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For more than two solid hours, the 2217 delegates to the 17th Communist Party Congress, held in Beijing in October in October of 2007, listened to the speech of HU Jintao, the Head of State and leader of the party. The speech laid out once again, as expected, the ideology of the party. Once again, the communist party’s hold on power was stressed as a guarantee for a secure future. What didn’t escape the attention of those hearers who happened to be awake, was that among the standard ‘party words’, there were also sprinkled here and there some other words that seemed to hint at more freedom and a greater flexibility in dealings with concrete everyday reality. President HU spoke of the democratic participation of the population and of their responsibility for the wellbeing of the nation. He spoke of socialism with Chinese features. Some of his words even seem to provide the justification for certain concessions to capitalistic thinking. But the foundations of socialism aren’t being rattled just yet. Under his leadership, all forces are to be joined together so that, together, they may cooperate in the building up of a “harmonious society”, in which all can live in peace and prosperity. One is tempted to ask whether such a speech in merely an expression of wishful thinking, or whether a realistic political option is being offered here for a way into the future.
The place of religion in today’s China
In this connection, religiously oriented men and women will certainly pose the so-called “Gretchen question”: “What is our connection with religion?” Where does religion have its place? In fact, during the course of HU Jintao’s monumental speech there was one brief mention of religion under the 6th topic, when he was speaking about the development and consolidation of socialism. It would have been difficult not to have made any reference at all to religion at a time when, for many people in China, the business of taking a good look at religion is steadily gaining in importance. From the point of the view of the Party, however, and that was plain for all to hear from the words of the Party Secretary, religion has importance solely insofar as it can offer a contribution to the economic and social development of the country, and even at that, only when it is in line with the directives issued by the Party.
And herewith are given the outlines of today’s Chinese policies concerning religion. Under Article 35 – “Freedom of religious belief” – the concept of religious freedom was inserted into the Constitution in 1982. There, it is stated that a citizen is free to believe or not to believe. Among the five religious bodies officially recognized as religions by the State are: Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam, but also Catholicism and Protestantism. This means that Christianity, as such, is not recognized as a religion according to the today’s government policies on religion. Christianity is only recognized as a religion insofar as it is expressed in one of its two manifestations, the Catholic and the Protestant.
The State pretty much limits the radius of action of the religious communities to the internal church sphere, and demands of them ideological submission, especially “adaptation to socialism” and “patriotism”. The State reserves for itself stringent control over the leadership and the activities of the individual religions. All places of worship and all “religious personnel” must be officially registered. In the organizations which it has erected (e.g., Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association), the State intervenes massively in the administration of individual communities and in dioceses, in the appointment to various church offices, in the theological formation of church personnel, and in many other areas. The responsible leaders, and all future leaders who are in the process of formation, are obliged to take part in regular ideological education sessions. Foreign contacts are strictly monitored. Despite all of this, in all five of the recognized religions, groups have formed which refuse to accept these strict limits and the not so benign control of the official State organs. They refuse to register, and they refuse to work together with the State. They are therefore considered by the authorities as “illegal” and through their refusal expose themselves to persecution. In many areas of China, these “unofficial groups” of an officially recognized religion are even numerically stronger than those belonging to the registered communities. Some times, and in some places, the authorities treat these “illegal” groups with varying degrees of tolerance. At other times, and in other places, the groups are persecuted and repressed with varying degrees of harshness. Their places of assembly are torn down as “illegal constructions”, the organizers are either fined or are forcibly arrested and summarily condemned to jail sentences by the security forces. The Christian churches are no exception to this rule. Among the Catholics one generally refers to the so-called “underground churches”, among the Protestants, the resistant groups are called “house churches”.
The development of the government’s religious policies after the seizure of power by the communists in 1949
The situation of Christianity as a religion in today’s China that has been outlined above is the result of a long historical development which had its beginning with the seizure of power by the communists in 1949. After the founding of the PR of China, the declared policy of the communist regime was to eradicate religion altogether. Christianity, more than the others, with its institutions and its large number of foreign personnel, was made the object of persecution and outright annihilation as an “instrument of imperialism” of the Western powers. Foreign missionaries were deported, the Apostolic Nunciature (the official representation of the Holy See) was closed in 1951 and the Nuncio, Archbishop Riberi, was deported. Chinese priests and protestant pastors suddenly found themselves either in prisons or in concentration camps where many were subjected to tremendous mistreatment or were simply murdered. Church property was either destroyed, confiscated, or put to other uses. The faithful were left entirely to themselves. And what happened then was something that no one ever dared to expect. in the face of all planned policies of annihilation that could be thought up by an atheistic regime, the faith of these Christians lived on, and through them continued to spread, thanks to the very dynamism and vitality of their faith.
That the Christian faith had survived in the hearts of the people was something that could not remain hidden from the security forces for very long. The realization finally began to dawn on them: It is simply not possible to annihilate Christianity and its churches. With this realization, the regime’s religious policies entered into a new phase. Christianity and the churches could continue to exist, but only as tools of the State and of the communist party, and under its direct control. The Christian churches were subsequently recognized as autonomous, national churches, independent of every outside influence. On the government level, the responsibility for all religious matters was transferred to the “Bureau for Religious Affairs”. Under its direction, however, the individual religions only were granted an internal organization as administrative institutions. Despite the fact that they were declared to be bridges between the religious communities and the regime, they gradually began to function as an independent organization, which appropriated for itself a position of power which didn’t originally belong to it. For the Catholic Church, this “bridge function” was assumed by the Patriotic Association (founded in 1957), for the Protestants it was taken on by the “Patriotic Three-Self-Movement” (founded in 1951).
