fuzhou	287
	Minbei	6
	Mindong	114
	Xiamen	160
Gansu	Lanzhou	86
	Pingliang	81
	Tianshui	50
Guangdong	Guangzhou	265
	Jiangmen	28
	Meizhou	189
	Shantou	120
	Shenzhen	85
	Zhanjiang	185
Guangxi		311
Guizhou		148
Hainan		19
Hebei	Baoding	77
	Cangzhou (incl. Langfang)	493
	Chengde	85
	Handan	1.160
	Hengshui	130
	Shijiazhuang	172
	Tangshan	138
	Xingtai	1.263
	Zhangjiakou	129
Heilongjiang		230
Henan	Anyang	437
	Kaifeng	50
	Nanyang	78
	Puyang	44
	Shangqiu	95
	Xinxiang	62
	Xinyang	52
	Zhengzhou	32
	Zhumadian	68
	Hubei	Chibi
Jingzhou [Shashi]		20
Wuhan		320
Xiangfan		54
Yichang		15
Hunan		57
Jiangsu	Haimen	37
	Nanjing	97
	Suzhou	29
	Xuzhou	155
Jiangxi		237
Jilin		200
Liaoning		555
Inner Mongolia	Bameng	214
	Baotou	96
	Chifeng	8
	Hohhot	164
	Jining	139
Ningxia		55
Qinghai		13
Shaanxi	Ankang	49
	Fengxiang	83
	Hanzhong	73
	Sanyuan	202
	Weinan	158
	Xi'an	173
	Yan'an	361
	Zhouzhi	383
	Shandong	Heze
Jinan		201
Liaocheng		159
Linyi		60
Qingdao		129
Weifang		44
Yantai		5
Yanzhou		174
Zibo [Zhoucun]		225
Shanghai		
Shanxi	Changzhi	115
	Datong	19
	Fenyang	277
	Linfen	85
	Puzhong	102
	Shuozhou	136
	Taiyuan	626
	Xinzhou	35
Yuncheng	163	
Sichuan	Chengdu	264
	Leshan	72
	Nanchong	432
	Xichang	61
	Yibin	78
Tianjin		96
Tibet Autonomous Region		none
Xinjiang		33
Yunnan	Dali	36
	Kunming	150
	Zhaotong	100
Zhejiang	Hangzhou	120
	Ningbo	230
	Taizhou	10
	Wenzhou	609
Total		16.748

Source: FICS survey published in *xdb* April 11.

they received their first Holy Communion. After baptism they participated in further catechesis and after one month made their first confession.¹⁵

15 Report on the website of the diocese: “Di si qi zhoumo mudaoban jieguo 150 ming xueyuan lingshou xili” 第四期周末慕道班结课150名学员领受洗礼 (As a Result of the 4th Weekend Catechumen Course 150 Catechumens Were Baptized), www.tj-church.org/news_show.asp?id=6237.



Xikai Cathedral, December 14–15, 2013. 150 catechumens were baptized (above), with baptismal candles lit by the godparents (center) and first Holy Communion (below). Photos: www.tj-church.org.

Table 4: Group and Individual Baptisms in the Xikai Cathedral 2013

Date 2013	Number of Persons Baptized
June 1	217
August 10	150
October 26	95
December 14	150
Individual baptism, diverse dates	155
2013 total	767

Numbers according to www.tj-church.org/news_show.asp?id=6237.

In the Diocese of Hong Kong 3,560 adults were baptized at Easter 2013. The catechumenate lasts considerably longer than in Mainland, namely 18 months (*Hong Kong Sunday Examiner* March 23).

Deceased Bishops 2013

1. Jin Luxian 金鲁贤 SJ, Aloysius (1916–2013), Shanghai
2. Liu Guandong 刘冠东, Peter (1919–2013), Yixian (Heb)
3. Liu Jinghe 刘景和, Paul (1920–2013), Tangshan (Heb)
4. Liu Jingshan 刘静山, John Baptist (1913–2013), Ningxia
5. Ma Xuesheng 马学圣, Joseph (1923–2013), Zhoucun (SD)
6. Qian Yurong 钱余荣, Thomas (1914–2013), Xuzhou (JS)

Episcopal Consecrations

No episcopal consecrations are known for 2013.

Priestly Ordinations



66 deacons were ordained priests in Mainland China in 2013 – 29 of them in Hebei Province. This number came from various sources and is certainly incomplete. There were probably additional ordinations in the underground Church which are not included in these statistics. In 2012 the relatively high number of 78 priestly ordinations was noted. In general, however, the number of priestly ordinations has dropped sharply for years.

Bishop Lucas Ly ordaining to the priesthood Frater Chen Andao who was – as the report remarks – trained in the Franciscan monastery, in Fengxiang on November 24, 2013. Report and photo: *xdo* Nov. 27.

Table 5: Priestly Ordinations in Mainland China in 2013

Diocese	Number of Ordinands	Ordination Date	Names of Ordinands
Anyang (Hen)	1	Aug. 20	Shen Qinghe 申清河
Beijing	1	June 29	Zhao Xiangdong 赵祥东
Dali (YN)	1	March 19	Yue Bangshuang 岳邦双 (Yi Nationality)
Fengxiang (SN)	1 1	Jan. 1 Nov. 24	Wang Liqiang 王利强 Chen Andao 陈安道
Handan (Heb)	6	Sept. 21	Li Shiwei 李士伟 Lu Xiwang 逯希望 Shi Xiaowang 石小望 Wang Jinliang 王金亮 Yuan Xiaowei 袁晓伟 Zhao Xilu 赵喜路
Hanzhong (SN)	1	Jan. 31	Fu Tao 付涛
Jinan (SD)	1	April 9	Yu Shuxian 于树贤
Jingxian (Heb)	4	April 25	Geng Yongqian 耿永前 Wang Xiangbo 王向博 Zhai Linyi 翟林溢 Zhang Xiaopin 张小品
Lanzhou (GS)	3	Sept. 15	Chen Hui 陈辉 Chen Zhong'ai 陈中爱 Chen Zhongcai 陈中才
Minbei (FJ)	1	Oct. 28	Pan Xiaoping 潘小平
Nanchang (JX)	1	Dec. 8	Bai Baoliang 白保亮
Nanjing (JS)	2	May 24	Wang Taiping 王太平 Zong Xuening 宗学宁
Nanning (GX)	6	May 1	Huang Jiande 黄剑德 Huang Lixian 黄立现 Lu Yehua 卢业华 Tao Riquan 陶日权 Wu Jian 吴健 Zhong Muming 钟木明
Not given (NM)	1	July 9	Du Buxing 都不兴 (Urnud Dubuxin Amur, Mongol)
Shanghai	1	Oct. 24	Xie Huimin 谢慧敏
Shijiazhuang (Zhengding, Heb)	3	Aug. 22	Liu Weibin 柳伟彬 Pei Yanning 裴亚宁 Shi Xiaoliang 师晓亮
Shuozhou (SX)	2	Aug. 6	Geng Feixiang 耿飞翔 Niu Lijun 牛立君
Taiyuan (SX)	4	Oct. 3	Liu Jianfeng 刘剑锋 Liu Jinping 刘晋平 Niu Ruigang 牛瑞刚 Wang Huanqing 王欢庆
Wanzhou (CQ)	3	May 14	Cai Mingxing 蔡明星 Lan Niansheng 兰年生 Liu Qiang 刘强
Weinan (SN)	1	May 31	Lin Fengjiang 蔺峰江
Wenzhou (ZJ)	2	May 15	Cao Guangzhun 曹光准 Zhang Yun 张云

Diocese	Number of Ordinands	Ordination Date	Names of Ordinands
Xianxian (Heb)	9	Oct. 1	Chen Wei 陈炜 Jia Yanbin 贾艳宾 Song Tianyun 宋天运 Wang Hongqing 王洪庆 Yang Guangming 杨光明 Yang Jingsi 杨静思 Zhang Changjian 张长见 Zhang Dongliang 张东良 Zhang Hongyan 张红岩
Xingtai (Heb)	3	Oct. 23	Feng Liming 冯黎明 Ren Liruo 任立若 Wang Daohan 王道涵
Yan'an (SN)	1	July 27	Luo Wei 罗伟
Zhaotong (YN)	1	March 19	Bu Shuncai 卜顺才 (Jingpo Nationality)
Zhaoxian (Heb)	5	July 25	Bai Jianmin 白建民 Bai Ziqiang 白自强 Dong Tao 董涛 Liu Mantang 刘满堂 Zhang Jianchao 张建超
Total	66		

Sources: *UCAN* March 19; *xdo* Jan. 5; April 10 and 25; May 8, 15 and 16; June 28; July 3, 12 and 29; Aug. 21 and 27; Sept. 23; Oct. 2, 4 and 30; Nov. 3 and 27; www.catholicgx.org Sept. 17 (= *xdo* Sept. 15); www.chinacath.org Sept. 29; Oct. 2 and 12; http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_500cf6040102ej2f.html.