Thus, for the Catholic Church the regime demanded the total separation from the Pope as leader of the Universal Church. Tied together with that was the requirement that the selection and consecration of Bishops be totally independent of Rome. With these provisions it was inevitable that there would be a split between those who wished to remain loyal to the Pope in order to remain Catholic, and those who believed, out of a sense of pastoral concern for the faithful, that it was somehow acceptable to allow themselves be drawn into compromises with the demands made by the regime. Among the Catholics, it was simply impossible to avoid a split into an “official Church” and an “underground Church”. Among the Protestants, in addition to the official “Patriotic Three-Self-Movement”, there soon arose the phenomenon of the so-called “house churches”, made up of Christians who simply wished to live out their faith free from state control of any kind. Both the Catholic underground movement and the Protestant house churches have become the thorn in the eye of the State, and until today no attempt has been spared on the part of the regime to either root them out entirely, or to bring them back under its control. The hardest test for the Christian churches came during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). As the violence and vandalism during this period reached their peak, even the official churches were not spared persecution. But the Christian faith survived even this difficult time, above all due to the great cohesiveness of the Chinese family. The faith emerged from this persecution even stronger than before.
The greater openness and liberalization of China in the 1980s also meant a certain political relaxation for the religions and more room for freedom in religious activities. Christian community life became more visible, church property was at least in part gradually handed back by the regime. The rebuilding could begin. The Christian churches attempted to use fully this newly expanded freedom for growth, both inner and towards the outside world. The number of the faithful increased considerably. The faith witness of the convinced Christians awakened great interest among many people who were trying to find their footing and were searching for some orientation in their lives. The communist regime could not help but see with their own eyes this growing desire among the people for religion and for Christianity. They once again suddenly became aware that the phenomenon of religion posed a great challenge to them. In order to guard against the danger of a too great influence of religion, to the detriment of the party’s position of power, it was in their interest to take decisive measures to strengthen their control. Among these was the tendency to channel the powers of religion in a more forceful fashion under the banner of Patriotism for the benefit of the new socialism “with Chinese features”.
At a conference on religious activity held in Beijing in 2001, sponsored by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Beijing city council, reference was once again made to a text in the Constitution which was supposed to serve as both a warning and as an orientation: “Normal religious activities and the legal rights and interests of religious groupings enjoy protection. Administrative handling by the state with regard to religious affairs is moving towards consolidation within the scope of law. But anyone who becomes involved in divisive and illegal activities under the banner of religion will be severely punished”. It is not explained here, however, just what is really meant by ‘normal activities’. In the further text of the conference it is then stressed that the adaptation of religion to socialist society is to be further strengthened. Leading personages belonging to religious circles and the majority of the believers are called to engage themselves in this modernization process.
And so the final result were new „regulations for religious affairs “, which became binding for all religions as Regulation No. 426 of the Council of State of the People's Republic of China, beginning March 1, 2005. What is at stake here is a ‘regulation’ in seven chapters and 48 articles, which it must be noted is not a ‘law’ in the strict sense. It would be beyond the scope of this article to go too much into detail. Much remains unclear. The doors are wide open for misunderstandings and also for abuse in the implementation of this ‘regulation’. The regime did manage, however, to achieve a double purpose. On one side, the practice of religious activities is protected from attacks from above, on the other side, the authorities now have an official handle with which they can proceed against “unregistered” groups and individuals, but also against the activities of these groups – all within a perfectly legal framework. But the intensity with which this “accommodation” is handled by local authorities differs very much from place to place. And so we come once again to the arrests of both Protestants as well as Catholics in leadership positions when they refuse to submit themselves to the control of government supervision. Yet. the fact of the matter is, as recent events have frequently shown, the appointment of Bishops who now have the approval of both the State and of the Vatican indicates that the authorities are finally taking a more pragmatic attitude in the treatment of this question.
Although the religious policies of the PR China have, over the course of recent decades, slowly enlarged the framework for the free exercise of religion, they remain nonetheless far, far behind what the rest of the world considers as a fundamental human right when it speaks of “religious freedom”. Yet it must by all means be recognized that the State has really been trying to make for itself an objective picture of the real essence of Christianity and its history. In the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences and in a whole series of other universities, there are now centers for research in Christianity, where genuine scholars, who are to be taken seriously, have been occupying themselves intensively with the phenomenon of Christianity, and have also been publishing the results of their studies.
It remains hoping that will lead these realizations and the concrete work of the Christian churches particularly within the social range to the promotion of an open dialog between representatives of the government and the Christian churches, for which for all Christians the practice of their religion on the basis of justice and freedom makes possible.
We can only hope that their findings, as well as the concrete work of the Christian churches, especially in the area of their social commitment, will gradually not only make possible, but will actually lead to an open dialogue between representatives of the regime and the Christian churches, which will make the practice of religion for all Christians something that rests on a foundation of justice and freedom. Yet at present this does not appear to be the way that things will work out, with the former “foreign body” and “trouble maker” suddenly becoming a “partner” that is to be taken seriously in the building together up of a “harmonious society”.
Meanwhile, in the form of over 50 million Bibles which have in recent years been printed and distributed, as well as in the witness of more than 60 million believing Christians of both confessions (estimate), despite all obstacles, the Word of God continues to make its way into the hearts of men and women in even the most far flung corners of this immense country. The Word of God is – as expressed in a traditional Chinese proverb – like the water which patiently makes its way around all obstacles, and in the end finds its way to the sea.
Fr. Anton Weber SVD, Director of the China-Zentrum
Source: Zeitzeichen - evangelische Kommentare zu Religion und Gesellschaft, März 2008, S. 30-32.