Religious Sisters' Profession of Vows

According to data that *China heute* received from FICS, 46 religious women of various congregations in China took final vows in 2013. The actual number is probably higher. Here, too, data is lacking from congregations in the underground.



An event which has become rare also in Chinese convents: 6 sisters took their first vows after their novitiate – the sister in the middle took final vows. Congregation of the Comfort of the Holy Spirit, Diocese of Handan (Heb), May 19, 2013. Report and photo: *xdo* May 27.

Study of the BB on Kaifeng and Nanyang in Henan Province

Table 6: Situation of the Religions in Kaifeng and Nanyang (October 2011)¹⁶

	Number of sites for religious activities		Number of religious personnel		Number of faithful		Percentage of faithful in the population (%)	
	Kaifeng	Nanyang	Kaifeng	Nanyang	Kaifeng	Nanyang	Kaifeng	Nanyang
Buddhism	27	78	146	217	31.490	116.903	0,6	1,1
Daoism	13	115	25	293	4.700	147.817	0,09	1,4
Islam	64	118	64	111	80.583	131.849	1,5	1,3
Catholicism	12	10	16	37	3.999	20.114	0,07	0,2
Protestantism	297	660	587	913	98.577	248.147	1,8	2,4
Total	413	981	850 [sic]	1.571	219.349	664.830	4	6,4

Numbers according to the religious affairs bureaus of Kaifeng and Nanyang.

Henan in central China, south of the Yellow River, is considered the cradle of Chinese civilization and is the province with the third largest population in China.¹⁷ A number of dynasties had their capital city in Henan, among others in Kaifeng. After 1949 Henan played a leading role in almost all political campaigns; the Cultural Revolution was particularly bloody there. The province is known to be conservative; up until the 1990s there was resistance to far-reaching economic reforms.¹⁸ From the following it will become clear that also the religious policy in this province was particularly repressive for a long time, with far-reaching and partially unexpected consequences also for the numerical development of the religions.



Map of Henan Province.

¹⁶ According to Duan Qi 2013, p. 254, Table 1.

¹⁷ In the population census of November 2010 Guangdong (104 mill.) and Shandong (95 mill.) pushed Henan (94 mill.) from its position until then as most populous province; cf. "Communiqué of the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China on Major Figures of the 2010 Population Census [1] (No. 2)," April 29, 2011, www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201104/t20110429_26450.html.

¹⁸ For the details concerning the period after 1949, see Thomas Heberer, "Henan," in: Brunhild Staiger *et al.*, *Das große China-Lexikon*, Darmstadt 2003, here p. 301.

In Henan a team from the Institute of World Religions of CASS conducted a comparative field study in May 2012. The study concentrated on the prefecture-level cities of Kaifeng 开封 and Nanyang 南阳 – thus including not only the cities themselves but also the counties and county-level cities under their administration. The results of the study were presented in three essays of the BB and are statistically interesting. Alongside the results of their surveys in the locality, the researchers used mainly official data such as statistical data of the local religious authorities and from local chronicles, results of older studies, etc. In the following, relevant passages from the contribution of CASS researcher Duan Qi are presented, comparing the situation of the religions in the two cities.¹⁹ As a starting point she takes the figures listed in Table 6 above, which the local religious affairs bureaus had given for the five recognized religions.

In her analysis of these figures Duan Qi finds that the percentage of religious believers in the population is low [a general characteristic of government statistics on religion, while e.g. surveys on religiosity often come to different results]. She further notices that the Protestants are clearly the largest of the religious groups, the Catholics the smallest. Then she interprets the statistics and analyses the situation of the individual religious groups against the background of recent history.

Protestantism in Kaifeng and Nanyang

Protestantism is the largest and, as Duan Qi explains, also the fastest growing religion in both cities: In Kaifeng at the time of the beginning of the People's Republic there were 12 Protestant denominations with only 2,300 faithful; in 2011 there were 98,577 faithful. On the eve of the foundation of the People's Republic, Nanyang had 18,243 Protestant Christians; in 2011 there were 248,147.²⁰

Duan gives the following reasons for the rapid growth of Protestantism. Firstly, due to the continuous repression of the traditional religions in both places already from the time of the Republic and especially of folk religion and popular Buddhism and Daoism after 1949, Protestantism became a substitute for folk religion in the countryside.²¹

Secondly, Protestantism was the first religion that could work openly again after the Cultural Revolution; thus – in Duan's opinion – it was *de facto* favored by the religious policy. In Kaifeng the Three-Self-Movement was already revived in 1980. In 1984 the city of Kaifeng already had 3,000 and the counties belonging to it 27,000 Protestant Christians, and in 1985 Kaifeng had 20 churches. In Nanyang the number of Protestants in 1985 had risen to 80,825 and there were 364 Protestant sites for religious assembly. By contrast the most famous of the Buddhist temples in Kaifeng, the Daxiangguosi, re-opened only in 1992, and the first Daoist religious site did not re-open until 1999.²²

19 Duan specializes in researching Protestantism. The BB also has a report by Tang Xiaofeng on Kaifeng and one by Li Huawei on Nanyang. Li Huawei's article has many additional numerical data which partially differ from those in Duan's report.

20 Duan Qi 2011, p. 258.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 255-258.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259.

Further reasons for the rapid growth of the Protestant communities, according to Duan, are their unique missionary zeal that was not to be stopped by persecution (they alone did missionary work during the Cultural Revolution) and the general Protestant concept of common priesthood that allows the laity to take on independent responsibility. People are also attracted by the mutual helpfulness of the Christians and the diversity of their activities.²³

The relationship between government supported Three-Self-Churches (*sanzi jiaohui* 三自教会 – Duan uses this term) and unregistered house churches (*jiating jiaohui* 家庭教会) differs greatly in the two cities. As Duan writes, in Kaifeng the Three-Self-Church is stronger, the house churches weak. In Nanyang it is the other way round. In the town of Chengguan in the county of Fangcheng, for example, the Three-Self-Church according to Duan has today only one meeting place with 50 believers, while the house churches, on the other hand, have one to two hundred places with over 10,000 faithful, or according to their own account 20,000 faithful. Since the beginning of the 21st century, two of the four Three-Self-Churches in the actual city area of Nanyang were taken over by house churches. Duan Qi puts this strength of the house churches in Nanyang down to the local, particularly “leftist” religious policy of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1974 the government arrested a number of church leaders, including Zhang Rongliang [in the meantime a nationally and internationally known house church leader], which according to Duan won him great prestige among the faithful. With that – as Duan writes – the foundation for the future house churches was laid. A second wave of repression in the 1980s that was directed above all at the group of the “Shouters” but also included “normal” house church members ultimately led to a further strong growth of house churches. In the 1990s some house churches in Nanyang turned to the charismatic movement, were again opposed and won still more adherents. Duan thinks that because of that some of these house churches of Nanyang spread to the entire Province of Henan and finally to all of China. However, the CASS team also found during its visit that in the rural counties of Nanyang attendance at religious services had decreased recently due to migration to the cities. House church representatives in Fangcheng stated to Duan Qi that they are not against the government but only against the “three-fix” policy (*sanding zhengce* 三定政策 [i.e. all the communities ought to gather in fixed localities, have a specific leader and limit their activities to a specific geographic region²⁴]), because that policy is contrary to the mandate to evangelize.²⁵

Catholic Church in Kaifeng and Nanyang

The Catholic Church, according to the statistics of the local religious authorities cited in the BB, is the smallest of the five religious groups, with 3,999 faithful in Kaifeng and 20,114 in Nanyang. – Here it is to be noted that the Catholic news agency *UCAN* gives a much higher number of Catholics for Kaifeng Diocese, namely 30,000.²⁶

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 260-262.

24 See e.g. www.igfm-muenchen.de/china/religion/religion.html.

25 Duan Qi 2013, pp. 264-268.

26 <http://directory.ucanews.com/country/china/35>. For Nanyang Diocese *UCAN* estimates 20,000 baptized Catholics which more or less corresponds to the data in BB. The diocesan borders, however, are probably not identical with those of the areas administered by the prefecture-level cities of Kaifeng and Nanyang.

Before 1949 there were more Catholics than Protestants in both places, whereas today the number of Protestants is many times greater than that of the Catholics. A major reason for the current weakness of the Catholic Church in Kaifeng and Nanyang, according to Duan, is the fact that in the first years of the People's Republic it was exposed to much greater political aggression than the Protestant church. Duan describes the development using the example of Nanyang Diocese as follows: In 1947 the diocese had 44 parishes, 109 places for prayer, 371 clerics, 26,355 faithful, 7,542 catechumens, one major seminary and 15 convents, the Diocese ran 2 middle schools, 18 primary schools, 2 orphanages, a home for the aged and handicapped, as well as 11 hospitals and clinics and thus had a certain influence in society. It owned 3,000 *mu* of land, including houses in Shanghai and Wuhan. In 1958, after the political campaigns of the 1950s, only 3 churches and 6,600 faithful remained, the fathers (later bishops) Jin Dechen, Zhu Baoyu and other priests who refused to join the Patriotic Association were in labor camps. In 1981 four of these priests were arrested once more and condemned to 10 to 15 years of prison. In 1985 the diocese had 5 re-opened churches, 5 priests and 4,129 faithful. It was only in the 1990s, after the release of the imprisoned priests, that the numbers of faithful increased again.²⁷

In Duan's opinion, alongside political factors, inner-church factors also contributed to weaken the Catholic Church: Unlike the Protestants, the Catholic Church according to Duan is not faithful-centered but priest-centered, so that the coherence of the communities is endangered when priests and church buildings disappear. Since it is strongly grounded in the clans and is not so mission-oriented, lost members are not so easily replaced by new members. Added to this are the demanding hurdles for the priesthood represented by strict theological studies and celibacy, as well as the division into official and underground Church.²⁸

The relationship between the underground Church and the official Church is described by Duan as follows:²⁹ In Kaifeng the official Church is stronger. Since the death of the Patriotic Association's Bishop He Chunming in 1986 "Kaifeng still has no bishop today,"³⁰ only a diocesan leader which, however, is better than a 'self-consecrated' bishop" since – as Duan points out – this way conflicts with the Vatican can be avoided and a stable development of the diocese can be guaranteed. In Nanyang on the other hand, according to Duan, the underground Church is stronger. She attributes that to the fact that people in the diocese under the leadership of Jin Dechen resisted the Patriotic Association from the

27 Duan Qi 2013, pp. 268-270. Duan cites as main source for this paragraph the local chronicle of Nanyang: Nanyang diqu difang zhi bianweihui 南阳地区地方志编委会 (ed.), *Nanyang diqu zhi* 南阳地区志 (xia ce 下册), Henan renmin chubanshe 1994, pp. 450-453. The figures for the year 1947 appear to be partially overestimated. The Catholic *Annuaire de L'Eglise Catholique en Chine 1948* (Shanghai 1948) which gives the statistics for 1947, gives for Nanyang Diocese 22,659 Catholics, 1 bishop, 8 Chinese and 22 foreign priests, 3 foreign lay brothers, 43 Chinese and 11 foreign sisters, as well as 1,130 catechumens. For Kaifeng Diocese, it gives 18,018 Catholics, 1 bishop, 11 Chinese and 17 foreign priests, 2 foreign lay brothers, 60 Chinese and 25 foreign sisters, as well as 970 catechumens (p. 13).

28 Duan Qi 2013, p. 270.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271.

30 Bishop He Chunming (1895–1986) was consecrated in 1962 without papal permission. After his death there were bishops in the underground: Bishop Liang Xisheng (born 1923, consecrated 1989) died 2007; his successor is Bishop Gao Hongxiao OFM, secretly consecrated in 2005 and not recognized by the government. Cf. <http://directory.ucanews.com/bishops/bishop.gao/570>.

beginning and that the imprisonment of the priests only increased their esteem among the faithful. Duan writes that during the field research, underground priests in Nanyang told her that they would gladly register directly with the government but not with the Patriotic Association because that latter, as a mass organization, should not place itself above the Church and the self-election and self-consecration of the bishops contradicts Canon Law. Furthermore Duan mentions that the local government recently sought to come closer to the underground and had won over the underground Bishop Zhu Baoyu and half the priests, although Bishop Zhu resigned after “interference from the Vatican.”³¹ At this point Duan gives some of her own reflections on how the problematic of the Catholic Church could be resolved.³²

Buddhism and Daoism in Kaifeng and Nanyang

In Kaifeng Buddhism (0.6% of the population) is much stronger than Daoism (0.09%), in Nanyang it is the reverse, with 1.1% Buddhists and 1.4% Daoists. Here, too, Duan brings historical reasons.

The relative strength of Buddhism in Kaifeng is due, according to Duan, to the activity of the monk Jingyan [1891–1991] who already in the 1920s and 1930s was a figurehead of Buddhism in Kaifeng through Buddhist erudition and charitableness in the tradition of “humanistic Buddhism.” After 1949, thanks to good relations with the government, he could at first continue to work. After the Cultural Revolution he took care of the formation of young monks and nuns and led protests against the non-return of the Daxiangguosi. The Daoists in Kaifeng, however, had at the time of the reform and opening up policy no leading personalities who could take care of training a young generation of clergy or fight for the restitution of temples.³³

Nanyang has a Daoist temple of great importance, the Xuanmiaoguan, which Duan sees as a factor for the strength of Daoism in that region. In 1949 in the area belonging to the prefecture-level City of Nanyang there were 57 Daoist temples, 233 Daoist priests (*daoshi* 道士) and 39 Daoist nuns (*daogu* 道姑). After the Cultural Revolution, thanks to the close connections with Wudangshan-Daoism in neighboring Hubei, Daoism in Nanyang could be revived as early as 1979. According to Duan a leading role in that was played by the director of the health office of Nanyang County, Liu Chengshan, who in 1967 had become a “lay Daoist” of the Wudangshan. In the Nanyang area in 1985 there were 7 newly built Daoist temples, 20 reopened temples, and 48 Daoist priests living in monasteries. By 2001 there were already 65 temples open and 537 Daoist priests. Buddhism in Nanyang, on the other hand, was – according to Duan – subject to attacks already during the time of the Republic and was repressed in the early years of the People’s Republic, due to the

31 According to *UCAN* things went the other way round: Bishop Zhu Baoyu (secretly consecrated in 1995) was officially installed as recognized by the government, after the Pope had already accepted his resignation one year earlier. As *UCAN* reported further, the Bishop Coadjutor in the underground Jin Lugang and half the priests of the diocese were against the official installation of Bishop Zhu; Catholics feared divisions in the diocese (*UCAN* June 30, 2011). – Bishop Jin Dechen (consecrated in 1993) was bishop of Nanyang in the underground until his death in 2002.

32 Duan Qi 2013, pp. 270-271.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 272.

resistance of some of the clerics to the actions of the People's Liberation Army and the Communist Party. Duan describes the Buddhism in Nanyang as rural Buddhism of the mountain forests, in contrast to the "urban" Buddhism of Kaifeng. The Buddhist monks and nuns in Nanyang are on average older and less educated than those in Kaifeng. Nevertheless, the proportion of Buddhist believers among the population is considerably higher in Nanyang than it is in Kaifeng. Duan attributes that to the [political] atmosphere in Nanyang being altogether more favorable for the religions and there being more believers in Buddhism among the rural population.³⁴

Islam in Kaifeng and Nanyang

The Muslims in Kaifeng and Nanyang are predominantly of Islamic Chinese-speaking Hui nationality. They are a relatively high percentage of the population, 1.5% in Kaifeng and 1.3% in Nanyang. As Duan writes, Islam came to Kaifeng and Nanyang very early and is closely knitted to the Chinese culture there; many of the Hui also pay attention to Fengshui, for example.

The observations of the CASS researchers regarding the relationship of the Muslims to the other religions are interesting. In Kaifeng they found a good number of Buddhists among the Hui population. This is seen to be due to the aid activities of the Buddhists under Master Jingyan for impoverished Hui during the time of the Republic. According to Duan in Kaifeng the relations between Hui and Catholics are also very good; Hui concealed the Sacred Heart statue of the latter during the Cultural Revolution. In Nanyang there are Hui who are even clerics of other religions, Buddhist or Daoist monks or Protestant pastors. In Nanyang conversions of Hui to Protestant Christianity are relatively frequent. This phenomenon of conversion, that would be quite unusual among Muslims in Northwest China, shows in Duan Qi's estimation that the Hui in both localities are relatively open-minded, but on the other hand it also shows that their religious bond with Islam is comparatively weak.

On that point, however, according to Duan there are differences between Kaifeng and Nanyang. In Kaifeng the traditional faith is preserved more completely because the Hui there live very close together. The Muslims in Kaifeng are concerned about plans to refurbish the Old City for tourism, because it is not clear what will become of the Old City mosques [and the Moslem population living around it]. In Nanyang, on the other hand, the Muslims have always lived scattered among the Han, have taken on Han customs to a great extent and there are more mixed marriages. The rate of conversion among the Hui there is consequently higher than in Kaifeng, especially conversion to the Protestant Christianity that is rapidly spreading in the region. In the meantime, Duan reports, some pious Muslims in Nanyang are trying to stem the "phenomenon of leaving the religion" ("chujiao xianxiang" 出教现象) through mosque education, Islamic marriage mediation, etc. and to win back Muslims who have become estranged from Islam.³⁵

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 273-275.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

With regard to Islamic schools there are also differences. The Muslims in Kaifeng belong in the main to the two traditional schools of Chinese Islam, the Gedimu and the Yihe-wani.³⁶ According to Duan, both schools reject the Salafiyya who do have some adherents in Kaifeng but no mosque. In Nanyang, on the other hand, the Salafiyya is spreading very rapidly. According to Duan that is due to the fact that in Nanyang the Moslem economy is less developed so that the Muslims depend on funds from outside for the renovation and building of mosques. Since the 1990s some new mosques were built with the help of Salafist Muslims from outside. In Nanyang, writes Duan, the Muslims do not have such a pronounced consciousness of affinity to a specific school of Islam as in Northwest China and for the majority it is all the same to which school their ahong belongs. Thus, in 1999 for example, the Hui in Niuzhuang accepted the fact that the Salafiyya took over their mosque which originally belonged to the Gedimu school.³⁷

The significant Jewish community that existed in Kaifeng from the Northern Song Era (960–1126) is not mentioned in the BB. This community disappeared later through assimilation into the Chinese environment; the Jews of Kaifeng are not recognized as a religion or ethnic minority by the Chinese government.

In the end Duan Qi – like her colleague Li Huawei, whose supplementary report on Nanyang is also to be found in the BB – comes to the conclusion that the very unequal situation of the religions in Kaifeng and Nanyang they ascertained is due in first place to the repressive religious policy. Religion is a spiritual, human need, writes Duan, and the attempt to repress it leads in the long run to opposite and unintended results. In her opinion, the government also ought to recognize that the leading religious personalities “cannot be replaced in their role towards the faithful by government officials.”³⁸

Both authors mention that the local policy towards religion has relaxed in recent times. That has eased the tensions between government, Protestant house churches and Catholic underground Church, in the opinion of Duan.³⁹ Li Huawei, on the other hand, who had visited Nanyang previously in 2009, found in 2012 that the policy had not basically changed. He gave one example: In 2012 the researchers noticed to their surprise that the local religious affairs bureau had confiscated the seal of the two official Protestant committees. Consequently, the Protestant representatives had to go to the religious affairs bureau each time they needed to stamp a document, sometimes they had to go several times for one stamp. In such a way – as Li ascertained – even the Protestants who originally supported the government were also alienated from it.⁴⁰

36 Gedimu 格地目 (Qadim) is the oldest school of Islam in China and has incorporated many elements of Chinese culture, in contrast to the Yihewani 伊赫瓦尼 (Ikhwani) movement, which originated in China at the end of the 19th century. On the Islamic groups in China, see among others Wang Jianping, “Einheit in Vielfalt. Wiederaufleben des Islam im heutigen China” (Unity in Diversity. Resurgence of Islam in Today’s China), in: *China heute* 2003, No. 6, pp. 227-234.

37 Duan Qi 2013, p. 277.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

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